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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the continuation behavior of prior service Selected Marine 
Corps Reserve (SMCR) unit members in the grades of E3 to E5 and examines the effect 
of activation post-9/11 on 12-month continuation rates.  The effect of monetary 
incentives is estimated and other significant predictors of continuation identified. 
Data were collected from the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) for all 
Selected Reserve (SelRes) members who served between August 31, 2001 and October 
31, 2009.  Limited data to determine service history were collected from December 31, 
1994 to July 31, 2001.  Two probit regression models were estimated for the three tour 
lengths of 4-, 12- and 24-months.  The models included explanatory variables for 
activation in support of a contingency operation, bonuses, economic conditions, ability, 
person-job fit, military experience, and demographics.  Two additional models were 
estimated to isolate the effects of prior reserve experience in the active and Reserve 
Components (RC). 
Factors having positive effects on continuation were activation frequency, 
bonuses, the unemployment rate, prior RC experience, tour length, and multiple tours.  
Negative influencers on continuation included activation length, deploying outside the 
continental U.S., unexcused absence from drill, being female, being married, and being 
older. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
As depicted in Figure 1, the Marine Corps failed to meet its congressionally 
mandated Selected Reserve (SelRes) end strength of 39,600 during fiscal years (FY) 
2007 and 2008.  In 2009, SelRes end strength exceeded the three percent lower limit, but 
fell 0.1 percentage point below this mark when calculating active duty operation support 
(ADOS) adjustments required by U.S. Code 10, § 115.  Missing end strength may have 
partly resulted from the active component initiative to “Grow the Force” to 202,000 
Marines, which targeted prior service Marines.  However, frequent post-9/11 activations 
also may have impacted retention.  Moreover, reserve retention has not been historically 
managed even though it has increased significantly over the past several years. 
 
3% lower limit (38,412)









































Source:  author, based on Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) data
SelRes Strength, Post-9/11
 
Figure 1.   SelRes Monthly Strength (30 September 2001–30 September 2009) 
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Due to these trends, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) for the first time assigned a 
retention goal for Marine Forces Reserve (MarForRes) units beginning in FY2010.   
The aim of this thesis is to identify the effect of several factors on the 
continuation of prior service Marines serving in MarForRes units.  The thesis focuses on 
the effect activation in support of contingency operations.  Additionally, the effect of 
affiliation and reenlistment bonuses, and other significant predictors of attrition, are 
evaluated to assist M&RA in improving the SelRes end strength model used by the 
Reserve Affairs Personnel Plans and Policy (RAP) branch to develop the annual 
recruiting mission and newly developed retention goal.   
B. BACKGROUND 
1. End Strength 
Annually, Congress mandates the SelRes end strength in § 411 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).  For FY2002 and FY2003, the mandate was 39,558 
Marines.1  Beginning in FY2004, the SelRes end strength requirement has remained at 
39,600 Marines.2  In practice, Congress allows the services a three percent variance in 
end strength as of September 30 of each year at the discretion of the Secretary of 
Defense.3  Prior to FY2008, this variance was limited to two percent.  Using the current 
(FY2010) end strength authorization, this allows the Marine Corps flexibility of 
maintaining end strength between a ceiling of 40,788 Marines and a floor of 38,412 
Marines.  As Figure 1 illustrates, the Marine Corps failed to both meet this target during 
the past two fiscal years and to achieve the two percent floor (of 38,808) the year 
previous. 
                                                 
1 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Public Law 107-107, § 411(a)(4), U.S. 
Statutes at Large 115 (2001). 
2 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Public Law 108-136, § 411(a)(4), U.S. 
Statutes at Large 117 (2003). 
3 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181, § 417, U.S. Statutes 
at Large 122 (2008), codified at U.S. Code 10 (2010), § 115(f)(3).  
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2. Continuation Rates 
As outlined in previous research by Kirby, et al., defining attrition for the 
Reserves is a complex issue and prone to measurement errors and misinterpretation.4  
Similar problems are encountered in analyses of retention.  For instance, a personnel loss 
in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units is not necessarily considered 
attrition for the Marine Corps as a Total Force because the personnel loss could become a 
gain for other components of the SelRes, such as the Active Reserve or the Individual 
Mobilization Augmentees.5  Alternatively, this same individual may enlist in the active 
component (AC) or transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve, Retired Reserve, or 
Standby Reserve.  To avoid this confusion, throughout this thesis continuation rates will 
be used to analyze the behavior of prior service personnel.  In general, continuation rates 
take a snapshot of personnel at one point in time and then determine if these same 
personnel remain in the same training category pay group (TCPG) at a future point.6  
As depicted in Table 1, overall SelRes continuation rates remained fairly steady 
between 2001 and 2008, varying by just over one percentage point from the mean for this 
period.  However, Table 1 also shows that continuation rates for Reserve personnel 
assigned to SMCR units have varied by over two percentage points from the mean, while 
prior service continuation rates have varied by nearly four percentage points from the 
mean. Overall, the mean dropped by nearly 2.5 percentage points for prior service 
personnel in SMCR units (from 68.29 to 65.86 percent) when comparing the first three 
years to the last three years. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Sheila Nataraj Kirby, David W. Grissmer, and Priscilla M. Schlegel, “Reassessing Enlisted Reserve 
Attrition: A Total Force Perspective,” N-3521-RA, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 5–6, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3521/ (accessed August 14, 2009).  
5 The terms Selected Reserve and Selected Marine Corps Reserve can be used interchangeably. 
However, SelRes typically signifies the entire Selected Reserve, while SMCR typically implies Selected 
Marine Corps Reserve units. To avoid confusion, I have designated the term SelRes to refer to the entire 
Selected Reserve and SMCR units to refer only to units of the SelRes. 
6 TCPG will be defined later in Chapter II, Reserve Organization and Structure for the Ready Reserve 
and Active Status List. 
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2002  80.77 86.79 70.38 
2003  79.88 85.22 67.18 
2004  81.27 87.83 67.32 
2005  80.46 85.39 63.48 
2006  79.49 84.92 64.39 
2007  80.00 85.66 65.94 
2008  79.95 84.72 67.24 
Average  80.26 85.79 66.56   
3. Importance of Retaining Prior Service Marines 
Although generally accounting for only 25 percent of reserve unit end strength, 
prior service personnel are a critical component of readiness for several reasons.  First, 
unlike non-prior service (NPS), prior service Marines have already completed entry-level 
training.  Not only does this save critical training dollars, these Marines are able to make 
an immediate impact on SMCR units, whereas nearly 11 percent of NPS personnel are in 
the initial accession training pipeline.  In addition, prior service Marines are normally 
recruited as non-commissioned officers (NCO) providing higher average levels of 
productivity than NPS recruits. 
More importantly, prior service Marines augment SMCR units with active duty 
experience, often involving combat since 9/11, which greatly increases the warfighting 
capability of the units in which they serve.  Lastly, continuation of prior service Marines 




                                                 
7 Based on TFDW Data. 
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This significant impact of prior service personnel on Reserve unit readiness “led 
to the passage of Title XI—The Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act” of 
1992 over concerns of low Army National Guard readiness during Operations Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm.8  The bill specifically states, 
The Secretary of the Army shall have an objective of increasing the 
percentage of qualified prior active-duty personnel in the Army National 
Guard to 65 percent, in the case of officers, and to 50 percent, in the case 
of enlisted members, by September 30, 1997.9 
However, prior service Marines create greater instability and turnover in units 
because they do not incur a service obligation.  Since reserve enlistment contracts only 
obligate individuals to serve in the Ready Reserve, prior service Marines are free to leave 
their SMCR units without consequence, unless they are contracted to serve by other 
means, such as an affiliation bonus, receipt of additional training, or involuntary 
activation orders.  As shown in Figure 2, prior service strength in SMCR units has 
dropped more rapidly than unit strength, and, as a share of overall unit strength, has 
dropped by over six percentage points since 2001. 
                                                 
8 Richard Buddin and Sheila Nataraj Kirby, “Enlisted Personnel Trends in the Selected Reserve, 1986–
1994,” MR-681/2-OSD, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 3. 
9 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Public Law 102-484, § 1111, U.S. Statutes 














































SMCR unit Prior Service
Source:  author, based on TFDW data
SMCR Unit Strength, post-9/11
 
Figure 2.   Comparison of Overall Unit End Strength and Prior Service Contribution 
For instance, the percentage of prior service Marines in units in 2001 stood at nearly 29.7 
percent, but sharply decreased to just over 20 percent by 2007 and stood at 23.6 on 
September 30, 2009.  During this same time period, continuation of prior service 
personnel in the critical ranks of lance corporal through sergeant decreased from 62.6 
percent to 54.8.  If this trend continues, filling the ranks of SNCO with high quality 
personnel in the future will become increasingly difficult.   
4. Increased Utilization of the Marine Corps Reserve 
Since the mobilization of Reserve Forces in 1990 for Operations Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm, the Marine Corps Reserve has transitioned from a strategic reserve 
to a post-Cold War operational reserve.  As Figure 3 shows, the Deputy Commandant for 
Plans, Policies and Operations regularly identifies Reserve battalions in the Marine Corps 
Force Generation Model for deployment in the Global War on Terror.  On average, 6,927 
SelRes Marines per month have served on activation orders since September 11, 2001, 
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Figure 3.   Frequency of SelRes Activations, Post-9/11 
Previous research has indicated that activation has a positive impact on the 
continuation rates of Reserve Marines.  However, given the expectation of continuing 
frequent SMCR unit activations, it is unclear if this positive trend will continue or if the 
activation effect on prior service Marines differs from the overall impact on the entire 
Reserve force.    
5. Transition to Lump Sum Bonuses 
Beginning in FY2006, the Marine Corps began offering lump sum reenlistment 
bonus payments to prior service SMCR unit Marines, as authorized in the 2005 National 
Defense Authorization Act.  According to a 2004 study by the Center for Naval Analysis 
(CNA), the use of a lump sum bonus would be more cost effective given the high 
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personal discount rates of enlisted Marines.10  Thereafter, a 2006 CNA study suggested 
revisiting this issue once enough time had passed to obtain and analyze changes to 
attrition behavior under this new payment plan.11 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Unlike the vast majority of previous research on reserve attrition, this thesis 
focuses on the continuation of the prior service SMCR unit population in grades E3 to 
E5.  For the majority of the statistical analysis, data was obtained from TFDW covering 
the period August 2001 to October 2009.  Bonus and incentive data was provided by 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs, while the Center for Naval Analysis provided seasonally 
adjusted monthly unemployment rate data tabulated from the U.S. Bureau of Labor and 
Statistics.  Unfortunately, incomplete bonus data during FY2006 and FY2007 limit a 
complete analysis of the retention effect of the transition to lump sum incentive 
payments. 
Using 12-month continuation rates for SMCR unit prior service Marines, I 
employ a standard multivariate statistical model to analyze the effect of activation and 
bonuses on continuation rates.  Additionally, this research identifies other statistically 
significant predictors of continuation, including marital status, gender, age, rank, 
unexcused absences, satisfactory years towards retirement, and prior Reserve service.  It 
should be kept in mind that given the narrow focus on rank and the SMCR unit prior 
service population, caution should be given in applying these results to the continuation 
behavior of the entire SelRes.  
                                                 
10 Anita Hattiangadi, Deena Ackerman, Theresa Kimble, and Aline Quester, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Lump Sum Bonuses for Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C Reenlistments: Final Report,” CRM 
D0009652.A4/1REV, (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2004), 56–57. The discount rate observed for active 
component Marines was 154.6 percent in Zone A, 18.5 percent in Zone B, and 14.3 percent in Zone C, 
while the government’s official discount rate was 4.75 percent.  
11 Anita Hattiangadi and Ann Parcell with David Gregory and Ian MacLeod, “SelRes Attrition and the 
Selected Reserve Incentive Program in the Marine Corps Reserve,” CRM D0013618.A2/Final, 
(Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2006), 94.  
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D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Determining the effects of activation, monetary incentives, and other predictors of 
prior service SMCR unit continuation rates is the goal of this study.  Chapter II continues 
the introduction and background with a review of Reserve organization and structure with 
an emphasis on the SelRes.   
Together, Chapters III–V compose the literature review.  Chapter III discusses the 
motivation for an individual to stay in a unit that is scheduled for activation in the near 
future, Chapter IV reviews theoretical models of attrition in the literature, and Chapter V 
provides a synopsis of historical characteristics and predictors of attrition in prior 
research on the SelRes.   
In Chapters VI–VIII, I will present the data, methodology, analysis, results, and 
conclusions.  Chapter VI specifies the models and describes the data and variables used 
in the multivariate model.  Chapter VII provides the results of the analysis and presents 
potential applications of those results.  Chapter VIII presents conclusions and 
recommendations for further research. 
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II. RESERVE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE 
 A. INTRODUCTION  
As stated in the Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual, “The 
Reserve Component (RC) is an integral part of the Total Force Marine Corps and 
provides augmentation and reinforcement in times of war or national emergency.”12   
The Marine Corps Reserve complements the Marine Corps operating 
forces structure and capabilities… [and] provides the added capability, 
flexibility, and depth that is the foundation for our sustainment at any level 
of recall or mobilization.  Total Force integration is the dominant theme 
for all Reserve planning, training, and administration.13 
The RC is “organized, administered, trained, and equipped under the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps” with the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and 
Reserve Affairs (DC M&RA) as the principal staff officer.   
The Director, Reserve Affairs Division (Dir RA) is the principal advisor to 
DC M&RA on all manpower matters pertaining to the RC.  The Dir RA is 
responsible for the development, review, promulgation, coordination, 
monitoring, administration, and oversight of Reserve manpower plans, 
policies, and programs on readiness, training, operations, budget, and 
structure necessary to meet Total Force Marine Corps manpower 
requirements.14  
B. COMPONENTS 
As shown in Figure 4, the three major components of the Marine Corps Reserve 
include the Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve.15  As of September 
30, 2009, the total Reserve force consisted of nearly 227,000 Marines to include over 
132,200 retired, approximately 1,200 Marines in the Standby Reserve, and over 93,400 
                                                 
12 “Marine Corps Reserve Administration Management Manual,” MCO 1001R.1K, (Quantico: VA, 
U.S. Department of the Navy, 2009), 3. 
13 Ibid., 3. 
14 Ibid. 
15 The structure and organization of the Marine Corps Reserve is based on the Armed Forces Reserve 
Act of 1952, Public Law 82-476, U.S. Statutes at Large 66 (1952). 
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Marines serving in the Ready Reserve.  In comparison, the Total Force, which includes 
both the active component (AC) and the RC, totaled just under 430,000 Marines.   
 
 
Figure 4.   Components of the Marine Corps Reserve16  
1. Ready Reserve 
The Ready Reserve is composed of both the Selected Reserve (SelRes) and the 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).  Together, they comprise the bulk of Reserves ready for 
immediate activation in a time of War or national emergency.  During the past 10 years, 
the Ready Reserve strength has hovered around 100,000 Marines.  However, this number  
                                                 
16 MCO 1001R.1K, Figure 1–1. 
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has dropped recently as fewer Marines departed the AC in response to the 202k “Grow 
the Force” initiative.  Figure 5 depicts the changes in Ready Reserve end strength 
between 2001 and 2009 by each of its various sub-components.  
a. Individual Ready Reserve 
The IRR is the largest sub-component of the Ready Reserve and serves as 
the primary recruiting population for prior service Marines.  As such, demographic 
changes in the IRR are of concern and directly affect the viability of sourcing the SelRes 
with critical prior service experience.  Marines assigned to the IRR typically fall into 
three categories: (1) Marines who have not completed their initial military service 
obligation (MSO) required by U.S. Code 10, § 651, (2) Marines who voluntarily remain 
in the IRR after completing their MSO, and (3) Marines actively participating in orders 












Source:  author, based on TFDW data
Sep 2001 Sep 2009
 
Figure 5.   Comparison of Ready Reserve Strength by Sub-component (2001–2009)17 
                                                 
17 Official SelRes end strength for 2009 as reported by Manpower and Reserve Affairs differs by 24 
due to the inclusion of pending joins and drops as of September 30. (Total Force Data Warehouse [TFDW] 
data collection cycle runs at the end of the month. Pending and retroactive diary actions are identified on 
the following end of month cycle). 
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The IRR population is identified and approved as a manpower pool for 
activation by the Deputy Commandant Plans, Policies and Operations (DC PP&O) under 
the cognizance of the Secretary of Defense.  Upon authorization by DC PP&O, IRR 
manpower requirements are sourced by DC M&RA.  Prior to and after activation, 
Mobilization Command (MOBCOM) administers the IRR under the direction and 
guidance of DC M&RA.    
b. Selected Reserve 
The SelRes comprises that part of the Ready Reserve, which regularly 
trains in support of its wartime mission.  As depicted in Figure 6, the SelRes consists of 
the Active Reserve (AR), IMA, SMCR units, and accessing Marines categorized as Initial 
Active Duty for Training (IADT).  As previously mentioned, these four sub-components 
combine to form the total SelRes end strength authorization of 39,600; however, only the 
AR end strength is individually legislated by Congress. 
(1)  Active Reserve.  The AR is a full-time active duty program 
whose purpose is to organize, administer, recruit, instruct, train and integrate the RC 
under the cognizance of DC M&RA.  The AR end strength of 2,261 is prescribed 
annually by Congress in § 412 of the National Defense Authorization Act and is included 
in the total SelRes end strength.18 
(2)  Individual Mobilization Augmentees.  IMAs are regularly 
drilling SelRes members assigned to an AC organization and who activate as individuals 
under DC PP&O authority.  Similar to the IRR, when not on active duty, IMAs are 
administered to by MOBCOM under the program management of Dir RA.  Per MCO 
1001.62, individuals may not serve in the same IMA organization for more than three to 
five years before transferring to a different AC organization or Ready Reserve sub-
component for a period of at least one year.  As shown in Figure 5, IMA end strength has 
nearly doubled since 2001 as IMA structure and paid billets have increased.19 
                                                 
18 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, § 412, U.S. Statutes 
at Large 123 (2009). 
19 Prior to Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS) end strength accounting procedures required by 
10 U.S.C. §115(b)(2)(B), FY09 IMA end strength stood at 3,053 Marines. 
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(3)  Selected Marine Corps Reserve Units.  SMCR units comprise 
the largest portion of SelRes end strength and are organized into the 4th Marine Division 
(4th MarDiv), 4th Marine Logistics Group (4th MLG), and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing (4th 
MAW) with the exception of force level units, which are organized directly under the 
Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (ComMarForRes).  
(4)  Initial Active Duty for Training.  IADT includes those SelRes 
individuals who have yet to complete their initial accession training and are not eligible 
for deployment outside the continental Unites States.  
c. Volatility of the Ready Reserve 
The Marine Corps actively manages the entire Ready Reserve and 
transitions between the IRR and SelRes are seamlessly accomplished via the Marine 
Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) of pay and personnel management.  Although one 
single career path does not exist, the majority of Marines navigate multiple sub-
components of the Ready Reserve during their active service.  As an example, a Marine 
may begin his career in the AC before transferring to the IRR upon his honorable 
discharge from active duty.  After one to two years, which is quite common,20 he may 
join an SMCR unit, activate, and remain with that unit for several years.  Later, he may 
decide to return to the IRR and continue to qualify for retirement using a litany of 
retirement point options.21  Thereafter, he might drill with an AC staff or other unit as an 
IMA, while serving several relatively short periods of active duty using local Active Duty 
Operational Support (ADOS) funding, or longer orders in support of a contingency 
operation, before returning to an SMCR unit.  These transactions may continue until he is 
either discharged or retires.   
                                                 
20 Anita Hattiangadi, “SelRes Attrition and the Selected Reserve Incentive Program,” 71. Between 
1997 and 2005, over 40 percent of AC Marines discharged to the IRR remained there for a period 
exceeding one year before joining the SelRes.   
21 Computation of retirement points is codified at U.S. Code 10 (2010), § 12732. In general, a Marine 
earns one point per day on active duty, one point per inactive duty period, one point for participating in 
funeral honors duty, 15 points for membership (while in an active status), and one point per period of 
appropriate, associate, or equivalent duty as depicted in Table 9–1 of MCO 1001R.1K. Thus, a Reserve 
may participate in the Reserve and qualify for retirement without joining the SelRes.  
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Often, this varied career path, which involves obtaining a wealth of 
knowledge and experience in multiple units and organizations while maintaining 
satisfactory participation requirements, enables a Marine’s competitiveness for promotion 
to higher rank.  However, unlike the AC, each Marine must actively manage his own 
career.  This, combined with a need to balance civilian career opportunities and 
requirements increases the volatility of service in the Ready Reserve.  
2. Standby Reserve 
As depicted in Figure 5, the Standby Reserve includes both the Active Status List 
(ASL) and Inactive Status List (ISL).  Together, these two sub-components comprised 
less than one percent of the total Marine Corps Reserve as of 30 September 2009, and 
included only four enlisted Marines.  
a. Active Status List 
Per MCO 1001R.1K, the ASL generally consists of Marines designated as 
key federal employees and those Marines for whom hardship or other reason renders 
them incapable of participating in training on a regular basis; however, they intend to 
return to the Ready Reserve in the future.  Members of the ASL remain in an active status 
for promotion and retirement purposes and must maintain at least 27 points annually to 
remain a satisfactory participant, though they are ineligible for pay.  As of September 30, 
2009, the ASL end strength consisted of 18 Marines. 
b. Inactive Status List 
Currently, the ISL consists solely of officers who have met their service 
obligation and desire to retain Reserve affiliation, but failed to meet minimum 
participation requirements to remain in an active status.  Members of the ISL are 
ineligible for pay, promotion, or retirement credit.22  As of September 30, 2009, the ISL 
end strength consisted of 1,181 officers. 
                                                 
22 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Public Law 103-337, § 1611(a)(1), U.S. 
Statutes at Large 108 (1994) codified at U.S. Code 10, §10153 (2010). 
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3. Retired Reserve 
The Retired Reserve consists of Regular Retirees, the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve 
(FMCR), Reserve Retirees in receipt of pay, Reserve Retirees awaiting pay (gray area), 
and Honorary Retirees.  Figure 6 compares the relative strengths of these sub-
components and depicts the growth of the Retired Reserve over the past eight years from 















Source:  author, based on TFDW data
Sep 2001 Sep 2009
 
Figure 6.   Comparison of Retired Reserve Strength by Sub-component (2001–2009) 
a. Regular Retired 
The Regular Retired List consists of all officers in receipt of retired pay 
who have completed 20 years of active service and those enlisted members in receipt of 




FMCR of which at least 20 years must have been on active duty.  Note: an enlisted 
member of the FMCR found not physically qualified for active duty upon activation may 
be immediately transferred to the Regular Retired List. 
b. Fleet Marine Corps Reserve   
The FMCR consists of those enlisted Marines who have completed at least 
20 years of active duty and are in receipt of retainer pay.  The FMCR pension is called 
retainer pay due to the potential training requirements and higher level of readiness 
afforded these individuals prior to reaching 30 years of service. 
c. Retired Reserve in Receipt of Retired Pay 
The Retired Reserve includes those Reserve officers and enlisted in receipt 
of non-regular retired pay upon reaching 60 years of age.  Effective January 28, 2008, 
this age is reduced by three months for each 90-day aggregate period served on active 
duty under contingency operation activation authority or ADOS orders.  However, this 
age may not be reduced below 50 years of age.23 
d. Retired Reserve Awaiting Pay 
“Gray Area” retirees include those Reserve members who have met the 
requirement of 20 qualifying years of non-regular service under U.S. Code 10, § 12730 
and have been approved for retirement by the Secretary of the Navy. 
e. Honorary Retiree 
Honorary retirees include those Reserve Marines who did not meet the 
requirements for retirement before reaching mandatory separation service limits and have 
been approved for honorary retirement by the Secretary of the Navy.  Honorary retirees 
are not eligible for monetary compensation and are not liable for activation; however, 
they may keep their rank for ceremonial purposes and may obtain access to certain 
military base facilities. 
                                                 
23 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181, § 647, U.S. Statutes 
at Large 122 (2008), codified at U.S. Code 10 (2010), § 12731(f).  
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C. PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENTS 
Each member of the Marine Corps Reserve in an active status is subject to 
varying annual participation requirements that can range as high as a minimum 48 
periods of inactive duty training (IDT)24 and 14 days of active duty training (ADT).  
Table 2 summarizes participation requirements listed in MCO 1001R.1K for each of 
these sub-components and also identifies their associated Training Category Pay Group 
(TCPG) by which they are categorized in MCTFS. 
 
Table 2.   Summary of Participation Requirements for Reserve Marines in an Active 
Status 
TCPG Category IDT ADT25 Points26 Other 
A SMCR units 48 14 NA  
B IMA 48 12 NA  
E, H IRR 0 0 27 Muster Duty 
F, P IADT NA Varies NA  
G, N ASL 0 0 27  
Q AR NA NA NA Active Duty 
 
Failure to meet the requirements listed in Table 2 is grounds for discharge from 
the Marine Corps Reserve or, in the case of officers beyond their Military Service 
Obligation (MSO), transfer to the ISL.  In addition, mandatory participants who have not 
completed their initial enlistment agreement to serve in the SelRes and accrue at least 
nine unexcused absences from IDT in a 12-month period will have their contractual 
period of participation extended. 
                                                 
24 According to Table 9-1 of MCO 1001R.1K, the minimum time period to complete a drill (IDT) is 
four hours and no more than two drills can be completed in a single calendar day. 
25 Exclusive of travel. Commanders may waive this requirement based on execution of ADOS orders. 
26 Minimum participation points applies only to officers beyond their MSO. Officers who are 
retirement eligible must obtain 50 points annually, regardless of TCPG. 
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D. ACTIVATION27 
With the exception of Honorary Retirees and IADT28, all members of the Marine 
Corps Reserve may be ordered to active duty under the Title 10 authorities listed in Table 
3.  All SelRes activations for duty other than training are considered involuntary 
notwithstanding the individual’s consent to that activation given the limits of statutory 
authority. 
 
Table 3.   Activation Authorities for the Marine Corps Reserve29  
Authority30 Categories Personnel Limits Duration Notes 
§ 12301(a) Entire RC None Duration plus 6 months Involuntary 
§ 12301(d) SelRes, IRR None Unlimited Voluntary 
§ 12302 SelRes, IRR 1,000,000 24 consecutive months Involuntary 
§ 12304 SelRes, IRR 200,000 365 days Involuntary 
§ 12308 Gray Area None Unlimited Voluntary 
§ 68831 Retired Reserve 25 during peacetime 12 in 24 months during 
peacetime 
Involuntary 




                                                 
27 Activation includes voluntary and involuntary order to active duty with and without the member’s 
consent. The term mobilization refers specifically to an order under involuntary authority with or without 
the member’s consent. These differences cannot be inferred from the data; thus, the term activation is used 
to avoid incorrect use of the term mobilization.   
28 IADT members may be ordered to active duty, but cannot deploy outside the U.S. prior to 
completing initial accession training. 
29 MCO 1001R.1K. 
30 § 12301(a) requires declaration of war by Congress. §§ 12302, 12304, and 688 (other than 
peacetime) require a Presidential Executive Order declaring a National Emergency. 
31 The personnel limits and duration are unlimited during war or National Emergency. During 
peacetime, officers retired early or notified of early retirement under § 638 are not eligible. 
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E. ACCESSIONS 
During June of each year, participants from M&RA, MarForRes, and the Marine 
Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) meet to finalize the subsequent FY non-prior 
service (NPS) and prior service recruiting missions at the annual Reserve Mission 
Planning Conference. 
1. SelRes Recruiting Missions 
In general, manpower analysts from RA develop SelRes accession and new prior 
service affiliation requirements based on historical trends and projected losses for the 
following fiscal year.  Figure 7 depicts the historical recruiting missions, post-9/11.  In 
order for recruiters to receive credit, NPS accessions must complete recruit training and 
prior service joins must stay with the unit for at least three months before leaving.  In 
addition, MCRC cannot receive credit twice for recruiting the same prior service Marine 
to two different units in the same FY.   
Until recently, the overall recruiting mission had decreased since 9/11, stabilizing 
after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in FY03.  Over the past several years, the NPS/prior 
service split has been approximately 60/40 with the exception of FY08 when adjustments 
were made to facilitate AC growth to 202,000.   
 
 
Figure 7.   SelRes recruiting mission, FY2002–present32,33 
                                                 
32 CRM D0013618.A2, 8. 
33 Anita Hattiangadi, “SelRes Attrition and the Selected Reserve Incentive Program,” 8. FY2007 
through FY2010 data provided by Reserve Affairs (RA).  
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At the annual mission planning conference in June, the missions are further 
specified via quota serial numbers (QSN), which link an individual manpower 
requirement to a reserve reporting unit code (RRUC), grade, and MOS placeholder.  In 
order to increase flexibility, some of these QSNs are left “open” and a RRUC is not 
specified.  Altogether, the QSNs are combined into a single requirements document 
commonly referred to as “Memo 01.”     
2. Reserve Optional Enlistment Programs 
All NPS enlisted accessions are contracted to serve in the Ready Reserve of the 
Marine Corps for an initial eight-year MSO.  The majority of these NPS accessions do so 
via six years of mandatory SMCR unit participation followed by a two-year Ready 
Reserve requirement, also known as 6x2 contracts.  This six-year obligation is required in 
order to qualify for the Selective Reserve Educational Assistance program.34   
As shown in Table 4, a small number of Marines each year join the Reserve under 
a shorter mandatory participation contract.  In doing so, the Marine Corps potentially 
loses these Marines in the latter, more productive period of their contracts.  However, 
some of these Marines may later extend their mandatory participation dates in order to 
qualify for educational benefits.  
 
Table 4.   Reserve Optional Enlistment Program Distribution (2001 and 2009) 
Contract 30 Sep 2001 30 Sep 2009 
3x5 36 21 
4x4 449 599 
5x3 29 8 
6x2 25,840 25,431 
Total 26,354 26,059 
 
                                                 
34 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110-181, § 647, U.S. Statutes 
at Large 122 (2008), codified at U.S. Code 10 (2010), § 12731(f). Reserve educational benefits are more 
commonly referred to as Chapter 1606 or MGIB-SR. 
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F. MONETARY INCENTIVES 
On an annual basis, Headquarters Marine Corps, Reserve Affairs Personnel Plans 
and Policy (RAP) releases Marine Corps Bulletin (MCBul) 7220 announcing policies and 
procedures for monetary incentives available during the upcoming FY.  In general, these 
incentives are further divided into the two broad categories of enlistment bonuses for 
NPS accessions, and reenlistment, extension, or affiliation bonuses for prior service 
Marines.  Table 5 summarizes each of the bonuses offered from FY2002 through 
FY2010.  
1. Non-Prior Service 
According to MCO 1001R.1K, NPS accessions may be eligible for an enlistment 
bonus if they meet the following criteria: 
• Assigned and agree to serve satisfactorily in a designated military 
occupational specialty (MOS) or unit for six years (6x2 contract) 
• Are a graduate of a secondary school with a category I, II, or III Armed 
Forces Qualification Test Score (AFQT) 
• Do not have prior military service in any armed force 
• Agree to serve in a billet requiring a critical skill as defined by RA 
2. Prior Service 
Prior service Marines may qualify for a reenlistment bonus provided they have 
not previously received a six-year reenlistment, extension, or affiliation bonus and serve 
or agree to serve in a designated MOS or unit in the rank of corporal through staff 
sergeant.  In cases where the prior service Marine is not qualified in the required MOS, 
the Prior Service MOS Retraining Program (PSMRP), formerly known as the Prior 
Service Training Assignment Program (PSTA), may be available to obtain the necessary 








Table 5.   Summary of Enlisted Monetary Incentives Available from FY 2002–
Present 
Incentive1 FY02–05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 






$7,500–3 yrs6 $5,000–3 yrs $15,000–3 yrs
7 $15,000–3yrs $5,000–3 yrs 
Enlistment $8,0008 $10,000 $10,000 $20,000 $20,000 $5,000 
Payment 
Schedule  Installments Installments
9 Lump Lump Lump Lump 
Notes: 
1 Concurrent receipt of monetary incentives and $350 MGIB-kicker authorized, except for affiliation bonuses after FY06. 
2 From FY07–11 June 2009, this bonus was restricted to prior service active component who had not previously served in the SelRes. 
3 Maximum $1200 in FY02-04, increased to $2400 in FY05. 
4 Second 3-yr bonus reduced to $2,000. 
5 Tiered bonuses of $15,000, $10,000, & $5,000 based on unit.   
6 First 3-yr bonus tiers were $7,500, $5,000, & $2,500. Second 3-yr tiers were $6,000, $4,000, and $2,000. 
7 Incentive was $7,500 first 3-yr bonus, $6,000 second 3-yr bonus prior to 15 March 2008. 
8 Originally $5,000 in FY02, retroactively increased to $8,000 on 7 May 2002.  
9 Reenlistment/Extension bonus was paid as a lump sum 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
While not all-encompassing, the purpose of this chapter has been to provide a 
quick overview of the RC structure and organization, simultaneously developing a deeper 
appreciation for the non-linear nature and volatility of service in the Marine Corps 
Reserve.  Although on the surface the RC may at first appear burdensome, or 
overwhelming at the very least, this same complex structure provides a functional 
flexibility and adaptability, which supports the needs of the Total Force while integrating 
two systematically diverse manpower pools.  
The focus for the remainder of this thesis will quickly narrow to determining the 
impact of mobilization, incentives, and other significant factors on the continuation rates 
of prior service SMCR unit Marines.  However, it is important to keep in mind the 
surrounding mechanisms and volatility described in this chapter inherent to the RC.  
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III. SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF 
ACTIVATION AND DEPLOYMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Activation can disrupt the lives of reserves and their families.  However, 
activation often results in deployment outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS).  Figure 8 
shows that nearly 80 percent of Marine Corps Selected Reserve (SelRes) activations and 
over 93 percent of reactivations are OCONUS.  Disruptions due to OCONUS deployment 
can create tremendous turmoil for everyone involved.  Service members miss birthdays, 
special holidays, and other significant family-life occurrences during their absence.  
Deploying to a combat zone or other hostile fire location (which represent 97 percent of 
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Figure 8.   Frequency and Location of SelRes Activations, Post-9/11 
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Not surprisingly, DoD closely monitors divorce and suicide rates of service 
members as indicators of stress in the force.35  However, a much more obvious metric in 
the SelRes, and the subject of this thesis, is a potential decrease in continuation rates of 
prior service personnel.  Since prior service personnel are not obligated to affiliate with a 
drilling unit, we would expect their reaction to an increase in activation and deployment 
to be more elastic than that of non-prior service (NPS) obligors. 
Although protected by statute, prolonged absence can negatively affect civilian 
careers and opportunities.  According to Status of Forces Reserve Component (SOFRC) 
survey data obtained in 2000 and 2004, 41 to 49 percent of activated reserves 
experienced an income loss while on active duty.36  According to recent estimates by the 
SAG Corp., small business, which employs approximately 72 percent of all reserve 
service members, experienced a three percentage point drop in sales when reserve 
employees were activated for 180 days or more.37  Given these negative impacts and the 
expectation of continued activations for the foreseeable future, why would a reserve 
service member continue to serve in the SelRes upon the completion of his service 
obligation?   
In this chapter, I will identify those factors that can potentially support or detract 
from continued reserve service despite these issues.  We will begin by reviewing the role 
of the Reserve and its relevance to the Global War on Terror.  Next, we will discuss 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivators using Herzberg’s two-factor theory as a basis for job 
satisfaction.  SelRes that have a high satisfaction should remain in the SelRes longer than 
those who are unhappy with their career choice.  In summary, we will identify a 
                                                 
35 Recent evidence indicates that suicide rates are increasing (see Barbara Starr, “Army to Report 
Record Number of Suicides,” CNN.com/US, January 30, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/01/29/army.suicides (accessed February 4, 2010).) Research on divorce rates 
does not support an increasing trend due to the Global War on Terror (see Benjamin Karney and John 
Crown, “Families under Stress: an Assessment of Data, Theory, and Research on Marriage and Divorce in 
the Military,” MG-599-OSD, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007).) 
36 David Loughran, Jacob Klerman, and Craig Martin, “Activation and the Earnings of Reservists,” 
MG-474-OSD, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 6–7. 
37 John Hope, Douglas Christman, and Patrick Mackin, “An Analysis of the Effect of Reserve 
Activation on Small Business,” SBAHQ-07-F-0306, (Annandale, VA: SAG, 2009), 16, 26. Small business 
is defined as having 100 or fewer employees. In comparison to large businesses, the effect on sales was 15 
times greater. 
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multitude of factors that affect the decision to stay in the SelRes to include hygienic 
issues, such as monetary compensation and protection of civilian employment, and 
intrinsic motivators to include societal acceptance, career aspirations, honor, recognition, 
and guilt. 
B. TRANSITION TO AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE 
Prior to the 1990s, the Department of Defense (DoD) managed and utilized the 
Reserve Component (RC) as little more than a strategic reserve–a force to mobilize in 
case of all-out war.  However, this paradigm began shifting after the end of the Cold War.  
Previously, the Reserve lay dormant following the Korean conflict with only a relatively 
few minor exceptions.  However, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm resulted in 
the involuntary call-up of 238,729 reserves service members in 1990-91.  Thereafter and 
for the remainder of the 1990s, the Reserve was increasingly relied upon for operations in 
Southwest Asia, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans.38 
The events of September 11, 2001 eliminated any remaining image of a strategic 
reserve.  Out of necessity, partly due to the downsizing of the AC and an increased 
Reserve share of the total force (amounting to 37 percent in 2008),39 the RC has 
consistently engaged in combat missions and operational support duty over the past eight 
years.  As previously discussed in Chapter I (Figure 3), the Marine Corps SelRes has 
reached a sustained level of activation, averaging 6,927 Marines per month during this 
period and can expect this operational requirement to remain stable for the foreseeable 
future.40 
                                                 
38 “Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense: Transforming the National Guard and 
Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force,” Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, 
(Arlington, VA: CNGR, 2008), 52–53. http://www.cngr.gov/Final%20Report/CNGR_final%20report%20 
with%20cover.pdf (accessed February 28, 2010).  
39 Ibid., 53. 
40 Total excludes the individual ready reserve and retired reserve. Total Marine Corps Reserve 
contribution, omitting active reserve, extended active duty for recruiting, and active duty for training, is 
8,891 as of September 2009. 
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C. VOLUNTEERING FOR DUTY 
Critics often point out that reserve service members are not volunteers and that 
they have no choice but to deploy.  They argue that reserve service members enlist to 
protect the Homeland, while not anticipating activation in conflicts, such as the current 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Ironically, it was not so long ago in our nation’s 
history that the best way to avoid the draft was to either go to college or join the 
Reserve.41  During the initial phases of the last two major activations, it was not 
uncommon to read about a service member declaring, “I joined the Army National Guard 
to pay for college.” 
However, as previously discussed in Chapters I and II, it is difficult to ignore the 
significant proportion of SelRes who are prior service and who may leave the SelRes 
almost at whim.  In the Marine Corps, which traditionally retains the fewest first-term 
enlistees, prior service accounts for 30.8 percent of SelRes units and individual 
mobilization augmentees (IMA) (23.6 percent in SMCR units).  As a whole, the DoD 
RCs obtain over half of their annual enlisted accessions from prior service sources.42  
Even the remaining NPS population can extricate themselves from a drilling obligation 
by relocating to a residence over 100 miles from the nearest Reserve unit.  Consequently, 
reserve service members, particularly prior service Marines, are “semi-volunteers” for 
activation and deployment.  Thus, it is important to understand what factors lead to job 
satisfaction, or conversely, dissatisfaction. 
D. EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
According to Frederick Herzberg’s two-factor theory, the two elements necessary 
for employee satisfaction are motivators and hygiene.  Hygiene factors are extrinsic in 
nature and include pay and compensation, as well as job security in the advent of 
activation.  Although neither of these factors are typically identified as the primary 
motivation for activation, this is in keeping with the role constituted by hygiene factors.  
                                                 
41 CNGR, 324. 
42 According to DoD’s FY2007 report on “Population Representation in the Military Services,” 
http://prhome.defense.gov/PopRep2007/download/download.html (February 24, 2010). Fifty-eight percent 
(81,386/145,860) of DoD reserve accessions in FY07 were prior service. 
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According to Herzberg’s theory, it is critical that extrinsic needs be first met in order to 
avoid job dissatisfaction and enable other intrinsic rewards to provide the primary 
motivation for continued employment.43  I will present several hygiene issues first 
followed by a discussion of intrinsic motivators. 
1. Compensation and Benefits 
Reserve service members are paid 1/30th of the active duty monthly base pay and 
eligible hazardous duty pays for each drill period.  During the typical month, reserve 
service members complete four drills in one weekend, thus receiving approximately 13 
percent of active duty base pay per month.  In addition, reserve service members typically 
serve 14 days annual training, paid similar to active duty with the main exception being a 
lower basic allowance for housing (BAH) rate.44  For those who are self-employed or 
who are otherwise unable to access affordable healthcare, participation in the SelRes also 
qualifies for Tricare Reserve Select (TRS) healthcare coverage at significantly lower 
premiums than typically offered by private insurance companies.45  Additionally, reserve 
service members may qualify for a retirement pension upon reaching 60 years of age (or 
younger age as discussed later in this chapter).  Lastly, reenlistment bonuses and other 
affiliation pays may be available for assignment to a critical unit or in an under-manned 
military occupational specialty (MOS).  Thus, there is some motivation to “moonlight” in 
the SelRes to augment one’s income, future retirement, or healthcare needs. 
Upon activation for any length of time for a contingency operation, or for a period 
greater than 30 days otherwise, reserve service members receive all components of active 
duty military compensation to include basic pay, BAH, basic allowance for subsistence 
(BAS), family separation allowance, and all eligible special pays to include hazardous  
 
                                                 
43 “Herzberg’s Motivation-Hygiene Theory,” NetMBA, 
http://www.netmba.com/mgmt/ob/motivation/herzberg/ (accessed March 4, 2010). 
44 Complete pay tables to include drill pay and BAH-RC, see 
http://www.dfas.mil/militarypay/militarypaytables/2010WebPayTable34.pdf. 
45 Monthly TRS rates for 2010 were $49.62 for an individual or $197.65 for family coverage and do 
not exclude pre-existing conditions. See http://www.triwest.com/document_library/pdf_docs/FS_2010 for 
the TRSRates.pdf for official rates and plan information. 
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duty and aviation continuation incentive pay.  In general, allowances are tax exempt and 
leave accrues at the normal rate of 2.5 days per month.  Additionally, activated service 
members and their family receive the same health care benefits provided to the AC. 
Upon assignment to a hostile fire designated location, service members also 
receive imminent danger pay/hostile fire pay and tax exempt status for their entire base 
pay up to the E-9 monthly salary.  Reenlistment bonuses and reserve affiliation pays 
received while in a hostile fire location are also eligible for the combat tax exclusion.   
Despite the above compensation and benefits, the before-mentioned SOFRC 
surveys indicated that 41 to 49 percent of activated reserve service members experience 
an income loss while activated.  Thus, some argue that causing reserves to take a pay cut 
to fight for their country is not equitable.  More importantly, if this monetary loss causes 
significant dissatisfaction, loss rates will dramatically increase; however, survey data can 
be misleading and recent studies by RAND conclude that this number is overstated.   
In contrast to the SOFRC surveys, Loughran, Klerman, and Martin (2006) 
empirically estimated that only 17 percent of activated reserve service members lost 
income when compared to their civilian earnings reported by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) in 2002 and 2003.  Of those that did lose income, only six percent 
exceeded $10,000.  In contrast, average earnings increased by $11,165 more than if these 
individuals had not been activated.  Additionally, over 40 percent of reserve personnel 
not activated during this same period experienced a lower income than the previous year 
in their civilian careers.46  Thus, not only does the average income of activated reserves 
exceed their civilian earnings, it can temporarily improve financial stability.   
Regardless, concern that involuntary activation should not result in loss of net 
income prompted passage of income replacement legislation, which will be discussed 
further in Chapter IV.  Additional benefits and compensation recently authorized include 
a decrease in the retirement age for activation and qualification for the Post-Deployment 
Mobilization Respite Absence (PDMRA) program, which will also be discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
                                                 
46 Loughran, Klerman, and Martin, xvii–xviii. 
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In summary, active duty military pay and benefits should not dissuade the 
majority of RC service members from serving on activation orders.  In the majority of 
cases, active duty pay exceeds civilian earnings and could quite possibly motivate some 
service members to stay or affiliate with a Reserve unit scheduled for activation. 
2. Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
Though financially stable during activation, concern that reserve service members 
may face problems with their civilian employers upon return from deployment is a 
significant concern.  In 1994, Congress passed the Uniform Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) to protect reserve service members faced with 
discrimination due to their reserve affiliation or absence due to activation.  To assist 
service members, the DoD-sponsored Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves 
(ESGR) organization provides information briefings and mediation services upon request.  
Figure 9 summarizes the reemployment portion of this act.  The maximum cumulative 
period of absence due to military orders is five years.  However, this limitation is waived 
for orders in support of a contingency operation.   
 
 
Figure 9.   USERRA Reemployment Time Table47 
Additional provisions of USERRA include the right to all pay raises and 
promotions that would have occurred during the service member’s absence and 
protection from termination of employment, except for cause, within 180 days if the 
                                                 
47 “USERRA Fact Sheet,” Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve, 
http://www.esgr.org/files/factsheet/USERRA.pdf (accessed March 4, 2010).  
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employee’s service related absence was greater than 30 days and one year if the absence 
was greater than 180 days.48  Although these protections mentioned under USERRA are 
not useful for self-employed reserve service members, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
they have been helpful for employees of large firms. 
In one case, an individual reemployed after returning from one-year activation 
orders was terminated nine months later.  After reminding his employer of his USERRA 
rights, he negotiated one additional year of pay and benefits as compensation for the loss 
of his job.  In other cases, pilots have avoided furlough by accepting activation orders 
when the airline industry downturn occurred in the early- to mid-2000s.   
Unfortunately, it is impossible to eliminate all forms of employer discrimination 
through legislation for reserve members.  However, USERRA has provided tremendous 
support for the Guard and Reserve in dealing with this issue.  Although activation may 
not endear all employees to their civilian employers, potential activation has decreased as 
a significant point of dissatisfaction from an employee point of view since Operations 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  Nevertheless, this issue undoubtedly results in the 
temporary and sometimes permanent loss of some SelRes whose civilian career path is 
incongruent with the activation expectations of an operational reserve.  
3. Summary of Hygiene Factors 
In this section, we have reviewed compensation, benefits, and reemployment 
rights of veterans.  None of these are strong motivators for activation since a reserve 
service member would have enlisted or reenlisted in the AC or active reserve (AR) 
program if full-time active duty was his objective.  However, using Herzberg’s two-factor 
theory, we can see that these factors provide the preventative medicine necessary in the 
area of financial stability to avoid attrition; thus, laying the groundwork for intrinsic 
motivation factors. 
                                                 
48 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, Public Law 103-353, § 
2(a), U.S. Statutes at Large 108 (1994), codified at U.S. Code 38 (2010), § 4316(c).  
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E. INTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
Suggesting that young men and women serve in the military mainly for 
compensation, or because they lack sufficient alternatives elsewhere, is insulting to many 
service members, particularly those in the Reserve whose drill pay is a fraction of active 
duty pay.  As an example, a botched joke by Senator John Kerry (2006) in which he 
stated, “Education—if you make the most of it and you study hard and you do your 
homework, and you make an effort to be smart, you can do well.  If you don't, you get 
stuck in Iraq,”49 resulted in a firestorm of criticism.  In response, Senator John McCain 
declared, “Senator Kerry owes an apology to the many thousands of Americans serving 
in Iraq, who answered their country's call because they are patriots and not because of 
any deficiencies in their education.”50  Politics aside, it is necessary to look beyond 
compensation and benefits to explain why the reserve continuation rate is not even lower 
given the current deployment tempo.  In particular, we will review social and 
psychological needs to include acceptance, expectations, career aspirations, personal 
pride and honor, recognition, and the guilt of remaining behind. 
1. Acceptance into Adulthood 
According to Grossman (2009), “in development psychology there is a general 
understanding that an individual must master the twin areas of sexuality and aggression 
in order to have truly achieved adulthood.”51  The U.S. Center for Disease Control reports 
that over 64 percent of high school seniors have engaged in sexual intercourse.52  This 
leaves aggression as the last barrier to adulthood for the majority of high school seniors.   
                                                 
49Rick Klein, “Kerry's 'stuck in Iraq' remark ignites firefight with Bush, GOP,” The Boston Globe, 
November 1, 2006, online edition, 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/11/01/kerrys_stuck_in 
_iraq_remark_ignites_firefight_with_bush_gop/ (accessed August 16, 2009). 
50 Ibid., para. 18. 
51 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New 
York: Back Bay Books, 2009), xxiv.  
52 “United States 2007: Percentage of students who have ever had sexual intercourse,” U.S. Center for 
Disease Control, http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/yrbss/QuestYearTable.asp?cat=4&Quest=Q58& Loc=XX&Year 
=2007&compval=&Graphval=yes&path=byHT&loc2=&colval=2007&rowval1=Sex&rowval2=Grade&By
Var=CI&Submit2=GO (accessed March 5, 2010). 
 34
Many of today’s youth see joining the military as a way in which to “test one’s 
courage,” to prove that they have reached the maturity and independence of adulthood.  
In particular, the Marine Corps targets this population through their advertising campaign 
“We’re looking for a few good men.”  As a result, the Marine Corps attracts those 
individuals desiring both a physical challenge and to prove themselves worthy.   
Staff platoon commanders at The Basic School in Quantico, Virginia often refer 
to war as the “Super Bowl” event of the Marine Corps.  As such, it is not enough for 
Marines to serve; they must deploy to combat as well.  Consequently, the next logical 
step after completion of training is to use their newfound skills on the field of battle and 
Marines pursue this opportunity when presented.        
2. Expectations 
Marines are constantly “sizing up” fellow Marines by the medals they wear on 
their chest.  A Marine who does not hold a campaign ribbon from Southwest Asia may 
lose some credibility in the eyes of his comrades.  He will be an “outsider looking in” on 
every conversation about Iraq, Afghanistan, and combat and left to question, good or bad, 
how he would have performed.  Even service members that have only deployed to 
Bahrain or Qatar are held in lower esteem.   
The expectation that Marines must deploy and fight is best echoed by the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps in his famous All Marine message, “Every Marine into 
the Fight.”  
The Marine Corps remains actively engaged in combat operation in the 
Central Command area of responsibility.  Marines, by their performance in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, have added notably to the legacy of our colors.  
Frequent deployments and short dwell periods have been the norm, yet our 
Marines have responded magnificently with unwavering determination 









join our Corps, Marines expect to train, deploy, and fight.  That’s who we 
are; that’s what we do; and we must allow every Marine that 
opportunity.53 
Incidentally, the Commandant’s message was directed more toward Congress than 
Marines.  The expectation to “train, deploy, and fight” is engrained in every Marine 
starting on the first day of boot camp and officer candidate school.  Anecdotally, a 
Marine reserve lieutenant colonel serving in Bagram, Afghanistan on his third 
deployment in four years was asked why he volunteered to deploy to again.  His response 
was simple, “I’ve already been to Iraq and Camp Lemonnier (Djibouti).  I just wanted to 
be able to say that I’ve been to all three.” 
3. Career Aspirations 
Given the high expectations placed upon Marines, it’s not surprising that 
participation in combat operations is an unstated requirement for promotion to senior 
rank.  In 2007, Lieutenant General Coleman, former Deputy Commandant for Manpower 
and Reserve Affairs (DC M&RA) advised, “I guarantee you…if you have a six- to seven-
year war and you don’t get to the war zone, you needn’t wonder what’s going to happen 
when it’s time for promotion.”54  This sentiment is reflected throughout the Marine Corps 
and combat experience is a significant briefing item for promotion boards. 
4. Honor and Pride 
There are also several deep-seated personal reasons why some Reserve Marines 
may feel obligated to activate and deploy in support of combat operations.  Since 
September 11, 2001, one of the most common questions asked of service members by 
complete strangers is “Have you been to Iraq?”  For the minority of prior service ground 
forces that have not deployed, it may be with great embarrassment and feeling of 
                                                 
53 “ALMAR 002/07 Every Marine Into the Fight–Commandant’s Intent,” U.S. Marine Corps, January 
19, 2007, 
http://www.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/2007/EVERY%20MARINE%20INTO%20THE%20FIGHT
-COMMANDANTand%2039;S%20INTENT.aspx (accessed March 5, 2010).  
54 Trista Talton, “General: Deploy or Risk Promotion Chances,” The Marine Corps Times, August 17, 
2007, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/08/marine_coleman_070815/ (accessed March 5, 
2010). 
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dejection that they answer “no” considering the many opportunities provided during the 
previous eight years of war.  This internal consternation is often sufficient motivation for 
Marine reserve service member to activate and deploy when called.  For this reason 
amongst many others, almost every single officer I served with in my last assignment 
voluntarily requested orders to Southwest Asia. 
General Patton best articulated this sentiment in his speech to the Third Army on 
June 5, 1944:   
There is one great thing that you men will all be able to say after this war 
is over and you are home once again. You may be thankful that twenty 
years from now when you are sitting by the fireplace with your grandson 
on your knee and he asks you what you did in the great World War II, you 
won’t have to cough, shift him to the other knee and say, ‘Well, your 
Granddaddy shoveled (explicative) in Louisiana.’ No, Sir, you can look 
him straight in the eye and say, ‘Son, your Granddaddy rode with the 
Great Third Army and a Son-of-a-(explicative)-(explicative) named 
Georgie Patton!’55 
General Patton understood his men’s intrinsic motivators well and had honed his oratory 
skills to a form of art.  
5. Status and Recognition 
Serving in the military is an honorable profession, recognized and respected by a 
vast majority of the American people.  In a 2009 Gallup Poll, 82 percent of those queried 
had high confidence in the military, marking the twelfth straight year atop the ratings for 
U.S. institutions.56  Status as a veteran can qualify an individual for discounts at stores 
like The Home Depot on major holidays, free entry into amusement parks and other 
venues on special occasions, and even educational benefits in certain states, such as 
California. 
                                                 
55 “Address to the Troops (The Famous Speech–Unexpurgated),” The Patton Society, 
http://www.pattonhq.com/speech.html (accessed March 4, 2010).  
56 Lydia Saad, “American’s Confidence in Military Up, Banks Down,” Gallup.com, June 24, 2009, 
http://www.gallup.com/ poll/121214/Americans-Confidence-Military-Banks-Down.aspx (accessed March 
4, 2010).  
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Veterans have two holidays recognizing their sacrifices.  Memorial Day honors 
those who have given their life in our nation’s service57 and Veteran’s Day is “a 
celebration to honor America’s veterans for their patriotism, love of country, and 
willingness to serve and sacrifice for the common good.”58  These holidays take on more 
meaning for veterans after having served in a hostile fire location away from friends and 
family. 
6. Guilt 
One of the most compelling reasons for a Reserve Marine to activate and deploy 
is guilt. In the film Taking Chance, Marine Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Michael Strobl 
awoke every night to review the list of Marines killed in action, obsessed with the fear 
that one of his friend’s names would be next and that he had done nothing to save them.59  
Although a veteran of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and awarded the 
combat action ribbon for satisfactory performance under enemy fire, LtCol Strobl was 
haunted with the guilt of staying behind and manning a desk while his friends and 
comrades fought in Iraq. 
In his book On Killing, Gross discusses this guilt as one of the main motivations 
for participating in combat:  
Men in combat are usually motivated to fight not by ideology or hate or 
fear, but by group pressures and processes involving (1) regard for their 
comrades, (2) respect for their leaders, (3) concern for their own 
reputation with both, and (4) an urge to contribute to the success of the 
group… 
This bonding is so intense that it is a fear of failing these comrades that 
preoccupies most combatants…The guilt and trauma associated with 
failing to fully support men who are bonded with friendship and 
camaraderie on this magnitude is profoundly intense.60 
                                                 
57 “Memorial Day History,” The Memorial Day Site, April 4, 2009, http://www.usmemorialday.org/ 
backgrnd.html (accessed March 4, 2010).  
58 “History of Veterans Day,” U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, http://www1.va.gov/opa/vetsday/ 
vetdayhistory.asp (March 4, 2010). 
59 Ross Katz and Michael Strobl, Taking Chance, directed by Ross Katz (New York: HBO, 2009). 
60 Grossman, On Killing, 88–9. 
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Gross’ analysis places LtCol Strobl’s fixation with guilt over consciously extending in a 
staff position in Quantico, VA into perspective.  Although it had been over 12 years since 
he had served with his comrades in the first Gulf War, this bond forged under fire had not 
diminished. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Although U.S. involvement in Iraq appears to be winding down, participation in 
Afghanistan is steadily increasing and shows no sign of relief in the near future.  In order 
to sustain regular Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) unit activations, the Marine 
Corps must retain the appropriate mix of combat veterans necessary to lead young 
Marines in battle.   
Policy makers must intuitively understand the extrinsic and intrinsic motivators 
that support these operations oriented manpower requirements.  Simultaneously, 
manpower analysts must be able to accurately predict the effect of activation on prior 
service SMCR unit Marines to ensure recruiting and retention efforts are focused in the 
right direction. 
In this chapter, we have more closely analyzed the social and psychological 
aspects of activation and deployment in addition to a cursory review of compensation and 
benefits.  The latter are categorized as hygiene factors that must be met to allow a Marine 
to continue affiliating with the SMCR units, while developing intrinsic motivators foster 
a Marine’s desire to stay serving in the SMCR units.  During the next chapter, I will 
review the ACOL and Expected Utility of Deployment models, which theoretically 
predict the effect of compensation, activation, and other factors on the behavior of the 
Marine Corps Reserve, specifically members of SMCR units and the Ready Reserve.   
 39
IV. REVIEW OF THEORETICAL MODELS OF RETENTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I will review the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) and 
expected utility of deployment models of retention.  The ACOL model compares the 
opportunity cost of military and civilian life and individual preferences between each.  
The expected utility of deployment model redefines utility as a trade-off between income, 
home, and deployed time.  The goal of this chapter is to explore these models as the basis 
for specifying the multivariate retention models to be estimated in Chapter VII.  In 
Chapter V, I will review previous empirical research in the areas of retention, attrition, 
and continuation prior to introducing the multivariate model used for this thesis and 
analyzing those results in Chapters VI and VII. 
B. ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING 
The ACOL model of reenlistment shown in equation 1 is based on the assumption 
that if an individual’s cost of leaving the military exceeds his net preference for civilian 
life in any future time horizon, then that individual will make the decision to stay in the 
military.  In this case, the cost of leaving is calculated by determining the monetary value 
of leaving immediately and subtracting that value from the net present value of staying 
over any future period.  One advantage of this approach is that it accounts for both 
changes in the military-civilian wage differential resulting from additional years of 
military service and loss of experience in the civilian labor market, as well as the 
increased military retirement pension based on years of service.  Warner and Asch use 
the following equation to summarize the ACOL model.61  
                                                 
61 John Warner and Beth Asch, “The Economics of Military Manpower,” in Handbook of Defense 
Economics, Volume I, ed. Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Science 
B.V., 1995), 360–1. 
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Given the following for an individual at year t: 
(1)  c mτ τ−  is the net preference for civilian life, 
(2)   MjW  is expected military pay in each future year j, 
(3)   ,
C
j tW  is civilian earnings in future year j if the individual leaves at t, 
(4)  ,
C
j nW  is civilian earnings in future year j if the individual separates after future 
year n, 
(5)  nR  is the expected value at future year n of retired pay and other separation 
benefits if the individual separates after year n, 
(6)  tR  is the present value at year t of retired pay and other separation benefits if the 
person leaves now, 
(7)  ρ  is the individual’s subjective discount rate on future income 
Several relationships can be anticipated by applying the ACOL model to 
continuation in the Marine Corps Reserve.  The most obvious principle is that an increase 
in the military-civilian pay ratio or an increase in monetary incentives should positively 
impact continuation.  While activated, individuals who experience a loss in civilian 
income might leave the Reserve after release from active duty.  By contrast, an individual 
who experienced an unexpected increase in income might be more likely to remain in the 
Reserve.  Similarly, a rise in the unemployment rate would also increase continuation.  
Additionally, an increase in Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores may signify 
higher civilian earnings potential, while not having a proportionately equal impact on 






One example that incorporates the ACOL model is a 2006 law supplementing the 
income of reserve service members experiencing a minimum $50 monthly loss of civilian 
income while involuntarily activated.62  It would appear that such a program would 
positively impact continuation.  However, given the stringent qualification criteria, the 
program is unlikely to generate a statistically significant impact on the Marine Corps 
Reserve. 
Another recent legislative change, which might also have limited impact on 
continuation is the recent reduction in the retirement age based on active duty service 
after January 28, 2008.  As previously discussed in Chapter II, this new law reduces the 
age by three months for every 90 days of qualifying duty.  However, as seen in the 
ACOL model, adjusting future income does not have the same effect as income in the 
present.  For instance, a 26-year-old Marine with an expectation of two additional years 
of activation prior to retirement as a Master Sergeant (E8) would be just as likely to stay 
in his SMCR unit if he was given a $279.32 bonus instead.63  Alternatively, a 30 year-old 
Marine with the same expectation would need $1430.98 for an equivalent impact on his 
decision to stay, thus, illustrating both the significance of time, preferences, and personal 
discount rates.64    
                                                 
62 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Public Law 109-163, § 614, U.S. Statutes 
at Large 119 (2006), codified at U.S. Code 37 (2010), § 910. The Reserve Income Replacement Program 
(RIRP) has a termination clause that requires an extension annually. As written, RIRP requires 18 months 
continuous activation, greater than 24 months cumulative, or back-to-back orders (less than 180 days) all 
under involuntary authority. Maximum reimbursement is $3,000 per month. During the first two years of 
the program, only two Marines qualified for this program. 
63 Computation of NPV based on a personal discount rate of 18.5 percent, an 8-year base quarter ECI 
of 3.37 percent, 8 years of service, and retirement at age 58 with 2984 retirement points (equivalent to 8.29 
years of active duty). Average retirement points based on Beth Asch, James Hosek, Michael Mattock, and 
Christina Panis, “Assessing Compensation Reform: Research in Support of the 10th Quadrennial Review of 
Military Compensation,” MG-764-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 93. Personal discount rate 
based on Anita Hattiangadi, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Lump Sum Bonuses.” 
64 Computation of NPV based on a personal discount rate of 14.3 percent, an 8-year base quarter ECI 
of 3.37 percent, 12 years of service, and retirement at age 58 with 2984 retirement points. Average 
retirement points based on Beth Asch, “Assessing Compensation Reform,” 93. Personal discount rate based 
Anita Hattiangadi, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Lump Sum Bonuses.”  
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C. EXPECTED UTILITY OF DEPLOYMENT 
Another important model in predicting continuation rates given the recent 
sustained level of operation tempo previously illustrated in Figure 3 (Chapter I) is the 
Expected Utility of Deployment.65  In this model, the individual’s utility is a function of 
his income, length of deployments, and length of dwell between deployments as shown in 
equation 2.  Expected utility is the cumulative total of the utility from time spent at home, 
shown in the first term of the equation, combined with the utility of deployment in the 
second term, assuming a uniformly distributed deployment time, which varies in length 
from 1d  to 2d .  Although an individual’s probability of deployment p might range from 
0 1p≤ ≤ , it is assumed that the desired probability of deployment is not 0 since a 
member serving in the All-Volunteer Force would likely have chosen a different 
profession if this were the case.66 
( ) ( ) ( )11 ,1,0 ,1 ,
2




−= − + + −∫                                                (2) 
Given the following: 
(1)  p is the probability of deployment, m is the base pay.  Thus, expected utility at 
home is  ) ( ),1,0p U m−  
(2)  d is the fraction of the time deployed, ω  is the deployed pay. Thus, dω  is the pay 
for the fraction of time deployed and ( ),1 ,U m wd d d+ −  is the expected utility 
while deployed  
(3)  ( )1 2 / 2d dδ = − .  Thus mean deployment time μ  is 1d δ+ . 
(4)  expected utility deployed is the average at each deployment length times the 




                                                 
65 Beth Asch and James Hosek, “New Economics of Manpower in the Post-Cold War Era,” in 
Handbook of Defense Economics, Volume 2: Defense in a Globalized World, ed. Todd Sandler and Keith 
Hartley (Oxford, United Kingdom: Elsevier Science B.V., 2007) 1097–9. 
66 Asch, “New Economics of Manpower,” 1099. 
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Asch and Hosek demonstrate that the optimum mean deployment time μ ∗  is at a 
maximum when the derivative of EU with respect to μ  equals 0, given that the optimum 
probability of deployment p∗  is not 0 and that 0 1μ∗< < .  Thus, expected utility is 
concave in nature.  Under this condition, the preferred variance is also zero ( )0δ ∗ = .67  
Figure 10 illustrates two potential possibilities for this relationship, 1EU  and 
2EU . However, marginal utility will vary individually and the characterization shown is 
not necessarily indicative of priori empirical results.  Thus, some individuals would 
prefer to always deploy rather than never at all, while others would opt to never deploy if 
their other choice was always deployed.  Independent of operational concerns, the 
optimum value for the service sμ∗  will be 1 2sμ μ μ∗ ∗ ∗< < .  
 
Figure 10.   Graphical Representation of the Expected Utility of Deployment 
The Expected Utility of Deployment model is of particular relevance to prior 
service Marines in SMCR units.  Since these individuals are not obligated to serve for 
any length of time, unless compelled by acceptance of a monetary incentive, they are free 
to transfer to another unit or training category pay group (TCPG) while continuing to 
qualify for retirement (as discussed previously in Chapter II).  Although units are 
stabilized from voluntary loss once an alert message is received from the Deputy 
Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations (DC PP&O), identification of units in 
the Force Generation Model has reduced information asymmetry and substantiated the 
probability and length of deployment well in advance of the alert message.  
                                                 
67 Asch, “New Economics of Manpower,” 1098–9. 
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Thus, individuals whose expectations of deployment are exceeded are likely to 
leave the SelRes or identify a service opportunity with a lower deployment expectation.  
Likewise, individuals who deploy less frequently than they desire may transfer within the 
Ready Reserve to billets and/or units that can meet their expectation.  While transfers to 
avoid deployment might reflect poorly on performance evaluations and later negatively 
impact service member career aspirations, transfers to deploying units might have the 
opposite result, rewarding those individuals later in their Marine Corps careers, thus 
shaping the force accordingly.   
Contextually, this discussion also explains why an SMCR unit member might join 
the IMA or IRR.  In particular, these two TCPGs might increase the possibility of 
identifying a billet that meets his expectation of deployment length and probability.  
Likewise, individuals in this scenario are more empowered to control their own destiny, 
and mirror an individually dynamic u ∗ , which could vary with changes in job and 
marital status, family concerns, childbirth, and civilian career opportunities.  
An interesting application of the Expected Utility of Deployment model is 
observed in current defense policies.  First is the Secretary of Defense Memorandum of 
January 19, 2007, which limited the involuntary mobilization of Reserve Forces, 
First, from this point forward, involuntary mobilization for members of the 
Reserve Forces will be for a maximum one year at any time… 
Second, mobilization of ground combat, combat support, and combat 
service support will be managed on a unit basis.  This will allow greater 
cohesion and predictability in how these Reserve units train and deploy… 
Third, the planning objective for involuntary mobilization of 
Guard/Reserve units will remain a one year mobilized to five years 
demobilized ratio... 
Fourth, I am directing the establishment of a new program to compensate 
or incentivize individuals in both the active and Reserve components who 
are required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or to extend beyond the 
established rotation policy goals.68 
                                                 
68 “Utilization of the Total Force,” U.S. Department of Defense, 1–2, 
http://ra.defense.gov/documents/quickwins/Utilization%20of%20Total%20Force%2019Jan07.pdf 
(accessed February 25, 2010). 
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In implementing this new policy, the Secretary of Defense attempted to obtain a 
workable compromise between operational requirements and manpower constraints.  
Specifically, Secretary Gates set the probability of deployment 1p =  for any member of 
the SelRes participating continuously for six years, while setting the expected values of 
0.17μ =  and 0δ = .  Not surprisingly, this mirrors the contractual obligation of over 97 
percent of SMCR non-prior service (NPS) personnel, as previously depicted in Table 4 
(Chapter II). 
Shortly thereafter, the Marine Corps released a policy to compensate individuals 
with non-chargeable leave known as Post-Deployment Mobilization Respite Absence 
(PDMRA) if their period of promised dwell (2:1 AC, 5:1 RC) was broken by deployment 
or activation.  Per MarAdmin 448/07, Marines were eligible for up to 23 days of PDMRA 
per deployment or activation and in the case of the RC, could instead opt for $3,000 of 
assignment incentive pay if they were assigned to a government job that did not allow 
simultaneous payment by two government entities.69   
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
During this chapter, the ACOL and Expected Utility of Deployment models were 
discussed to theoretically predict the effect of compensation, activation, and other factors 
on the behavior of the Marine Corps Reserve, specifically members of SMCR units and 
the Ready Reserve.  During the next chapter, I will review previous research in this area 
and present the empirical evidence they provide in the subject area of this thesis.  In this 
regard, a greater emphasis will be placed on the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps 
Reserve. 
                                                 
69 “MARADMIN 448/07: Post-Deployment Mobilization Respite Absence (PDMRA),” U.S. Marine 
Corps, July 27, 2007, http://www.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/2007/Messagesfinal43.aspx (accessed 
February 25, 2010).  
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V. HISTORICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PREDICTORS OF 
ATTRITION AND RETENTION 
Maintaining the strength and readiness of the All-Volunteer Force has been the 
focal point of numerous studies and research.  At the center of this research are the 
federally funded research and development centers.  In particular, the National Defense 
Research Institute (RAND Corporation) and Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) have a 
wealth of institutional knowledge and have produced a multitude of analyses, which are 
readily accessible to the public. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the exception of enlistment supply, the majority of manpower studies can be 
categorized as dealing with either retention or attrition.  Although these terms are often 
used synonymously by those not indoctrinated in military manpower, it is important to 
note the distinction between the two terms that often leads to systematic differences in 
behavior.  
1. Attrition 
Attrition refers to the premature loss of personnel prior to the expiration of a 
contractual service obligation also known as non-EAS attrition for the active component.  
First term attrition, the loss rate of personnel prior to completing their initial period of 
required service, is commonly the focus of these studies.  However, attrition can also 
refer to losses during specific training events, such as boot camp and follow-on military 
occupational specialty (MOS) schools or subsequent enlistment terms.  Due to the 
difficulty of accurately measuring 48-month attrition, 36-month loss rates are commonly 
used as the measure of first term attrition in the naval services. 
Defining attrition in the Marine Corps Reserve is much more challenging than in 
the active component (AC).  As previously discussed in Table 4 (Chapter II), initial 
contractual drilling obligations in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units 
range from three to six years, while reenlistment contracts only obligate Marines to serve 
in the Ready Reserve vice in SMCR units or in the SelRes.  In addition, not all enlistees 
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complete their initial basic military and technical skills training in one summer.70  
Moreover, an individual loss in the SMCR units does not necessarily translate into a 
Marine Corps Reserve loss.  Thus, how one defines both the population and loss are 
important factors to consider when comparing different analyses of attrition.   
2. Retention 
Retention differs from attrition in that it measures the stay rate for individuals not 
contractually obligated to serve or who have successfully completed their obligation.  For 
active component enlisted Marines, this rate is based on the percentage of Marines 
reenlisting at the end of an enlistment term.  In this regard, the Marine Corps sets goals or 
objectives called alignment plans for both the first and subsequent terms, referred to as 
first-term alignment plan (FTAP) and subsequent term alignment plan (STAP).  
Complicating this measure is Marines who extend, but do not ultimately reenlist.  
Officers, on the other hand, are not contractually obligated past their initial service 
obligation and their stay rates are normally measured as continuation or retention past 
various years of service or during a certain time interval based on survival up to that 
point. 
As with attrition, measuring retention for the Marine Corps Reserve is not 
straightforward and depends on a number of factors, which includes the volatility of the 
Ready Reserve as previously discussed in Chapter II.  Additionally, years of service often 
do not coincide with qualifying years towards retirement.  Furthermore, SelRes members 
who have successfully completed their initial drilling obligation are no longer 
contractually obligated to continue drilling and may request transfer to the Individual 
Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), Active Reserve (AR), Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) 
or Active-Status List (ASL) at any time.  Even accepting a monetary incentive does not  
 
 
                                                 
70 Under the Incremental IADT (IIADT) program, enlisted accessions are allowed to complete recruit 
training and MOS school in two separate periods. In the majority of IIADT accessions, this concession is 
allowed in order to recruit college students or individuals with long follow-on schools who otherwise 
would be unable to attend both recruit training and MOS school.  
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legally obligate an individual to continue drilling with an SMCR unit; although, failure to 
comply with the terms of the contract results in pro-rated recoupment of the incentive 
based on the unfulfilled portion of the contract. 
3. Organization of the Literature Review 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on prior studies on the historical 
characteristics and predictors of attrition and retention.  Considering the enormous library 
of research in this area, the scope of this review cannot be comprehensive, but rather will 
focus on studies involving the Reserve and/or the Marine Corps, where possible.  As 
such, the remainder of this chapter will be divided into the two areas of attrition and 
retention studies. 
B. ATTRITION STUDIES 
In general, attrition studies attempt to identify the factors and characteristics that 
impact the probability that an individual will decide to leave the service prior to 
fulfillment of his obligatory contract.  However, in many studies, the definition of 
attrition includes retention losses.  For the purposes of this chapter, studies where the 
definitions of attrition and retention are fully intertwined will be categorized under the 
broad area of attrition.  The following studies highlight the factors significant in the 
attrition decision. 
Doering and Grissmer (1985) identified the changing composition of the armed 
forces during the first 10 years of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) as context for further 
research.  Specifically, they identified substantial increases in the percentage of females, 
blacks, and high school graduates combined with a decline in AFQT Category I and II 
scores.  The Reserve followed similar patterns with the primary difference being a 







increased longevity and experience levels as an issue that would require further research 
to identify more efficient compensation and benefits combinations considering the 
changing demographics caused by aging of the force.71 
Doering and Grissmer also performed a selected review of research in the area of 
attrition.  For the active component, they found that attrition varied inversely with 
educational achievement and higher aptitude scores (AFQT).  Women had higher attrition 
than men; whites had higher attrition than non-whites; 18–19 year old enlistees had lower 
attrition than 17-year-olds and enlistees over 20; married enlistees had lower attrition 
than single enlistees; and longer terms of service were associated with increased attrition.  
Additionally, individuals unemployed prior to enlisting, and those with frequent job 
changes, appeared to have higher levels of attrition.  One concern discussed was that it 
appeared the services’ institutional policies seemed to be creating a standard level of 
attrition regardless of the quality of new recruits by “creaming” each cohort.72 
Although Doering and Grissmer acknowledged that scant research had been 
completed on the SelRes, they did identify systematic differences between the AC and 
SelRes based on the nature of reserve participation and enlistment influencers. 
Since 93 percent of the SelRes surveyed held another full-time job, changing 
employer attitudes is an important factor in attrition.  Additionally, Doering and Grissmer 
identified changes in marital status, migration, and the birth of a child as significant 
indicators of attrition.  Although they were unable to test their hypothesis, Doering and 
Grissmer predicted that enlistees who were married prior to accession would have lower 
attrition since they had already experienced this life-changing event.  Doering and 
Grissmer also predicted that older enlistees, between the ages of 24–28, would have 
higher attrition since this was the age at which the probability of migration, marriage, and 
employer change was highest.73  
                                                 
71 Zahava Doering and David Grissmer, “Active and Reserve Force Attrition and Retention: A 
Selected Review of Research and Methods,” P-7007, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1985), 4–8. 
72 Ibid., 13–14. 
73 Ibid., 18–20. 
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Grissmer and Kirby (1985) hypothesized that the following three factors 
contribute to a high rate of Reserve attrition: “the quality and demographic composition 
of the enlistment cohort, transfers to the active forces or to reserve component, and for 
moonlighting reservists, the turbulence of normal civilian life.”  Using a logit model for 
the 1980 National Guard and Reserve enlisted cohort, they determined that non-high 
school diploma graduates (NHSDG) separated at a rate 12 to 13 percentage points higher 
than high school diploma graduates (HSDG) during their first two years of service, while  
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) category I enlistees had a 7 to 11 percentage 
point lower attrition versus category IV enlistees.  Lastly, everything else equal, they 
determined that the female attrition rate was approximately twice that of males, 
potentially due to increased difficulty of adjusting to some MOSs, earlier marriage, and 
the difficulties of childbirth.74 
Using cross-tabulation, Grissmer and Kirby identified that 28 percent of Army 
Reserve and 17 percent of Guard attrition during the first two years was to the active 
forces, another RC, or returned to the SelRes.  However, they were only able to indirectly 
support their third hypothesis that the turbulence of civilian life was a large factor in 
attrition.  Specifically, they identified correlations with the demographic factors (gender, 
age, and race) that experience the highest number of migration, marriage, and job 
changes across the U.S. and a higher level of attrition.75 
Grissmer and Kirby (1988) followed up their previous study from 1985 by 
including multiple Army Reserve and Guard cohorts from 1980–1982 and using a similar 
logit regression model.  In extending their previous study, Grissmer and Kirby were able 
to analyze the consistency of attrition factors over time.  They found that the estimated 
relationships remained stable; however, the magnitude of each effect changed over time.  
Additionally, they determined that certain factors, such as age, marriage, and childbirth, 
were gender- and race-specific.  For instance, males were not affected by changes in  
 
                                                 
74 David Grissmer and Sheila Kirby, “Attrition of Nonprior-Service Reservists in the Army National 
Guard and Army Reserve,” R-3267-RA, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1985), 44–46. 
75 Ibid., 46. 
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status, while females experienced a strong negative impact.  Likewise, increasing 
enlistment age raised attrition for males, whereas black females experienced lower 
attrition.76   
Grissmer and Kirby also attempted to analyze the impact of the unemployment 
rate on attrition.  Grissmer and Kirby believed that higher unemployment might attract 
recruits who have a weaker taste for the military and are more risk-averse in their full-
time job.  Other factors that lower attrition are lower migration and higher stability for 
individuals in their full-time jobs.  Thus, the effect of unemployment was theoretically 
indeterminate and would require empirical determination.  However, changes in Army 
institutional policies, which were strongly linked to higher attrition, made this attempt 
inconclusive.  Specifically, a shift towards a more lenient discharge policy was 
confounded with a period of higher unemployment resulting in nonrandom attrition.77 
In one of only a few studies on reserve prior service attrition, Marquis and Kirby 
(1989) used a Cox proportional hazard function to estimate the effect of unemployment, 
civilian wage rates, changes to drill pay, incentives, and prior RC service.  Of particular 
interest is how they defined both attrition and reserve prior service.  In their research, 
they took the total force approach and examined only attrition to civilian life.  However, a 
temporary separation that occurred between the Reserve member’s anniversary dates was 
not considered a loss.78  As such, a transfer from the Army Reserve to the active Navy is 
not considered attrition, whereas a loss upon successful completion of an individual’s 
service obligation is considered attrition by this broad definition.79   
                                                 
76 David Grissmer and Sheila Kirby, “Changing Patterns of Nonprior Service Attrition in the Army 
National Guard and Army Reserve,” R-3626-RA, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1988), 53–59. 
77 Ibid., vi–vii, 17. 
78 Anniversary dates are based on the first day a member enters into an active status and are used to 
determine satisfactory years towards retirement. As previously discussed in Chapter II, an individual must 
obtain 50 points each anniversary year to qualify as a satisfactory year towards retirement. Using this 
definition, an individual could temporarily separate for up to a year, and not be counted as a loss, as long as 
the member was assigned to the reserves on the subsequent anniversary date.  
79 Susan Marquis and Sheila Kirby, “Economic Factors in Reserve Attrition: Prior Service Individuals 
in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve,” R-3686-1-RA (Santa Monica: RAND, 1989), vi–vii, 17–
18. 
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Of additional interest is their definition of prior service.  In this case, they 
included all individuals with prior military training and experience to include prior 
recruits and prior active and reserve forces.  This population included all prior service 
enlisted members serving in the Army Reserve or Army National Guard from 1980–82 
regardless of rank or years of service with loss data monitored up until 1985.  As such, 
their techniques accounted for right-censored data.80  
As previously mentioned, the primary purpose of Marquis and Kirby’s research 
was to estimate the effect of compensation factors.  In this regard, they calculated a 
military pay elasticity of 0.45 for the Guard and 0.95 for the Army Reserve.  A 10 percent 
increase in unemployment was estimated to decrease attrition by 1.3 and 1.7 percent for 
the Guard and Reserve, respectively.  On the other hand, a 10 percent increase in civilian 
pay would increase attrition by 1.5 percent for the Guard and 3.0 percent for the Army 
Reserve.  As with other studies at this time, the impact of receiving a bonus was not 
statistically significant, though negative in this case.  The authors believe that systematic 
differences existed in the population eligible to receive a bonus.  For instance, the 
bonuses are targeted at individuals in MOSs with high attrition.  Additionally, they 
believe that the coefficients are negatively biased due to self-selection on the part of 
individuals who accept a bonus.81 
Lastly, Marquis and Kirby identified a 10.1 percent higher attrition probability for 
reserves whose prior service is on active duty.82 
This may be partly due to differences in information and expectations: 
those with prior reserve service are more likely to know what the reserve 
job involves than those who had previously served only on active duty.83 
A 1991 United States General Accounting Office (GAO) report on SelRes 
attrition identified a multitude of factors affecting reserve attrition (defined to include 
retention) in addition to those already discussed.  This research used Reserve Component 
                                                 
80 Susan Marquis, “Economic Factors in Reserve Attrition,” 2, 17. 
81 Ibid., vi, 35–9. 
82 Ibid., 31, 40. 
83 Ibid., vii. 
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Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) files provided by the Defense Manpower 
Data Center (DMDC) from 1986–88 in addition to the 1986 Reserve Component Survey.  
The analysis included both cross-tabulations of data, as well as the estimation of a logit 
model for SelRes attrition by service, prior active service, non-prior service (NPS), prior 
reserve service, and DoD overall. 
Given the extensive nature of this report and importance of the findings, only 
those most relevant to this thesis are summarized below. 
• Aggregate attrition data can mask trends that occur at lower levels.  For 
instance the overall Marine Corps Reserve SelRes attrition rate was 28 
percent, while E-4 to E-5 attrition was 45 percent.84 
• An indirect relationship exists between high NPS to prior service ratios 
and high loss rates.85  Specifically, they believed that the Air Force’s low 
loss rates were correlated with a lower percentage of NPS, while the 
Marine Corps high loss rates were indicative of a high percentage of NPS 
in units 
• MOS mismatches, defined as a prior service assigned to a billet prior to 
obtaining the requisite MOS designator, are strongly related to attrition.  
For the Marine Corps Reserve, this factor increased attrition by 9.7 
percentage points86 
• Smaller units proportionally have higher loss rates87 
Lastly, when comparing demographic factors across all six RCs, to include the 
Army and Air National Guards, the magnitude and in some cases the relative relationship 
of demographic factors varied tremendously.  Similarly, combining dissimilar 
populations, such as NPS and prior service together generated greater ambiguity due to 
the systematic differences between these two populations.88  
In a follow-up to the 1991 GAO report, Kirby and Grissmer (1993) reassessed 
losses from a total force perspective.  Specifically, their hypothesis is that from a DoD  
 
                                                 
84 “Reserve Components: Factors Related to Personnel Attrition in the Selected Reserve,” NSIAD-91-
135, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, 1991), 4, 21.  
85 Ibid., 19. 
86 Ibid., 31, 85. 
87 Ibid., 60. 
88 Ibid., 79–85.  
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return on investment perspective, “it is losses to civilian life that constitute a real loss–
individuals who leave and do not return to military service provide no return on the 
money spent training them.”89   
Using longitudinal data for cohorts (FY82–88) in all services, Kirby and Grissmer 
used a Kaplan-Meier estimator to conduct survival analysis to identify factors that might 
have caused a drop in two-year attrition between FY82 and FY86.  Controlling for 
quality and other demographics, they were unable to identify the cause for the significant 
drop in retention.  Their theory is that some other factors, the most important being the 
implementation of the reserve G.I. Bill and increased resources for equipment and 
training resulted in the decrease in attrition.90 
Using “Recruit’s Education and Background” survey results, Wenger and Hodari 
(2004) identified non-cognitive factors as influencers of attrition rates for AC personnel 
in all services.  Specifically, heavy smokers were predicted to have higher attrition by 
13.5 percentage points and being expelled from school increased attrition by 6.0 
percentage points.  They hypothesize that these indicators potentially reveal a deviant 
behavioral pattern.  Likewise, individuals who did not complete 12 years of schooling 
have higher attrition than HSDGs and certificate holders.  They suggest that educational 
credentials are measuring a non-cognitive factor, such as persistence or determination.91     
Dolfini-Reed, Parcell, Gregory, and Horne (2005) used six-month loss rates to 
estimate the impact of activation on SelRes attrition.  Like several previous studies, the 
definitions of attrition and retention are intertwined and the population included all 
enlisted grades, excluding the active reserve (AR).  Specifically, they used post-9/11 
RCCPDS data up until January 2005 and calculated SelRes six-month loss rates for those 
members who completed their activation by April 2004 and then compared those rates to  
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90 Ibid., 31. 
91 Jennie Wenger and Apriel Hodari, “Predictors of Attrition: Attitudes, Behaviors, and Educational 
Characteristics,” CRM D0010146.A2/Final (Alexandria, VA: CAN, 2004), 71.  
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FY00.  They also noted that it was important to use only individuals who had completed 
their activations since activated individuals “are not eligible to leave and their inclusion 
will artificially lower the loss rate.”92   
Their major findings include that enlisted six-month weighted average loss rates 
increased by 4.4 to 4.6 percentage points from FY00 for Marine Corps Reserve SelRes 
enlisted regardless if they were activated or not, loss rates increased with the length of 
activation and loss rates were lower for those who deployed outside the continental 
United States (OCONUS).  Self-selection bias limited comparing loss rates of activated 
individuals to those never activated since those who remained in the model (never 
activated) were likely systematically different from those who separated.  Additionally, 
activated individual loss rates were based on six months from their last activation, 
whereas it is unclear which six-month period should be used as comparison for 
individuals never activated.  Lastly, they recommended future research that would define 
and model transition between states using a multinomial logit model of transition 
between states and a Cox regression model of time spent in each state.  Combined, these 
models would create a semi-Markov process.93 
In a follow-on study, Dolfini-Reed, Parcell, and Horne (2005) identified that the 
previous relationships estimated for enlisted SelRes, also existed SelRes officers, though 
their magnitude differed greatly.  Marine Corps Reserve SelRes officers who were 
activated had a 7.9 percentage point increase in six-month loss rates.  However, officers 
who were not activated experienced only a 1.9 percentage point increase in six-month 
loss rates and officers who deployed OCONUS had loss rates 6.2 percentage points lower 
than those officers activated and not deploying OCONUS.  Lastly, the authors noted a 
decrease in six-month loss rates for officers with multiple activations.94 
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93 Ibid., 3, 13, 17, 22–29. 
94 Michelle Dolfini-Reed, Ann Parcell, and Benjamin Horne, “Patterns of Reserve Officer Attrition 
since September 11, 2001,” CAB D0012851.A2/Final, (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2005), 2, 10, 13, 16. 
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Hattiangadi and Parcell (2006) identified monetary incentives as a significant 
factor in reducing attrition for Marine Corps Reserve NPS and prior service SelRes 
enlisted.  In this case, loss rates were determined at 6-month, 24-month, and 36-month 
intervals for NPS upon arrival at their SMCR units after completion of recruit training.  
Similarly, prior service SMCR unit loss rates were calculated at the same time intervals 
after receipt of a reenlistment bonus.   
Using logit regressions, Hattiangadi and Parcell estimated a drop in attrition of 3.9 
and 5.5 percentage points for the average NPS enlistee at the 24-month and 36-month 
intervals, respectively, although no statistical difference was observed at six months.  The 
marginal effect for prior service reenlistees was a reduction of attrition by 11.4, 23.9 and 
17.0 percentage points at the respective time intervals.  Due to limited variation, they 
were unable to analyze the impact of different bonus amounts or lump sum versus 
installment payment options on attrition and recommended this for future research when 
enough data are available.  Lastly, they recommended the Marine Corps Reserve 
implement FTAP goals to properly align and mirror SMCR units to the active 
component.95 
C. RETENTION STUDIES 
As with attrition, retention studies attempt to identify the factors and 
characteristics that impact the probability that an individual will decide to stay in the 
service upon completion of his obligatory contract.  The following studies highlight the 
factors significant in this decision. 
The first study discussed above under attrition also spent considerable time 
reviewing prior research in the area of retention.  Consequently, it is discussed in this 
section as well.  Doering and Grissmer (1985) established that present and expected 
future values of compensation affected retention.  In particular, they pointed out the 
substantial increase in retention as retirement vesting approaches.  However, they also 
identified the issue of nonrandom payments as a difficulty in identifying the impact of 
incentives and bonuses.  For instance, a high demand low density military occupational 
                                                 
95 Anita Hattiangadi, “SelRes Attrition and the Selected Reserve Incentive Program,” 1–3, 26, 76–95. 
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specialty (MOS) might receive a bonus, while experiencing low retention rates, whereas, 
a high retention MOS would not receive one.  This suggests reverse causation and 
selection bias affects efforts to isolate the effects of these variables.  Lastly, Doering and 
Grissmer indicated that deployments and family separations negatively affect retention, 
though the strength of the relationship appeared to vary by service.96 
Doering and Grissmer also identified several predictors of retention in the SelRes.  
Although they expected individuals to behave similar to “moonlighters” in the civilian 
sector with respect to pay and compensation, using experimental data they found that pay 
elasticity concerning bonuses was approximately 0.14–0.19 as compared to the 
approximate value of 1.0 for the civilian sector. However, Doering and Grissmer also 
observed that bonus payments tended to significantly reduce separation in the out-years.  
Other research based on survey data validated their finding with elasticities ranging from 
0.1–0.3.  Thus, Doering and Grissmer hypothesized that taste plays an important role and 
that the “reserve job seems to be somewhere between this kind of ‘voluntary’ 
participation and the typical monetary induced-moonlighter.”97 
Hansen and MacLeod (2004) identify several relationships that impact retention.  
First, they define the reenlistment rate as the proportion of service members who renew 
their reenlistments.  They also provide DoD’s measure of attrition as the total losses 
divided by the average strength over a given time period.  Some of the relationships 
discussed by Hansen and MacLeod include increased continuation with rank for enlisted 
personnel, higher continuation rates for service members with 13–17 years of service 
(YOS) followed by a decrease after 20 YOS, as well as a confirmation of many of the 
previous demographic and educational attainment relationships previously discussed in 
this chapter.  Although their data included RCCPDS files from FY2000–2003, Hansen 
and MacLeod were unable to account for individuals who had been activated or deployed 
during this time-frame.98 
                                                 
96 Zahava Doering, “Active and Reserve Force Attrition and Retention,” 15–18. 
97 Ibid., 21–23. 
98 Michael Hansen and Ian MacLeod with David Gregory, “Retention in the Reserve and Guard 
Components,” CRM D0009534.A4/1REVl, (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2004), 1–4, 12–18. 
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Schumacher (2005) studied the impact of activation on an individual’s decision to 
continue service in the Marine Corps Reserve.  For his study, he included all service 
members in the Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve from 1988–1992 and 1996–2004. 
Schumacher’s definition of retention counted only separations from the RC or transfer to 
the Retired Reserve as a loss.  His thesis concluded that there was a positive relationship 
between activation and retention, though this impact decreased with the length of 
activation.99  
Quester, Hattiangadi, and Shuford (2006) looked at the impact of deployment 
tempo on the retention of active component Marines.   Specifically, their dataset included 
the FY2004 FTAP population and number of days spent away from home due to 
deployments, training, and temporary additional duty in the previous 36 months.  Their 
research concluded that the number of days deployed had a greater negative impact on 
retention of enlisted Marines without dependents than those with dependents.  In 
addition, never deploying negatively impacted retention.  Thus, Marines who deployed 
between 1–100 days had higher retention than those deploying greater than 100 days or 
not at all.  Lastly, all else equal, Marines with dependents were more likely to reenlist.100 
Lien (2006) estimated the effect of bonuses on the reenlistment and continuation 
of SelRes service members in the U.S. Navy.  Using a logit model, she estimated that 
sailors who accepted a reenlistment bonus were more likely to continue in the SelRes by 
approximately 12 and 17 percentage points for periods of 12 and 24 months, respectively, 
based on RCCPDS data from October 1999–March 2005.  As with many prior 
regressions, limited variability in the data prevented determining the impact of differing 
bonus amounts.101 
                                                 
99 Joseph Schumacher, Forecasting Retention in the United States Marine Corps Reserve, (Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 18–22, 40. 
100 Aline Quester, Anita Hattiangadi, and Robert Shuford, “Marine Corps Retention in the Post-9/11 
Era: The Effects of Deployment Tempo on Marines with and Without Dependents,” CRM 
D0013462.A1/Final, (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 2006), 39–43. 
101 Diana Lien with David Gregory and Michael Hansen, “The Effect of Enlistment and Reenlistment 
Bonuses on Participation in the Navy Selected Reserves,” CRM D0013385.A2/Final, (Alexandria, VA: 
CNA, 2006), 1–2, 48. 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Although we have reviewed only a selection of the vast number of studies 
conducted in the area of attrition and retention for the U.S. armed forces, several themes 
have developed.  First, there is no one single definition of attrition or retention.  Often, 
the best definition is that which best captures the behavior of interest. 
Second, we have observed multiple ways by which to restrict the population of 
interest.  However, care should be given to not mask the impact of certain categories of 
service by taking into account potentially diverse and systematically different behaviors.  
Examples have included the six various RCs; the SelRes, IRR and Standby Reserve; prior 
service and NPS; officer and enlisted; and junior and senior pay grades. 
Next, the availability and integrity of data are limiting factors in any research, 
which ultimately prohibit the most thorough investigation and analysis.  It is in this last 
regard, which unfortunately I will be unable to avoid completely. 
Lastly, although sometimes contradictory, we have identified several common 
relationships existing between attrition and demographics, compensation, unemployment, 
educational attainment, ability, and activation.  These relationships will form the 
foundations for the models specified in this thesis.  In the next chapter, I will review the 
data used in the statistical analysis, specify the models primarily used to estimate the 
effect of activation and monetary incentives on loss rates, and describe the dependent and 
explanatory variables used in the models. 
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VI. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter I, the purpose of this thesis is to improve the SelRes end 
strength model.  Reserve Affairs Personnel Plans and Policy (RAP) branch uses this 
model to develop the annual recruiting mission and the recently-implemented retention 
goal.  This thesis focuses on the effect of activation and monetary incentives on the 
continuation rates of prior service SMCR service members in the grades of E3 to E5.  
In this chapter, I will review the data used in the multivariate analysis, present the 
model specification, and describe the dependent and explanatory variables.  Hypothesized 
effects of the explanatory variables and data restrictions will be presented along with an 
analysis of select cross-tabulated data. 
B. DATA 
1. Sources 
a. Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) 
My primary data source is the Marine Corps TFDW.102  Pay and 
personnel data elements are entered into the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) 
approximately five times per week and then uploaded to TFDW on a monthly basis.  The 
result is a monthly snapshot of the Total Force.  Historical active component (AC) data 
elements are available via TFDW on the last day of each month from September 30, 1997 
sequence 103 to the present sequence 252 and on the last day of each quarter dating back 
to 31 March 1972 sequence 1.  Appendix 1 shows the sequence designator for each 
month and/or quarter where data is available in TFDW.   
                                                 
102 The Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) is a restricted system of the Manpower Information 
Technology Branch of Manpower & Reserve Affairs (M&RA). It is the Marine Corps' official system of 
record for USC Title 10 end strength reporting. The TFDW houses more than 30 years of historical 
manpower data from a variety of USMC and DoD systems, including MCTFS, MASS, RCCPDS, 
MCTIMS and DEERS, in one central location to provide manpower analysts with a comprehensive view of 
a Marine's career from “street to fleet.” 
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Unlike the AC, Marine Corps Reserve data are available beginning on 
December 31, 1994 sequence 92.  However, data between December 31 and October 31, 
1998 sequence 116 are inconsistent as a result of data storage issues.   
For this thesis, 74 data fields were retrieved.  Appendix 2 provides a list of 
each variable name and its description.  The data represented 4,344,814 monthly-person 
observations from August 31, 2001 sequence 150 to 31 October 2009 sequence 248.  In 
addition, four data elements used to determine pre-9/11 service characteristics were 
retrieved from sequence 92 to 149.  This data represented another 2,307,937 monthly-
person observations.  Lastly, eight data elements used to determine the composition of 
the entire Reserve Component (RC) (shown above in Chapter II) were retrieved for 30 
September 2001 sequence 151 and 30 September 2009 sequence 247.  This data 
represented 432,569 monthly-person observations. 
b. Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) 
Seasonally adjusted, monthly unemployment data by state were obtained 
from CNA for sequence 150 to 248 (August 2001 to October 2009).  The same data are 
also available in raw form from the U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) website.103  
c. Reserve Affairs Personnel Plans and Policy (RAP)      
SelRes enlistment, reenlistment, and affiliation bonus data were provided 
by RAP for FY2002 to FY2009.  However, significant missing data were evident for 
FY2006 and FY2007.  As mentioned previously, missing data for these two years will 
limit a future analysis of recent changes to monetary incentives.  The data elements 
provided by RAP include ssn, date, and service agreement.  Beginning in FY2006, bonus 
amount and recoupment flag data fields were provided as well. 
d. Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 
DMDC is an organization under the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 
Program Integration responsible for collecting manpower and personnel data for the 
                                                 
103 BLS data can be downloaded at http://www.bls.gov/lau/#tables. 
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Department of Defense (DoD).  DMDC serves as the largest integrated personnel data 
repository of DoD manpower records and currently holds over 35 million personnel 
records.104  Three data fields, unavailable for Reserve Marines in TFDW, were requested 
from DMDC, specifically MGIB usage data, monetary incentive data fields, and 
educational attainment.  However, these fields were not made available with sufficient 
time for analysis in this thesis.  Thus, this is one of several areas I will recommend for 
future research. 
2. Data Cleaning and Restrictions 
TFDW data often contains observations on individuals who are no longer serving 
in the Selected Reserve (SelRes) or are affiliated with an AC program.  These 
observations were identified and removed from the SelRes master file.  Specifically, 
deserters and separations were identified via a reserve record status code of 9 or D and 
removed from the Selected Reserve master file.  Additionally, those reserve service 
members who have reenlisted in the AC (component code COMPCODE 11), joined an 
AC officer commissioning program (COMPCODE KP), retired and/or recalled to active 
duty (COMPCODE or reserve COMPCODE beginning with A), or accepted full-time 
orders as an extended active duty recruiter (COMPCODE CD and reserve reporting unit 
code 0) were removed from the SelRes master file. 
Since the purpose of obtaining data prior to sequence 150 was to determine the 
characteristics of service (SMCR unit join dates, previous activation, and prior RC 
experience), those observations that did not coincide with a SelRes member in sequences 
150 to 248 were dropped from the SelRes master file.  Additionally, all observations 
outside of fiscal years FY2002 to FY2009 were removed from the SelRes master file 
upon completion of coding since they were beyond the scope of this thesis.  Additionally, 
analysis will not include FY2009 observations since the 12-month continuation behavior 
of these individuals cannot be tracked with available data.   Lastly, the SelRes master file 
was divided into officer and enlisted master files.  After cleaning the data, the SelRes 
                                                 
104 “DMDC Profile,” Defense Manpower Data Center, 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/profile/Profile_Overview.pdf (accessed March 9, 2010). 
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enlisted master file was reduced to 79,012 unique identification numbers and 2,917,243 
monthly cross-sectional observations and the SelRes officer master file was reduced to 
5,358 unique identification numbers and 190,565 monthly cross-sectional observations. 
3. Coding 
The online Marine Corps Codes Manual (CODESMAN) was used to interpret and 
code each data element from TFDW.  Appendices 3–24 of this thesis contain a list of the 
codes used for this coding effort.  Additionally, each observation is assigned an 
observation number based on the length of uninterrupted SMCR service (tour length) on 
that date.  In this case, uninterrupted service is defined as not having a break greater than 
two months, for reasons, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  If an individual 
drops from the SMCR units for a period of three months or more, and then later rejoins 
the SMCR, his observation number restarts at 1 and a binary variable is generated 
indicating this incident as a subsequent SMCR tour.  Observation numbers are coded 
consecutively for temporary drops of less than three months and account for the elapsed 
time between these missing periods. 
An unstated objective of this thesis was to develop a database of SelRes enlisted 
characteristics for future research.  Consequently, the SelRes enlisted master file has been 
coded in such a way as to facilitate analysis of other potential populations of interest to 
include the active reserve (AR) program and individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) 
for both officer and enlisted, non-prior service (NPS) and prior service.  Twelve-month 
continuation rates may be calculated for any observation number and the values of 
explanatory variables reflect the most current value at the time of that observation.  A list 
of the variables present in the SelRes enlisted master file is included as Appendix 25.   
4. Codebook 
A codebook describing the final coded dataset is provided at Appendix 26 for the 
SelRes enlisted master file.  The codebook describes each variable created for this thesis 




appropriate.  Although beyond the scope of this thesis, a codebook is also available for 
the SelRes officer master file from the Naval Postgraduate School, Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy. 
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
My general approach is to analyze how 12-month continuation rates are affected 
by activation and monetary incentives using cross-sectional snap-shots of the prior 
service SMCR unit population based on their observation number in SMCR unit Training 
Category Pay Group (TCPG) A.  I will use regression analysis to isolate the independent 
effects of activation and monetary incentives, as well as demographics, background, 
economic conditions, ability, performance, person-job fit, prior reserve experience, and 
tour length. 
1. Binary Response Model 
Because the 12-month continuation outcome y is a binary response, our concern is 
the response probability P as shown in equation 3 given various individual characteristics 
x :105  
( ) ( )1 21 1 , , , kP y x P y x x x= = = …               (3) 
 
2. Probit Models 
The use of linear probability models to estimate (3) have two major drawbacks: 
(1) probabilities are not restricted between zero and one, and (2) partial effects of the 
explanatory variables are held constant. To avoid these issues, I have modeled the 
response probability P as a function G as shown in equation 4, where ( )0 1G z< < :106  
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 1 01 k kP y x G x x G xβ β β β β= = + + + = +…                   (4) 
 
                                                 
105 Jeffrey Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 4th ed. (Mason, OH: South-
Western Cengage Learning, 2009), 575. 
106 Ibid., 575. 
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In particular, the probit model, which uses the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function, as shown in equations 5 and 6, will be used to estimate the 
parameters for 12-month continuation rates:107   
        
( ) ( ) ( )zG z z dvφ υ
−∞
= Φ = ∫               (5) 
 
where ( )zφ  is the standard normal density 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1/2 22 exp 2z zφ π −= −                        (6) 
3. Model Specification 
Based on the influential factors that were identified in the literature review and 
the prior service population, four models are specified in this thesis.  The first model, 
shown in Figure 11, incorporates those factors from Chapter V that have been statistically 
significant in prior studies estimating the effects of activation and monetary incentives.   
 
Model 1108 
P(Continuation = 1|x) = G(β0 + β1-3Activation Frequency + β4Months Previously 
Activated + β5Deployed OCONUS + β6State Unemployment Rate + β7AFQT + β8Lump 
Sum Bonus + β9Bonus + β10-13Race + β14Gender + β15Children + β16-17Marital Status + 
β18Age + β19-20Rank + β21Joined Prior to 9/11 + β22-27Fiscal Year Effects) 
Figure 11.   Model 1 Specification Using Explanatory Variables Drawn from the 
Literature Review 
 
                                                 
107 Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 576. 
108 Actual variable names are listed in Appendix 26. The names include: ret_12mos_PS 
(Continuation); mob1, mob2, mob3 (Activation Frequency); mos_mob_prior (Months Previously 
Activated), oconus_dep (Deployed OCONUS), unemployment (State Unemployment Rate); afqt (AFQT); 
bonus_fy06plus (Lump Sum Bonus); bonus (Bonus); nativeamerican, asian, black, pacificislander (Race); 
female (Gender); child1_plus (Children); married, divorced (Marital Status); age (Age); cpl, sgt (Rank); 
pre_9_11 (Joined Prior to 9/11); and d03, d04, d05, d06, d07, d08 (Fiscal Year Effects). Continuation 
variables are coded under “ret” and activation variables are coded under “mob.” 
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In addition to the first model, the second model, as shown in Figure 12, 
incorporates person-job fit variables relevant to the Marine Corps Reserve.  These 
include such factors as performance and conduct, physical and technical skill evaluations, 
and prior experience in the SelRes.   
Variables hypothesized to increase the probability of 12-month continuation 
include activation frequency indicators, increases in the state unemployment rate, higher 
conduct marks, higher Marine Corps physical and technical test scores and qualifications, 
increased monetary incentives, prior reserve experience and tours, and the combat arms 
occupational specialty grouping.  Alternatively, the following variables are predicted to 
decrease the probability of continuation: cumulative number of months activated, 
deployment OCONUS, unexcused absences from drill, female, being married, and age.  
The remaining variables are ambiguous a priori.  
 
Model 2109 
P(Continuation = 1|x) = G(β0 + β1-3Activation Frequency + β4Months Previously 
Activated + β5Deployed OCONUS + β6State Unemployment Rate + β7AFQT + 
β8Proficiency Rating + β9Conduct Rating + β10Rifle Qualification + β11Physical Fitness 
+ β12Basic Skills Testing + β13Advanced Water Survival + β14Unexcused Absences + 
β15Retirement Qualified Years + β16-18Prior Reserve Experience + β19Lump Sum Bonus + 
β20Bonus + β21-24Race + β25Gender + β26Children + β27-28Marital Status + β29Age + β30-
31Rank + β32-33General Occupational Groupings + β34Headquarters/Force Units + 
β35Joined Prior to 9/11 + β36-41Fiscal Year Effects) 
Figure 12.   Model 2 Specification with Marine Corps Reserve-specific Characteristics 
 
                                                 
109 Actual variable names from Appendix 26 include the following variables in addition to those 
specified in Model 1: prof_svc (Proficiency Rating); con_service (Conduct Rating); rifle_score (Rifle 
Qualification; pft_score (Physical Fitness); bst (Basic Skills Testing); wsc_advanced (Advanced Water 
Survival); unexcuse_12_mos (Unexcused Absences); satyrs (Retirement Qualified Years); true_reserve, 
SMCR_PS2, SMCR_PS3 (Prior Reserve Experience); combat_arms, aviation_community (General 
Occupational Groupings); and mfr (Headquarters/Force Unit). 
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Models 3 and 4 use nearly the same specification as Model 2, except the prior 
service SMCR unit population is restricted based on prior military experience.  
Specifically, the prior service RC and prior service AC populations parameters are 
estimated separately to rectify omitted variable bias caused by aggregation of the data.  
The effect of activation will be shown to differ between the two population samples in 
Chapter VII. 
Model 3 estimates the parameters for continuation of the prior RC population.  
The specification is the same as shown in Model 2, except several variables were omitted 
due to infrequent observation.  Specifically, the race indicators of nativeamerican and 
pacificislander and the water survival qualification indicator wsc_advanced were 
dropped.  More importantly, only six prior service RC service members were observed to 
have accepted an affiliation or reenlistment bonus; thus, the bonus indicators of bonus 
and bonus_fy06plus were both dropped from this Model. 
Model 4 estimates the parameters for continuation of the prior AC population.  
Like the RC model, some variables were omitted due to infrequent observation to include 
the race indicator of pacificislander and the mob frequency indicator of mob3. 
In all four models, parameters are estimated using individuals with the same tour 
length (4, 12, and 24 months).  In the next two sections, we will discuss these variables in 
greater detail. 
D. DEFINITION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
For prior service SMCR unit Marines, manpower analysts are most interested in 
predicting the SMCR unit continuation rates in the subsequent fiscal year (12-month 
period) to develop the annual recruiting mission (as discussed above in Chapter II) and 
fiscal appropriation requests.  Unlike NPS that require additional time and resources to 
complete both recruit and military occupational specialty (MOS) training, the typical 
prior service Marine has the requisite MOS to make an immediate impact on unit 
readiness.  Thus, a 12-month prediction is adequate. 
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1. Defining Continuation Rates 
As previously discussed in Chapter V, attrition typically refers to the loss of 
service members during a time period prior to completion of their contractual service 
obligation.  However, this definition is not indicative of SMCR prior service since these 
individuals do not have a binding contract with which to restrict their movement between 
Reserve Component (RC) TCPGs.  
Alternatively, retention typically refers to the reenlistment of service members at 
the expiration of their contractual obligation.  Once again, this definition loses relevance 
when describing the participation behavior of SMCR prior service who reenlist in the 
Ready Reserve vice the SelRes.  In this case, annual continuation rates, which indicate 
the observed probability of the average service member to stay in the same TCPG over a 
one-year period most appropriately describes the behavior of interest. 
It is also important to define both gains and losses to SMCR units.  As discussed 
above in Chapter II, Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) does not receive 
mission credit for a prior service Marine until that service member has been with the 
SelRes for at least three months.  Similarly, it is common for Marines to temporarily drop 
from an SMCR unit for one to two TFDW cycles due to an administrative error or 
oversight on the part of the Marine.  Consequently, we avoid these issues by analyzing 
the behavior of SMCR unit prior service joins that have been with the unit for over three 
TFDW monthly cycles (sequences).  Temporary drops of less than three TFDW monthly 
cycles are not counted as a loss. 
2. Dependent Variable: ret_12mos_PS 
The dependent variable ret_12mos_PS (12-month continuation) is dichotomous 
and indicates if a prior service SMCR unit Marine is still serving with an SMCR unit 12 
months later.  Figure 13 portrays this behavior on a monthly basis (by sequence) for prior 
service SMCR unit Marines in the ranks of lance corporal through sergeant.  Also shown 




comparison demonstrates the lag response of end strength to changes in continuation 
rates, the importance of accurate forecasts, and reinforces the principle of using small 





























   
   
   
   
   
   















Source:  Author, based on TFDW (Oct 01 - Sep 09)
LCpl-Sgt (Oct 01 - Sep 08)
SMCR Prior Service Strength and Continuation Rates
 
Figure 13.   Continuation Rates and On-hand Strength 
E. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Explanatory variables in the model include activation, state-level economic 
conditions, ability, performance, person-job fit indicators, monetary incentives, 
demographics, occupational groupings, and fiscal year differences.  The observation 
number will be used as a restriction for tour length in all four models.  In addition, prior 
service experience will be used as a restriction in Models 3 and 4.  Each of these 
variables will be defined and described in the following paragraphs. 
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1. Activation 
a. Activation Frequency: mob1, mob2, mob3 
The binary activation frequency variables, mob1, mob2, and mob3, are 
representative of a service member’s historical activation history in the SelRes at the 
point of observation dating back to December 31, 1994.  As an example, an individual 
who has activated twice, including a current activation, would be represented by mob1 = 
0, mob2 = 1, and mob3 = 0.   
As discussed in Chapter III, prior service activations are semi-voluntary in 
nature.  In recent years, units are aware of their activation schedule and actively recruit 
service members who desire and expect to be activated.  Thus, prior service members not 
desiring activation are less likely to have frequent activations and choose to transfer to 
the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).  Due to this self-selection by SelRes service 
members, we would anticipate a positive correlation between activation frequency and 
continuation rates.  The cross-tabulation of continuation rates and activation frequency 
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Figure 14.   Continuation Rates by Activation Status 
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b. Months Previously Activated: mos_mob_prior 
Months previously activated is an integer variable and counts all previous 
months on activation orders while a member of the SelRes, based on the current 
observation number.  In general, we would anticipate activation to have a cumulative 
effect, regardless of an individual’s RC participation status.  Consequently, it does not 
reset to zero, nor do any of the activation dependent variables reset when a member 
breaks from the SelRes (permanently or temporarily).  An individual with 12 months of 
prior activation would be represented by mos_mob_prior = 12. 
Based on prior empirical results discussed in the literature review and 
taking into account the Expected Utility of Deployment model, we would expect 
decreasing marginal returns as the length of activation increases.  If an individual in the 
ranks of lance corporal to sergeant desired extended active duty, then he would have 
reenlisted in the AC.  Thus, we hypothesize that an inverse relationship exists between 
months activated and the probability of continuation.  Depending on the magnitude of 
this relationship, the net effect of activation may be negative for individuals with higher 
cumulative months of activation. 
c. Previously Deployed OCONUS: oconus_dep 
Previously deployed OCONUS is a dichotomous variable that indicates 
where an individual deployed.  If an individual activated at least once and deployed 
OCONUS, then this variable takes on the value of 1, otherwise it remains 0, regardless of 
an individual’s activation history. 
Considering the dynamics of deploying to a hostile fire zone as discussed 
in Chapter III, the effect of deploying OCONUS is uncertain.110  On one hand, deploying 
to a hostile fire zone increases an individual’s pay and career opportunities and partially 
satisfies an individual’s pursuit of honor, recognition, and credibility as a Marine.  
Conversely, there is tremendous stress and turmoil for Marines who are subsequently 
separated from friends and family members.  In addition, once an individual deploys to a 
                                                 
110 Ninety-eight percent of all OCONUS deployments were to a hostile fire zone (see Figure 9). 
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hostile fire location, his desire for redeployment OCONUS may be satisfied.  Lastly, 
although Figure 14 does not demonstrate a large impact on continuation, a service 
member must be activated to deploy.  Thus, we would anticipate OCONUS deployment 
continuation rates to be positively biased by activation when not controlling for these 
effects.  Consequently, the impact of deploying OCONUS is ambiguous a priori. 
2. Unemployment Rate: Unemployment 
The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate is a continuous variable based on an 
individual’s home state of residence in the Marine Corps Reserve during the month of 
observation.  The weighted average for all prior SMCR unit new joins during FY02–
FY08 would be represented by unemployment = 5.3. 
Based on the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model discussed in Chapter 
IV, we would expect a rise in unemployment to increase continuation rates.  Also, 
empirical results from the literature review suggest that a one percentage point increase in 
unemployment will increase continuation rates by 1.3 to 1.7 percentage points.  
Accordingly, we hypothesize a positive relationship between unemployment rates and 
continuation. 
3. Ability: afqt 
The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is a continuous variable that 
represents the most recent test scores at the time of observation.  According to the ACOL 
model discussed in Chapter IV, it is possible that an individual’s intellectual ability as 
measured by the AFQT could increase a service member’s military career opportunities 
and future expected earnings.  Alternatively, a higher AFQT could also increase potential 
civilian earnings.  Although prior studies discussed in the literature review empirically 
determined a lower attrition rate for first-term Marines, we cannot anticipate the same 
behavior for prior service Marines not obligated to drill in the SelRes by a binding 
service contract.  Therefore, the effect of AFQT is ambiguous.  However, given the 
minimal range in average scores, which increased from 60.0 to 61.4 across the first 48 
observations, it is unlikely that AFQT will have a large effect on continuation, regardless 
of sign.  
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4. Monetary Incentives 
a. Bonus 
The variable bonus is binary with bonus = 1 indicating that an individual 
received a bonus.  We would expect a strong positive correlation between receiving a 
bonus and continuation.  Although acceptance of a bonus does not legally obligate a 
service member to participate in SMCR units, failing to fulfill the service agreement 
results in the loss of future installment payments, or recoupment of funds in the case of a 
lump sum bonus.  Considering the ACOL model and the high discounts rates estimated 
for enlisted service members in the literature review, we would expect bonuses to have a 
large positive effect on continuation.  Figure 15 supports this hypothesis and indicates a 
6.6 percentage point increase in continuation across all observations and a 10.5 
percentage point increase during the first 12 months with respect to a bonus, not 
controlling for other factors. 
We would also anticipate a strong effect of the bonus amount, which has 
varied widely over the past eight years, from $50/mo to $15,000/three years as indicated 
above in Table 5 (Chapter II).  However, the absence of this data element in RA files 
prior to FY2006 combined with incomplete data from FY2006 and FY2007 make 
analysis of the bonus amount difficult.  Inferring the amounts based on categorical 
variables is also problematic due to the litany of monetary incentives available each year.  
Thus, the model will not account for differences in bonus amounts. 
b. Lump Sum Payment: bonus_fy06plus 
The variable lump sum payment is dichotomous and indicates if a bonus 
was paid via a lump sum.  Since the payment option is dependent on an individual 
receiving a bonus, the lump sum payment variable cannot take on a value of 1 unless a 
bonus 1 is also indicated.  Conversely, one cannot infer whether or not an individual 
























































Source: Author, based on TFDW, Oct 01 - Sep 09
LCpl-Sgt (Oct 01 - Sep 08)
SMCR unit Prior Service Continuation Rates
 
Figure 15.   Comparison of Monetary Incentives and Continuation Rates 
Although data were not available from RA designating the bonus payout 
method, I was able to infer this information given that all bonuses, except the $50 
monthly affiliation incentive, were offered as a lump sum beginning in FY2006.  After 
FY2006, installment payments were no longer offered.  However, since significant 
increases in bonus amounts occurred simultaneously to a change in payment method, I 
will be unable to separate these two effects. 
Based on the previous discussion of personal discount rates and the ACOL 
model, we would expect that a lump sum bonus would have a strong positive impact on 
continuation, independent from bonus size.  Likewise, a significant increase in the 
payment amount could also positively impact continuation rates, given the minimal bonus 
amounts provided prior to FY2006.  As shown in Figure 15, large increases in 
continuation rates over the first 12 months appear to support this hypothesis, though the 
effect appears to diminish over time, potentially after completion of the affiliation 
 76
requirement.  Lastly, the limited number of monetary incentives granted (371 bonuses 
excluding missing FY2006 and FY2007 data) suggests that there is vast room for 
improvement of continuation rates if additional funding is allocated to this area. 
5. Person-Job Fit 
This category of variables is used to describe certain factors that indicate 
congruence of a service member’s technical skills and abilities with Marine Corps criteria 
and evaluations.  These variables also portray how well an individual has adapted to the 
Marine Corps, and on a personal level, denote competence and credibility as a Marine. 
a. Performance: prof_svc 
For Marines below the rank of sergeant, performance is measured on a 5.0 
scale known as proficiency marks, with anything below a 4.0 indicating sub-standard 
performance.  Marine Corps Order (MCO) P1070.12K describes the proficiency mark as 
follows:    
In addition to technical skills and specialized knowledge, relating to duty 
proficiency marks, the “whole Marine concept” must be considered. 
Such attributes as mission accomplishment, leadership, intellect and 
wisdom, individual character, physical fitness, personal appearance, and 
completion of professional military education.111  
The proficiency variable chosen is continuous and reflects the cumulative 
average marks for a Marine’s entire career, prior to that observation, measured at three to 
six-month intervals.  Marines with an average mark below 4.0 are not eligible for 
reenlistment.  As such, the proficiency variable has been converted to a range of 1.0 from 
4.0 to 5.0.112 
 
 
                                                 
111 “Individual Records Administration Manual,” MCO P1070.12K W/CH1, (Quantico, VA: U.S. 
Department of the Navy, 2000), 4–42. 
112 Using a range of 1.0, prof_svc = 0.0 represents a 4.0 proficiency duty rating, prof_svc = 0.5 
represents a 4.5 rating, and prof_svc = 1.0 represents a 5.0 rating.  
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Although it would seem that a service member with high proficiency 
marks would signify a relatively high person-job fit, it is also likely that these same 
attributes of performance are highly desired in the civilian sector.  Thus, the hypothesized 
effect of performance on continuation is ambiguous. 
b. Conduct: con_service 
Conduct is evaluated for Marines below the rank of sergeant using the 
same scale and frequency of observation as proficiency.  The conduct variable chosen is 
continuous and reflects the cumulative average marks for a Marine’s entire career, prior 
to that observation, measured at three- to six-month intervals.  Marines with an average 
mark below 4.0 are not eligible for reenlistment.  Similar to proficiency, the conduct 
variable has also been converted to a range of 1.0. 
As described below in MCO P1070.12K, a high conduct mark is 
indicative of a good person-job fit.  Therefore, we would expect that high conduct marks 
are associated with higher continuation rates.      
In addition to observance of the letter of law and regulations, conduct 
includes conformance to accepted usage and custom, and positive 
contributions to unit and Corps. General bearing, attitude, interest, 
reliability, courtesy, cooperation, obedience, adaptability, influence on 
others, moral fitness, physical fitness as effected by clean and temperate 
habits, and participation in unit activities not related directly to unit 
mission, are all factors of conduct and should be considered in evaluating 
the Marine.113   
c. Rifle Qualification Scores: rifle_score 
Rifle marksmanship skills are considered a core competence for Marines.  
All enlisted SelRes Marines are required to qualify once every two years.  Marksmanship 
skills are a source of pride and are displayed on dress uniforms by wearing marksmanship 
badges.  Moreover, approximately one-sixth of a Marine’s promotion score in the ranks 
of lance corporal and corporal is based on this score.  Rifle qualifications are also 
included on fitness reports for sergeants and above. 
                                                 
113 “Individual Records Administration Manual,” MCO P1070.12K, 4–39. 
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Per Appendix 9, the rifle score has been converted to a continuous 
variable using a 5.0 scale.  Although, a high rifle score could be interpreted as a good 
indicator of person-job fit, the relationship between rifle scores and overall performance 
as a Marine is tenuous.  Thus, the effect of hereditary shooting ability (hand-eye 
coordination) is ambiguous. 
d. Physical Fitness: pft_score 
Although physical fitness is also hereditary in nature, related to body 
composition and build, the physical fitness test (PFT) requires a certain level of 
dedication and effort by the Marine to maintain a satisfactory fitness-level.  Therefore, 
we would anticipate a high pft score to reflect a good person-job fit.  Similar to the rifle 
score, pft is a continuous variable converted to a 5.0 scale using Appendix 9 as a guide.   
e. Basic Skills Test: bst 
The BST is an annual knowledge and skills test.  The recordable portion of 
the evaluation is a 50-question written test of a Marine’s knowledge of customs, 
courtesies, and Marine Corps history.  Although a high score could indicate a good 
person-job fit, this evaluation is pass or fail and does not normally impact a Marine’s 
career.  Accordingly, scores typically vary based on the emphasis that each unit places on 
the bst, so that the effect may be insignificant.  This variable is continuous and ranges 
from zero to 50. 
f. Advanced Water Survival: wsc_advanced 
The advanced water survival variable is dichotomous and indicates 
whether a Marine obtained an advanced water survival certification, such as a safety 
swimmer, instructor, or instructor-trainer.  All Marines are required to have a minimal 
water survival qualification based on their MOS.  Since obtaining an advanced 
certification is not typical (1 out of 100), our base case is a service member who has not 
obtained an advanced certification.  
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Although hereditary and previous youth experience can play a large role in 
a Marine’s water survival classification, attending an advanced water survival 
qualification course requires additional time and funding.  Thus, we would only expect 
units to send individuals to training who are likely to provide a return on investment.  
Accordingly, we hypothesize that obtaining advanced water survival certification predicts 
a higher probability of continuation. 
g. Unexcused Absence: unexcuse_12_mo 
Unexcused absence is an integer variable that indicates the number of 
unexcused absences a Marine is awarded in the previous 12 months of observation.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, SelRes Marines are required to satisfactorily complete 48 drills 
per year, typically scheduled once a month as a four-drill weekend.  Therefore, missing 
one weekend of drills would result in four unexcused absences. 
Failure to attend drills without an authorized excuse is likely a strong 
indicator that a Marine has a person-job fit conflict with his civilian career, family, or the 
Reserve unit.  Consequently, we would expect an inverse relationship between the 
number of unexcused absences and a service member’s continuation rate. 
6. Military Experience 
The next category of variables describes certain characteristics of a service 
member’s military experience that could impact his decision to continue serving in an 
SMCR unit.  Examples include prior experience in the SMCR units, rank, years of 
satisfactory service, and occupational groupings.  
a. Prior Obligor: true_reserve 
Prior experience in the SMCR as an obligor is a dichotomous variable.  
True_reserve = 0 indicates an initial enlistment in the AC, while true_reserve = 1 
indicates an initial enlistment in the RC.  As depicted in Figure 16, over 76 percent of all 
prior service recruits during the past eight years have previously served in the AC.114 
                                                 
114 Note: 9,721/12,739 = 76.3 percent. The prior service experience of an additional 791 prior service 




























































Source: Author, based on TFDW, Oct 01 - Sep 09
LCpl-Sgt (Oct 01 - Sep 08)
SMCR unit Prior Service Continuation Rates
 
Figure 16.   Continuation Rates and Prior Reserve Experience 
Prior service Marines who initially enlist in the RC would have a much 
better understanding and expectation of service in an SMCR unit than a Marine whose 
prior experience was in the AC.  Consequently, they would have a more realistic job 
preview and a better person-job fit.  Hence, we would expect a positive effect on 
continuation rates.  Figure 16 supports this hypothesis, showing a 12 percentage point 
increase in continuation over all observations and a 17.5 percentage point increase during 
the first 12 months.  The decreased effect averaged across all observations suggests that 





b. Previous SMCR tours: SMCR_break_PS_gt1 
One or more prior SMCR tours is a dichotomous variable indicating that a 
Marine re-affiliated with an SMCR unit after a temporary break in service greater than 
three months.  As shown in Figure 16, this occurrence is common to approximately 15 
percent of prior service recruits in the ranks of lance corporal to sergeant.115   
Similar to prior experience in the SMCR as an obligor, we would expect 
that individuals returning for a second tour in the SMCR would also have a more realistic 
job preview.  However, this behavior also suggests that they are more likely to transfer 
should a career opportunity arise elsewhere in the RC or other outside factors decrease 
their free-time available to drill.  As such, we would anticipate an initial positive effect 
on continuation that diminishes over time.  Figure 16 support this hypothesis showing 
nearly a six percentage point difference during the first 12 months, but no significant 
difference when averaged across all observations. 
c. Retirement Qualified Years: satyrs 
Satyrs is an integer variable that increases annually based on the 
anniversary date and obtaining 50 retirement credit points.  As previously discussed in 
the ACOL model, the closer a service member is towards retirement the higher his net 
present value of future military earnings becomes.  The literature review also supports 
this relationship between retention and proximity to reserve retirement vesting.  
However, with a median value of satyrs = 5, for prior service SMCR unit Marines in the 
ranks of lance corporal to sergeant, this retirement pull is likely weak.  Therefore, the 
estimated effect of retirement qualified years towards retirement, given the subject 
population, is ambiguous a priori. 
d. Rank: cpl, sgt 
The experience category of rank includes the three binary indicator 
variables of lcpl, cpl, and sgt.  In the model, lance corporal is indicated as the omitted 
variable when cpl = 0 and sgt = 0. 
                                                 
115 Note: 2,207/13530 = 14.9 percent. 
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Marines enter the ranks of non-commissioned officer (NCO) upon 
promotion to corporal.  For some, this may be a moment of achievement or a point of 
pride, not leaving the Marine Corps as a lance corporal. Thus, it’s conceivable that lance 
corporals might have higher continuation rates for this reason.  Alternatively, empirical 
evidence from the literature review suggests that retention increases beyond the rank of 
corporal making promotion to sergeant an important career step.   As such, the rank of 
corporal is a decision point for some on whether to pursue the Marine Corps as a career.   
The cross-tabulation of rank and 12-month continuation rates in Figure 17 
supports this concave relationship.  Lance corporals have higher continuation rates while 
holding out for promotion to corporal.  They then depart having met their goal and 
deciding against (at least temporarily) a Marine Corps career.  The higher continuation 
rate of sergeants suggests that they have adjusted to the additional rank and responsibility 
as an NCO and are increasingly making the decision of a Marine Corps career.  However, 
determining the independent impact of each of these variables is necessary to further 


































Source: Author, based on TFDW, Oct 01 - Sep 09
LCpl-Sgt (Oct 01 - Sep 08)
SMCR unit Prior Service Continuation Rates
 
Figure 17.   Continuation Rates for Lance Corporal through Sergeant 
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e. Occupational Groupings: combat_arms, aviation_community 
All SMCR unit Marines can be divided into occupational groupings using 
the three general categories of ground combat arms, aviation, and support.116  Two binary 
variables were generated to distinguish the three categories with support, the omitted 
variable, indicated by combat_arms = 0 and aviation_community = 0.  
In general, we might expect the combat arms community to receive less 
technical training.  As a result, they would potentially have a lower net present value of 
future civilian earnings using the ACOL model.  Therefore, we would expect higher 
continuation rates.  Additionally, the likelihood of the combat arms community to work 
closely together in teams, maintaining unit cohesion and integrity, could also potentially 
increase continuation rates compared to other communities. By contrast, the likelihood of 
working in small detachments or being attached to another unit increases for the support 
community. 
For the aviation community, we would expect a higher quality of life due 
to the proximity of large bases and airfields, as well as increased funding.  Accordingly, 
we would expect higher continuation rates for the aviation community, diminished 
somewhat by the draw of their technical backgrounds. 
f. Headquarters and Force Units: mfr 
This dichotomous variable includes units assigned directly to Marine 
Forces Reserve (MarForRes), such as reconnaissance, air naval gunfire liaison, and civil 
affairs, as well as individuals assigned to the MarForRes staff.   Force units are close-knit 
and offer more prestige than other units, attracting service members with a higher person-
job fit.  Additionally, assignment to a high-level staff reduces information asymmetry and 
increases autonomy, which can lead to higher job satisfaction.  As a result, we would 
anticipate higher continuation rates by service members assigned to these types of units.    
                                                 
116 For purposes of this thesis, ground combat arms includes PMOS of 03xx, 08xx, and 18xx, 
accounting for 33 percent of SMCR units. Aviation includes the PMOS categories of 59xx–79xx, excluding 
METOC, accounting for approximately 8.4 percent of SMCR units. The remaining PMOS are broadly 
categorized as “support.” 
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7. Demographics 
Demographic variables include gender, marital status, children, race groups, and 
age.  Each variable is described in this section. 
a. Female 
The female variable equals 1 for a female and 0 for a male, which make up 
over 94 percent of the prior service population in the ranks of lance corporal through 
sergeant.117  Although traditional family and occupational roles have slowly evolved, we 
would anticipate a lower continuation rate among females, since they are more likely to 
take career intermissions due to the birth of children.  Also, we would expect females 
with young children to be more risk averse to activation and deployment OCONUS.  In 
general, these hypotheses are supported both by empirical studies from the literature 
review and the cross tabulation of data.  Figure 18 indicates an initial 4.4 percentage 
point lower continuation rate for females in the first 12 months, and a 7.5 percentage 
point difference averaged across all observations.  However, it is also possible that the 
effect of children is negatively biasing the effect of gender for females.  Thus, partialing 
out the differences using multivariate analysis will estimate more accurate effects. 
                                                 

































































Source: Author, based on TFDW, Oct 01 - Sep 09
LCpl-Sgt (Oct 01 - Sep 08)
SMCR unit Prior Service Continuation Rates
 
Figure 18.   Continuation Rates by Gender and Parenting 
b. Children: child1_plus 
The variable for children is dichotomous and indicates if a service member 
has at least one child, child_plus = 1, or none at all, child_plus = 0.  Over 77 percent of 
all prior service SMCR unit new joins in the ranks of lance corporal through sergeant 
have no children.  Empirical results are mixed as to the effects of children on 
continuation rates.  Although we would expect the preoccupation with child rearing to 
make an individual more risk averse to deployments and prolonged absence, it is also 
plausible that parenting could increase an individual’s desire to protect the safety and 
security of the U.S.  Moreover, raising children could reduce family earnings through the 
loss of spousal income, making supplemental income a priority.  Additionally, programs, 
such as Tricare Reserve Select, with a flat-rate premium and no exclusions for pre-
existing conditions (as discussed in Chapter III), could make continued service in an 
SMCR unit more attractive for single-income families with children.  As such, the overall 
effect of children on continuation rates is ambiguous a priori. 
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c. Marital Status: Married, Divorced 
Marital status is composed of three states; single, married, and divorced; 
as indicated by the three binary variables of single, married, and divorced.  The single 
marital status represents 54.7 percent of all new joins in the ranks of lance corporal 
through sergeant118 and is indicated in the model by omission when married = 0 and 
divorced = 0.  Empirical results from the literature for AC personnel suggest that being 
married is associated with higher retention.  However, we would anticipate the opposite 
effect for reserve personnel.  Specifically, participation in the Reserve is part-time for the 
majority of reserve service members and more akin to moonlighting as suggested in the 
literature review.  Additionally, spouses are more likely to pursue a higher paying civilian 
career without the interruptions of military moves experienced by the AC; thus, the 
additional income of reserve participation may be less appealing. As such, we would 
expect that married reserve service members might be more risk averse to deployments 
and prolonged absence from family members.  However, the literature review also 
suggested that certain age groups experienced more changes in marital status, and we 
would expect a change in marital status from single to married to have a negative effect 
on continuation rates.  Thus, although Figure 19 suggests a lower continuation rate for 
married SMCR unit Marines, it is necessary to control for such other effects as activation, 
age, and children to accurately estimate the effect of marital status on continuation rates.  
                                                 


















































Source: Author, based on TFDW, Oct 01 - Sep 09
LCpl-Sgt (Oct 01 - Sep 08)
SMCR unit Prior Service Continuation Rates
 
Figure 19.   Continuation Rates by Marital Status 
d. Race/Ethnicity: Black, Pacificislander, Nativeamerican, Asian 
Race is defined by the five categories of white (84.6 percent), black (11.1 
percent ), pacificislander (2.9 percent ), nativeamerican (1.1 percent ), and asian (0.3 
percent ).  TFDW did not account for the Hispanic population separately, and thus, they 
are included in the category of white.119  In the model, white (and Hispanic) are indicated 
as the omitted variable by black = 0, pacificislander = 0, nativeamerican = 0, and asian 
= 0.  Although historically minorities have been attracted to the services due to its 
perception of opportunity and equality, the proclivity of service during combat operations 
may be affected less by racial differences.  As such, no hypothesis is given concerning 
the effect of race. 
                                                 
119 Authors calculations based on TFDW data for SMCR unit new joins in the ranks of lance corporal 
through sergeant from October 2001–September 2008. Note: 1,930 Marines (14.3 percent overall) did not 
provide their race. 
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e. Age 
Age is a continuous variable based on the date of observation.  The 
average age for prior service SMCR unit new joins is 26.5.  The Marine Corps is a 
physically demanding occupation and we would expect older Marines to find less job 
satisfaction in undertaking strenuous activities.  Although we would expect a positive 
effect as the age of retirement vesting nears, Reserve Marines in the grades of lance 
corporal through sergeant are less likely to be affected by retirement decisions per our 
previous discussion of the ACOL model (Chapter IV).  Additionally, older Marines are 
less likely to be affected by the desire for acceptance into adulthood as discussed in 
Chapter III.  Accordingly, we hypothesize an inverse relationship between age and 
continuation rates.   
8. Annual Effects 
a. Fiscal Years: d03, d04, d05, d06, d07, d08 
Fiscal year dummies account for differences due to unobservables that 
may affect each year differently.  For instance, the U.S. population strongly supported the 
military for much of FY2002 in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  However, public 
opinion began to sour as operations in Iraq bogged down in FY2004 and FY2005.  
Moreover, the 202k “Grow the Force” Initiative in FY2006 and FY2007 attracted many 
prior service Marines to reenlist in the AC, in part due to significant monetary incentives.  
Overall, it is difficult to predict the balance of changing U.S. attitudes and force structure 
on each fiscal year individually.  However, we would expect the base year of FY2002, 
indicated as the omitted variable, to have a positive effect on continuation rates. 
b. Pre 9/11 Service: Pre_9_11 
Prior service Marines joining prior to 9/11 did so with relatively low 
expectations of activation and deployment in the Marine Corps Reserve.  However, those 
joining after this date had a more realistic job-preview regarding frequency of 
deployments based on both experience, unit rotation schedules, and written guidance  
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provided by the Secretary of Defense, as discussed in Chapters III and IV.  Therefore, we 
would expect that individuals who joined prior to 9/11 would have a lower probability of 
continuation.  
9. Tour Length: obs_PS 
The variable obs_PS is an integer indicating the number of months an individual 
has served consecutively in the SMCR units.120  The longer the tour length, the more 
likely it is that individuals with incongruent family lives, civilian jobs, person-job fit, 
personality conflicts, and unmet expectations have transferred from the SMCR to a 
TCPG with more compatible participation requirements.  Therefore, we would anticipate 
that the effects of those factors, which decrease the probability of continuation, to 
diminish and the continuation rate to increase, as shown in Figure 20.   
  Continuation Rates  
  Increase by ~0.33  
  Percentage Points  



















1 12 24 36 48
Tour Length (obs_PS)
Source:  Author, based on TFDW data (Oct 2001 - Oct 2009)
LCpl - Sgt
12-month SMCR Unit Continuation Rates
 
Figure 20.   Continuation Rates by SMCR Tour Length 
                                                 
120 As previously discussed, a break of service less than three months does not result in resetting the 
tour length variable (observation number) to zero. 
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In order to control for tour length, the population for each model is restricted by 
obs_PS.  In particular, the analysis will focus on the three tour lengths of obs_PS = 4, 
obs_PS = 12, and obs_PS = 24.  The first period was chosen based on the three-month 
service requirement for MCRC recruiting mission credit (discussed above in Chapter II).  
The 12-month tour length was chosen to estimate the 12-month retention rates following 
a full-year of service.  Lastly, the 24-month tour length continuation rates coincide with 
the participation requirements for the majority of monetary incentives discussed in 
Chapter II. 
Analysis of tour length as a dependent variable will not be addressed in this thesis 
and is a recommendation for future research.  In particular, the probit model requires 
independence of the cross-sectional data.  Difference-in-differences or pairs matching are 
two potential techniques for panel data.  However, selection-bias due to sample 
truncation requires incorporating the entire Ready Reserve and AC populations.  
Obtaining this additional dataset from TFDW is an area for future research.  Survival 
analysis is another possible approach; however, this method is also problematic due to 
activation-limited loss positively biasing continuation rates.  
10. Summary of Hypothesized Effects 
Table 6 summarizes the hypothesized effects of each explanatory variable on the 
dependent variable, ret_12mos_PS.  Each of these effects will be analyzed using the three 









Table 6.   Hypothesized Effects of Explanatory Variables 
Category Variable Name Type Expected Sign Models 
mob1 Binary + All 







mob3 Binary + 1, 2, 3 







oconus_dep Dichotomous . All 
unemployment Continuous + All 
Ability afqt Continuous . All 












bonus_fy06plus Binary + 1, 2, 4 
prof_svc Continuous . 2, 3, 4 
con_service Continuous + 2, 3, 4 
rifle_score Continuous . 2, 3, 4 
pft_score Continuous + 2, 3, 4 
bst Integer . 2, 3, 4 








unexcuse_12_mo Integer - 2, 3, 4 
true_reserve Dichotomous + 2 
SMCR_break_PS_gt1 Dichotomous + 2, 3, 4 











cpl Binary - All 
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Category Variable Name Type Expected Sign Models 
sgt Binary - All 
combat_arms Binary + 2, 3, 4 
aviation_community Binary + 2, 3, 4 
mfr Dichotomous + 2, 3, 4 
female Dichotomous - All 
child1_plus Dichotomous . All 
married Binary - All 
divorced Binary . All 
black Binary . All 
pacificislander Binary . 1, 2 
asian Binary . All 








age Continuous - All 
d03 Binary - All 
d04 Binary - All 
d05 Binary - All 
d06 Binary - All 
d07 Binary - All 












pre_9_11 Binary - All 
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11. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7 provides a summary of the prior service SMCR unit dataset used to 
estimate the parameters for Models 1 and 2.  Tables 8 and 9 provide a summary of the 
prior RC and AC datasets used to estimate Models 3 and 4, respectively.  
As Table 7 shows, the average 12-month continuation rate for this period is 55.5 
percent.  As shown in Appendices 27–31, the average rate ranges from 50.0 to 59.1 
during the 4-, 12-, and 24-month tour lengths used in this analysis.  The continuation rate 
also varies significantly between the prior RC and prior AC populations.  According to 
Tables 8 and 9, the average continuation rate for prior RC is 63.8 percent, while the prior 
AC rate is lower at 51.9 percent.  Rates for the prior RC and AC populations at the 4-, 12- 
and 24-month tour lengths are shown in Appendices 32–41.  As discussed previously, 
these disparities are expected given the differences in experience and realism of job 
previews between the AC and RC components.      
The average number of months activated for the SMCR unit population is 4.7 
months; this increases to 10.75 months when only considering the 37.7 percent of prior 
service who have activated once, and six percent for those who have activated more 
frequently.  As shown in Appendix 28, only 15.4 percent of all prior service new joins 
have previously activated.  Within 24 months, the activation rate increases to 58.3 
percent.  As can be expected, prior service RC Marines have a 26 percentage point higher 
average activation rate (as shown in Tables 8 and 9). 
Table 7 shows that less than two percent of all prior service SMCR unit Marines 
received a monetary incentive, of which only six were prior RC.121  There are two 
primary reasons why this number is so low.  First, prior to FY2008, the maximum bonus 
amount ranged from $833 to $2,500 per year for a three year commitment, as shown 
previously in Table 5.  Not until FY2008 was the bonus increased to $15,000, which was 
payable in a lump sum.  As such, prior to FY2008 the vast majority of Marines were not 
willing to accept a commitment to serve in the SMCR units for the amount of money  
 
                                                 
121 The actual number may be slightly higher due to incomplete FY06 and FY07 data. 
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being offered.  Second, RA has a limited budget to provide bonuses, although this was 
not a major contributing factor prior to FY2008.  Bonuses are given out on a first come, 
first served basis. 
Another difference between the prior AC and RC populations is in AFQT scores.  
Tables 8 and 9 show on average, prior RC Marines scored nearly nine points higher than 
prior AC.  Unfortunately, as indicated by the 28,761 fewer data points, approximately 12 
percent of observations were missing this data element.  Additionally, a relatively small 
number of impossibly low values also account for some of these missing data points.  
Differences in descriptive statistics for the person-job fit variables between prior 
RC and AC Marines are unremarkable.  For instance, the average duty proficiency and 
average conduct score of 4.5 is nearly identical for the two populations.  Similarly, both 
population groups scored nearly the same on the 300-point PFT and 50-point BST.122 
On the basis of military experience, the two prior service groups differ in both 
rank and MOS.  Although both have the same percentage of corporals (29 percent), the 
prior RC is more lance corporal heavy (20 percent) and the prior AC has a higher 
percentage of sergeants (65 percent).  In addition, prior RC are approximately 11 
percentage points more likely to serve in combat arms and 50 percent less likely to serve 
in the aviation community. 
Demographically, the prior AC population is more diverse than the prior RC 
population with nearly twice as many females and more married service members.  
Additionally, prior AC service members are more likely to be non-white and to have 
children. 
Although the prior RC composes only 26.5 percent of the total SMCR unit 
observations, the differences mentioned above, particularly in the areas of activation, 
experience, and continuation rates, suggest important and systematic differences between 
the two populations.  Thus, I will estimate the parameters shown in Figures 11 and 12 for 
prior RC and AC service members together in Models 1 and 2 and for Figure 12 
separately in Models 3 and 4.  
                                                 




Table 7.   Descriptive Statistics, All Prior Service SMCR, E3–E5 (All Observations) 
Variable N Mean sd Min Max 
ret_12mos_PS 234003 0.5552 0.4969 0 1 
mob1 234003 0.3770 0.4846 0 1 
mob2 234003 0.0567 0.2313 0 1 
mob3 234003 0.0047 0.0686 0 1 
mos_mob_prior 234003 4.7170 6.9700 0 62 
oconus_dep 234003 0.3254 0.4685 0 1 
unemployment 222680 5.4270 1.0280 2.2 11.4 
afqt 205242 60.8900 18.7200 30 99 
bonus 234003 0.0189 0.1361 0 1 
bonus_fy06plus 234003 0.0051 0.0710 0 1 
prof_svc 222039 0.5227 0.1260 0 0.9 
con_service 222029 0.5120 0.1388 0 0.9 
rifle_score 225159 4.1380 0.7039 0 5 
pft_score 220192 4.4630 0.3680 3 5 
bst 218690 44.7400 5.0490 10 50 
wsc_advanced 234003 0.0130 0.1134 0 1 
unexcuse_12_mo 234003 0.7318 3.5730 0 48 
true_reserve 212891 0.2650 0.4413 0 1 
SMCR_break_PS_gt1 234003 0.1445 0.3516 0 1 
satyrs 209089 6.1690 1.8620 3 14 
cpl 234003 0.2859 0.4518 0 1 
sgt 234003 0.6300 0.4828 0 1 
combat_arms 234003 0.3357 0.4722 0 1 
aviation_community 234003 0.0839 0.2773 0 1 
mfr 234003 0.0535 0.2250 0 1 
female 234003 0.0496 0.2171 0 1 
child1_plus 234003 0.3103 0.4626 0 1 
married 234003 0.4475 0.4972 0 1 
divorced 234003 0.0565 0.2308 0 1 
black 234003 0.0959 0.2944 0 1 
pacificislander 234003 0.0030 0.0545 0 1 
asian 234003 0.0246 0.1550 0 1 
nativeamerican 234003 0.0095 0.0970 0 1 
age 232052 27.7000 4.0200 21 55.71 
d03 234003 0.1723 0.3777 0 1 
d04 234003 0.1527 0.3597 0 1 
d05 234003 0.1438 0.3509 0 1 
d06 234003 0.1232 0.3287 0 1 
d07 234003 0.1162 0.3205 0 1 
d08 234003 0.1327 0.3393 0 1 
pre_9_11 234003 0.1865 0.3895 0 1 






Table 8.   Descriptive Statistics, Prior RC Service SMCR, E3–E5 (All Observations) 
Variable N Mean sd Min Max 
ret_12mos_PS 56418 0.6383 0.4805 0 1 
mob1 56418 0.4811 0.4996 0 1 
mob2 56418 0.1342 0.3409 0 1 
mob3 56418 0.0143 0.1187 0 1 
mos_mob_prior 56418 8.1550 8.3700 0 62 
oconus_dep 56418 0.5406 0.4984 0 1 
unemployment 56123 5.2600 1.0940 2.2 11.4 
afqt 52277 67.5300 18.7000 30 99 
bonus 56418 0.0022 0.0468 0 1 
bonus_fy06plus 56418 0.0005 0.0223 0 1 
prof_svc 55485 0.5032 0.1297 0 0.9 
con_service 55481 0.5036 0.1339 0 0.9 
rifle_score 55752 4.0250 0.7709 0 5 
pft_score 53667 4.4510 0.3723 3 5 
bst 54604 44.8400 5.0900 14 50 
wsc_advanced 56418 0.0086 0.0925 0 1 
unexcuse_12_mo 56418 0.6764 3.7140 0 48 
SMCR_break_PS_gt1 56418 0.1336 0.3403 0 1 
satyrs 49438 6.2760 2.0990 3 14 
cpl 56418 0.2925 0.4549 0 1 
sgt 56418 0.5091 0.4999 0 1 
combat_arms 56418 0.4125 0.4923 0 1 
aviation_community 56418 0.0575 0.2328 0 1 
mfr 56418 0.0430 0.2029 0 1 
female 56418 0.0320 0.1759 0 1 
child1_plus 56418 0.2421 0.4284 0 1 
married 56418 0.3740 0.4839 0 1 
divorced 56418 0.0298 0.1699 0 1 
black 56418 0.0765 0.2658 0 1 
pacificislander 56418 0.0037 0.0609 0 1 
asian 56418 0.0213 0.1443 0 1 
nativeamerican 56418 0.0076 0.0871 0 1 
age 54963 26.9100 3.6770 21 48.66 
d03 56418 0.1464 0.3535 0 1 
d04 56418 0.1502 0.3573 0 1 
d05 56418 0.1436 0.3507 0 1 
d06 56418 0.1369 0.3437 0 1 
d07 56418 0.1555 0.3624 0 1 
d08 56418 0.1794 0.3837 0 1 
pre_9_11 56418 0.1039 0.3052 0 1 
obs_PS 56418 16.9600 14.3700 1 96 






Table 9.   Descriptive Statistics, Prior AC Service SMCR, E3–E5 (All Observations) 
Variable N Mean sd Min Max 
ret_12mos_PS 156473 0.5192 0.4996 0 1 
mob1 156473 0.3373 0.4728 0 1 
mob2 156473 0.0319 0.1757 0 1 
mob3 156473 0.0017 0.0414 0 1 
mos_mob_prior 156473 3.5840 6.1050 0 53 
oconus_dep 156473 0.2506 0.4334 0 1 
unemployment 156267 5.4550 1.0100 2.2 11.4 
afqt 147435 58.5900 18.2000 30 99 
bonus 156473 0.0274 0.1633 0 1 
bonus_fy06plus 156473 0.0074 0.0856 0 1 
prof_svc 153369 0.5237 0.1220 0 0.9 
con_service 153369 0.5076 0.1380 0 0.9 
rifle_score 153549 4.1660 0.6812 0 5 
pft_score 149094 4.4810 0.3588 3 5 
bst 150308 44.7300 5.0160 12 50 
wsc_advanced 156473 0.0148 0.1209 0 1 
unexcuse_12_mo 156473 0.7947 3.6160 0 48 
SMCR_break_PS_gt1 156473 0.1321 0.3386 0 1 
satyrs 146964 5.9520 1.6020 3 14 
cpl 156473 0.2939 0.4555 0 1 
sgt 156473 0.6544 0.4756 0 1 
combat_arms 156473 0.3039 0.4599 0 1 
aviation_community 156473 0.0922 0.2893 0 1 
mfr 156473 0.0557 0.2293 0 1 
female 156473 0.0593 0.2362 0 1 
child1_plus 156473 0.3036 0.4598 0 1 
married 156473 0.4430 0.4967 0 1 
divorced 156473 0.0600 0.2375 0 1 
black 156473 0.1009 0.3012 0 1 
pacificislander 156473 0.0031 0.0553 0 1 
asian 156473 0.0270 0.1621 0 1 
nativeamerican 156473 0.0105 0.1020 0 1 
age 155977 26.9800 2.9560 21 43.96 
d03 156473 0.1747 0.3798 0 1 
d04 156473 0.1505 0.3576 0 1 
d05 156473 0.1442 0.3513 0 1 
d06 156473 0.1211 0.3263 0 1 
d07 156473 0.1082 0.3106 0 1 
d08 156473 0.1274 0.3335 0 1 
pre_9_11 156473 0.2019 0.4014 0 1 
obs_PS 156473 16.1900 14.8900 1 98 
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we reviewed four model specifications and three different tour 
lengths for multivariate analysis using the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function, probit.  The first model focuses on the primary research question, “what is the 
impact of activation on continuation rates for prior service SMCR unit personnel in the 
ranks of lance corporal through sergeant” and on the secondary research question 
regarding the effect of monetary incentives on continuation.  The second model will be 
used to identify other significant predictors of continuation.  The third and fourth models 
estimate these effects separately for prior RC and prior AC sub-groups.  Lastly, this 
chapter reviewed the dependent variable, 12-month continuation rates, the hypothesized 
effects of the explanatory variables, and presented cross-tabulations of select variables.  
The next chapter provides the results of the multivariate analysis followed by the 
conclusion and recommendations for future research. 
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VII. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The inverse cumulative distribution function (probit) regression model was used 
to estimate the effects of activation and monetary incentives on continuation.  
Demographics, state-level employment conditions, ability, and fiscal year effects were 
used as controls for the first model.  Although not the primary focus of research, a second 
model was generated to identify the effects of military knowledge, skills and abilities 
(KSA), and military experience.  The second model provides a starting point for 
additional research in predicting prior service continuation rates and non-prior service 
attrition rates for the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) via service-specific 
approaches not discussed during the literature review.  The third and fourth models were 
introduced to estimate changes to the effects of activation and monetary incentives by 
military experience (prior Reserve Component [RC] and active component [AC]).  Table 
10 summarizes the goals and key explanatory variables in the four models employed in 
this analysis. 
 
Table 10.   Summary of Empirical Models 
Model Purpose Key Variables Controls 
1 Estimate effect of activation and monetary incentives. 
Activation (frequency, length, and 
location), monetary incentive (bonus 
and payment method.) 
Unemployment rate, 
ability, demographics, 
rank, and fiscal years. 
2 Identify SMCR-specific predictors of continuation. 
Military experience (prior service, prior 
tours, general MOS categories), 
performance (proficiency and conduct), 
KSA (testing and evaluations). 
Model 1 variables. 
3 & 4 
Identify systematic 
differences for prior RC 
(Model 3) and AC (Model 4) 
Same as above. Model 2 variables123 
 
                                                 
123 Table 6 lists several omitted variables due to insufficient observations. 
 100
For the multivariate analysis, I used pooled cross-sectional data to maximize the 
number of observations and then estimated 12-month continuation rates for prior service 
SMCR at various tour length intervals (4-, 12-, and 24-months).  The purpose of this 
chapter is to review the overall model validity, to interpret the effects of the focus 
variables and control variables, to analyze potential policy implications, and to discuss 
the model limitations and areas for further research.  We will begin by evaluating model 
goodness of fit. 
B. OVERALL MODEL ASSESSMENT 
1. Likelihood Ratio Test 
The likelihood ratio test (LR test) is used to determine if the unrestricted fitted 
model is a statistically significantly better fit than the null model, which contains only the 
intercept β0.  The test statistic is twice the difference of the unrestricted Lur and null log 
likelihoods, L0, approximated using a chi-square (χ2) distribution.124  As the p-values in 
Table 11 show, Models 1–4 are found to be statistically significant at the .01 level.  Based 
on this test, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least one of the explanatory 
variables in each model helps to explain 12-month continuation rates better than the null 









                                                 
124 Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics, 580. 
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Table 11.   Comparison of Goodness of Fit (LR test and Pseudo R2) 
Log Likelihood 
Model Tour Length Null Unrestricted 
χ2 Degrees of Freedom Prob > χ
2 
4 -6,760 -6,957 394 27 0.0000 
12 -4,063 -4,168 212 27 0.0000 1 
24 -1,966 -2,028 124 27 0.0000 
4 -5,686 -5,965 558 40 0.0000 
12 -3,356 -3,572 432 40 0.0000 2 
24 -1,703 -1,797 189 40 0.0000 
4 -1,200 -1,257 113 34 0.0000 
12 -781 -837 113 34 0.0000 
3         
(Prior 
RC) 24 -404 -461 115 34 0.0000 
4 -4,445 -4,617 343 37 0.0000 
12 -2,529 -2,705 353 37 0.0000 
4         
(Prior 
AC) 24 -1,242 -1,322 159 37 0.0000 
2. Coefficient of Determination 
Another method used to determine model validity is by determining how well the 
model predicts future outcomes.  The coefficient of determination R2 is a measure of the 
proportion of explained to total variance used in ordinary least squares (OLS) models.  
Since the probit model is estimated via maximum likelihood, a pseudo R2 was calculated 
by subtracting the unrestricted log likelihood to null proportion from one as shown in 
equation 7:125 
 
Psuedo R2 = 1 - Lur/L0              (7) 
 
Typically, pseudo R2 values are lower for probit models than for OLS since log 
likelihoods are a measure of asymptotic probabilities and not a true measure of 
explanatory power.  Moreover, the low pseudo R2 values shown in Table 12, ranging 
from 0.025 to 0.125, are less important than the estimated coefficients, which will be 
used to predict the effects of the explanatory variables on continuation rates.  
 
 
                                                 
125 Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics, 581. 
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Table 12.   Pseudo R2 values for Models 1–4 
Model 1 2 3 (Prior RC) 4 (Prior AC) 
Tour Length 4 12 24 4 12 24 4 12 24 4 12 24 
Pseudo R2 0.0283 0.0254 0.0306 0.0468 0.0605 0.0525 0.0449 0.0675 0.125 0.0371 0.0651 0.06 
 
3. Classification Table 
The third common measure of model validity is the classification table.  This 
index measures the percent correctly classified based on a probability criteria of 0.50.  As 
shown below, the percent correctly classified ranges from 58 to 72 percent for observed 
continuation probabilities of 48 to 67 percent for the different models and tour lengths.  
“Sensitivity” and “specificity” are measures of accuracy for occurrence and non-
occurrence of each event.  In this case, “sensitivity” measures how accurately the model 
predicted continuation for those observed to continue, while “specificity” measures how 
accurately the model predicted loss for those observed to leave the SMCR units within 
the 12-month period.  Although the model does not perform well as a predictor of 
individual behavior, the purpose of the model is to predict the effects of activation and 
monetary incentives, while holding constant other predictors of continuation.  As such, 











Table 13.   Classification Table for Models 1–4 
Correct Incorrect 
Model Tour Length 
Observed 






Negative Sensitivity Specificity 
4 48.69% 2233 3610 1543 2656 58.19% 40.86% 42.39% 45.67% 70.06% 
12 53.6 2346 1165 1636 890 58.16% 41.08% 43.31% 72.50% 41.59% 1 
24 59.20% 1562 273 951 214 61.17% 37.84% 43.94% 87.95% 22.30% 
4 47.22% 1922 3257 1295 2151 60.05% 40.25% 39.77% 47.19% 71.55% 
12 53.15% 2079 1163 1258 668 62.73% 37.70% 36.48% 75.68% 48.04% 2 
24 59.71% 1350 334 740 242 63.17% 35.41% 42.01% 84.80% 31.10% 
4 60.99% 1002 166 567 144 62.16% 36.14% 46.45% 87.43% 22.65% 
12 62.45% 713 128 347 77 66.48% 32.74% 37.56% 90.25% 26.95% 3 (RC) 
24 67.89% 463 69 167 36 72.38% 26.51% 34.29% 92.79% 29.24% 
4 43.39% 891 3159 660 2039 60.04% 42.55% 39.23% 30.44% 82.72% 
12 50.14% 1404 1030 916 553 62.36% 39.48% 34.93% 71.40% 52.93% 4 (AC) 
24 56.60% 872 329 509 221 62.20% 36.86% 40.18% 79.78% 39.26% 
 
C. INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION OF COEFFICIENTS 
In this section, I will review the multivariate analysis results for each of the 40 
explanatory variables discussed above in Chapter VI.  Additionally, I will compare each 
model and discuss the differences that result from the four specifications and the three 
different tour lengths.  In this regard, more emphasis will be given towards the prior RC 
(Model 3) and prior AC (Model 4) due to both hypothesized and estimated systematic 
differences in behavior.  In the subsequent section, I will more closely examine the 
effects of activation and monetary incentives, apply them to notional Marines, and 
provide some policy applications.  Marginal effects (computed at the mean) for key 
variables by model and tour length are provided in Tables 14–16.  The full regression 







Table 14.   Results of Probit Continuation Model: Marginal Effects (4 months) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (RC) Model 4 (AC) 
mob1 0.1078*** 0.0984*** 0.0779** 0.0909*** 
mob2 0.1428*** 0.1493*** 0.1256*** 0.0818 
mob3 0.2785*** 0.292*** 0.2519***  
mos_mob_prior 0.005*** 0.0013 -0.0014 0.0054 
oconus_dep -0.0465*** -0.0915*** -0.0589* -0.1275*** 
unemployment 0.0161 0.0182*** 0.0324** 0.015** 
afqt 0.0009*** -0.0001 -0.0008 0.0002 
bonus_fy06plus 0.2826*** 0.3136***  0.3504*** 
bonus 0.0709* 0.0874**  0.0828** 
nativeamerican 0.0079 0.0221  0.0307 
asian -0.0238 -0.0266 -0.0859 -0.0049 
black -0.0082 0.0127 0.0913** -0.0046 
pacificislander 0.0569 0.0025   
female -0.0414* -0.0576** -0.1498** -0.0449* 
child1_plus -0.0020 -0.0034 0.0317 -0.0196 
married -0.052*** -0.0327** -0.0591** -0.0221** 
divorced -0.0083 0.0150 0.0544 0.0063 
age 0.0026 -0.0030 -0.0121*** 0.0015 
cpl -0.1855*** -0.0828*** -0.2381*** -0.0047 
sgt -0.1809*** -0.1009*** -0.1965*** -0.0289 
pre_9_11 -0.0558* -0.0725** -0.1899 -0.065* 
d03 0.0454** 0.0332* 0.0354 0.0276* 
d04 0.0298 0.0319 0.0662 0.0223 
d05 -0.0289 -0.0350 0.0072 -0.0478** 
d06 -0.0106 -0.0232 0.0166 -0.027 
d07 -0.0160 -0.0208 0.0646 -0.0463* 
d08 -0.042** -0.044** 0.0549 -0.0736*** 
prof_svc  -0.0680 -0.0494 -0.0877 
con_service  0.1659** 0.3597* 0.1139 
rifle_score  -0.0046 0.0307* -0.0202** 
pft_score  0.0344** 0.0681** 0.0223 
bst  -0.0009 0.0009 -0.0015 
wsc_advanced  0.0117  0.0118 
unexcuse_12_mo  -0.0327*** -0.0168** -0.0375*** 
satyrs  0.0096* 0.0012 0.015** 
true_reserve  0.1506***   
SMCR_break_PS_gt1  0.0566*** 0.0599* 0.0522** 
combat_arms  0.0314** 0.0225 0.0318** 
aviation_community  0.0515 0.0238 0.0496** 
mfr  0.1497*** 0.1015* 0.1604*** 
ret_12mos_PS 0.4869 0.4722 0.6099 0.4339 
Observations 10,042 8,625 1,879 6,746 
***Coefficient is significant at 1-percent or better  
**Coefficient is significant at 5-percent or better  
*Coefficient significant at 10-percent or better  
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Table 15.   Results of Probit Continuation Models: Marginal Effects (12 months) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (RC) Model 4 (AC) 
mob1 0.1202*** 0.1114*** 0.0529 0.1998*** 
mob2 0.2581*** 0.2512*** 0.1209* 0.3573*** 
mob3 0.3262*** 0.3392*** 0.1688  
mos_mob_prior -0.0097*** -0.0158*** -0.0095*** -0.0288*** 
oconus_dep -0.0971*** -0.1207*** 0.0111 -0.1681*** 
unemployment 0.0035 0.0077 0.0154 0.0057 
afqt 0.0017*** 0.0004 0.0007 0.0003 
bonus_fy06plus -0.1559 -0.0947  -0.1207 
bonus 0.1272*** 0.1695***  0.1879*** 
nativeamerican -0.1043 -0.0797  -0.0313 
asian -0.0687* -0.0517 -0.1319 -0.0267 
black 0.0048 0.0334 0.0396 0.0268 
pacificislander 0.1127 0.1473   
female -0.0687** -0.0867*** -0.1788** -0.0681* 
child1_plus 0.0347** 0.0365* 0.0627* 0.0272 
married -0.0519*** -0.0506*** -0.0213** -0.0591*** 
divorced -0.0046 0.0106 0.0236 0.0056 
age -0.0046** -0.007** -0.0146*** -0.0009 
cpl -0.1618*** -0.1388*** -0.253*** -0.0631 
sgt -0.1095*** -0.117*** -0.2979*** -0.0278 
pre_9_11 -0.0235 -0.0231 -0.1594 -0.0189 
d03 -0.0812** -0.0985*** -0.1456 -0.0994** 
d04 -0.0290 -0.0582 -0.1374 -0.0521 
d05 -0.1181*** -0.1246*** -0.2371* -0.1029** 
d06 -0.0748* -0.085** -0.1577 -0.078* 
d07 -0.0616 -0.0675 -0.0906 -0.0817* 
d08 -0.0228 -0.0309 -0.0458 -0.0593 
prof_svc  0.0400 0.1919 0.0075 
con_service  0.0314 -0.1032 0.0304 
rifle_score  0.0146 0.0192 0.0131 
pft_score  0.0399* 0.0594 0.034 
bst  0.0007 -0.004 0.0022 
wsc_advanced  0.0425  0.0626 
unexcuse_12_mo  -0.0266*** -0.0341*** -0.026*** 
satyrs  0.0094 0.008 0.019** 
true_reserve  0.1753***   
SMCR_break_PS_gt1  0.042* 0.0859*** 0.0322 
combat_arms  0.0056 -0.0314 0.0111 
aviation_community  0.0417 0.0247 0.0304 
mfr  0.0318 -0.0398* 0.0476 
ret_12mos_PS 0.5360 0.5315 0.6245 0.5014 
Observations 6,037 5,168 1,265 3,903 
***Coefficient is significant at 1-percent or better  
**Coefficient is significant at 5-percent or better  
*Coefficient significant at 10-percent or better  
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Table 16.   Results of Probit Continuation Model: Marginal Effects (24 months) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (RC) Model 4 (AC) 
mob1 0.1588*** 0.1588*** 0.2391*** 0.1402*** 
mob2 0.292*** 0.2917*** 0.3024*** 0.2392*** 
mob3 0.3279* 0.2977* 0.28**  
mos_mob_prior -0.012*** -0.0133*** -0.018*** -0.0135*** 
oconus_dep -0.0872*** -0.1169*** -0.1355** -0.1251*** 
unemployment -0.0011 0.0019*** -0.0044 0.0079 
afqt 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0012 -0.001 
bonus_fy06plus -0.0879 -0.0790  -0.0339 
bonus 0.0076 0.0712  0.0751*** 
nativeamerican 0.1223 0.1424  0.1204 
asian 0.0233 0.0501 0.1197 0.0076 
black -0.0092 -0.0083 0.1141* -0.0644 
pacificislander 0.1188 0.1602   
female -0.1308*** -0.1372*** -0.127 -0.1396** 
child1_plus -0.0032 0.0099 0.092* -0.0387 
married -0.0154 -0.0075 -0.0677 0.0224 
divorced -0.1077** -0.0893* -0.1123 -0.0909* 
age -0.009*** -0.0114*** -0.0222*** -0.0017 
cpl -0.094** -0.0777 -0.2528*** 0.1696** 
sgt -0.0444 -0.0132 -0.178** 0.2377*** 
pre_9_11 0.1749*** 0.1608 0.0806 0.1703*** 
d03 -0.0199 -0.0223 0.0756 -0.0368 
d04 0.1067* 0.0764 0.0665 0.0913 
d05 0.1345** 0.0946 0.1433* 0.0851 
d06 0.1187** 0.0982 0.1654 0.0718 
d07 0.118* 0.0890 0.1404 0.0839 
d08 0.0890 0.0581 0.2679** -0.05 
prof_svc  0.1517 0.9015*** -0.1084 
con_service  -0.1370 -0.6318* -0.0393 
rifle_score  0.0213 0.013 0.0228 
pft_score  0.0322 0.0396 0.0301 
bst  0.0019 0.0034 0.0026 
wsc_advanced  -0.0905  -0.1503* 
unexcuse_12_mo  -0.013*** 0.0209 -0.0139*** 
satyrs  -0.0036 -0.0084 0.0119** 
true_reserve  0.1478***   
SMCR_break_PS_gt1  0.06* 0.0496 0.0702* 
combat_arms  0.0224 0.0205 0.0176 
aviation_community  0.0120 0.1558** -0.0414 
mfr  0.0888 0.087 0.0863* 
ret_12mos_PS 0.5920 0.5970 0.6789 0.5660 
Observations 3,000 2,666 735 1,931 
***Coefficient is significant at 1-percent or better  
**Coefficient is significant at 5-percent or better  
*Coefficient significant at 10-percent or better  
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1. Activation 
As discussed above in Chapter VI, activation was measured along several 
dimensions: cumulative frequency, length, and location.  Using multivariate analysis, 
these effects were separated and the independent estimated parameters are shown in 
Tables 14–16.  Our hypothesis was that activation would have a positive effect on 
continuation, while length would have a negative effect.  Consequently, the net effect 
could be positive for shorter activations and negative for longer activations.  The 
continuation effect of deploying OCONUS was ambiguous a priori.   
As shown in Figure 21, all four models support the positive effect of activation 
frequency on continuation, though the effect of mob2 is not statistically significant at four 
months (Model 4) and mob1 and mob3 are not statistically significant at 12 months 
(Model 3).  The parameter estimates that are statistically significant range from 7.8 to 
35.7 percentage points depending on the model and tour length with the majority of 
effects statistically significant at the .01 level of statistical significance.  Given that the 
preponderance of prior AC SMCR service members have not activated in the RC during 
the first four months after initial join, the lack of statistical significance of mob2 using the 
4-month model is not unexpected.  In general, prior RC have higher estimated positive 
effects of activation frequency at 4- and 24-month tour lengths, but lower than prior AC 
at the 12-month tour length.   
Our hypothesis that cumulative activation length has a negative effect on 12-
month continuation rates is overwhelmingly supported for both the 12- and 24-month 
models at the .01 level of statistical significance.  Effects range from approximately a 1.0 
to 2.8 percentage point decrease in continuation rates per month of activation computed 
at the mean.  Conversely, the 4-month model does not show a statistically significant 
effect of cumulative activation, except in Model 1 (which is a positive 0.5 percentage 
points per month at the mean).  Although this is in contrast to our expectation, the 
positive effect at four months is plausible given that Marines have recently made the 
decision to join or potentially stay (in the case of prior RC) and it is less likely that they 
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Figure 21.   Summary of Marginal Effects of Activation by Model and Tour Length 
With the exception of the 12-month prior RC model, the effect of deploying 
outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS) is statistically significant and negative, as shown 
in Figure 21.  Depending on the model and tour length, the empirically estimated effect 
ranges from -4.6 to -16.8 percentage points.  Thus, the evidence suggests that deploying 
OCONUS has a moderately large negative impact on continuation rates.  This finding is 
consistent with our discussion of deployments in Chapter III; wherein, the incentive to 
deploy OCONUS based on career aspirations, credibility, and recognition is diminished 
after completing a prior deployment to a hostile fire location. 
Given the independent effects of activation, the results are also consistent with the 
Expected Utility of Deployment model.  Service members expect to be activated and 
deployed as part of their career choice.  The net effects demonstrate decreasing marginal 
returns, and at some length, the net effect can become negative, indicating the service 
member’s expectations are well-exceeded.   
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Although our specifications focus more narrowly on prior service SMCR than the 
models previously discussed in the literature review, the empirically determined 
relationships are consistent with results in the prior literature.  However, some caution is 
necessary concerning the increased positive effects of mobilization frequency.  Although 
Figure 21 shows an increase ranging from 12 to 23 percentage points between mob1 and 
mob3, the overall net effect of activation includes decreasing returns due to activation 
length.  More importantly, there is some potential for self-selection bias.  For instance, 
those who desire a greater level of active duty could be volunteering for activation with 
other units.  In this scenario, the increased effect might be indicative of those who have 
revealed this preference, as opposed to the prior service SMCR population as a whole.  
2. Unemployment 
In accordance with the ACOL model, we expected 12-month continuation rates to 
increase with unemployment.  As shown in Table 14, this hypothesis is supported in 
Models 2–4 at the .05 level of statistical significance.  The prior AC estimated effect is 
1.5 percentage points for every one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate.  
This is consistent with historical estimates of 1.3 to 1.7 percentage points, which did not 
account for differences in prior military experience.   
The much larger estimate of the effect of unemployment of 3.2 percentage points 
for prior RC is possibly the result of differences in career patterns and timing.  For 
instance, prior RC are more likely to have recently transitioned from an obligor status.  
Thus, the prior RC SMCR service members are more heavily impacted by unemployment 
on the decision to leave, whereas the prior AC SMCR service members are less affected, 
given their recent decision to join the SMCR units.    
With some exceptions, the unemployment rate does not appear to be a significant 
predictor of continuation in the 12- and 24-month models.  Still, this result is consistent 
with our discussion of tour lengths and diminishing marginal effects as an SMCR unit 
career preference is potentially revealed.   
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3. Ability 
As predicted, the effect of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) as a 
proxy for ability is ambiguous in Table 6.  As indicated in Figures 14–16, the afqt 
variable is significant in only one of the 12 models (Model 1, 4 months).  However, even 
in this model, the size of the marginal effect requires an 11-point change in average 
AFQT scores to increase continuation rates by one percentage point.  As such, AFQT 
does not appear to be an important predictor of average 12-month continuation rates for 
the entire prior service population. 
4. Monetary Incentives 
Monetary incentives in the form of affiliation and reenlistment bonuses are 
hypothesized to have a large positive effect on 12-month continuation rates.  In addition, 
we hypothesized a larger magnitude for bonus_fy06plus due to the combined effect of a 
lump sum payment and increased payment amount.  However, due to the limited number 
of prior RC service members who accepted a bonus (Model 3), we were only able to 
estimate the impact of monetary incentives on the prior AC SMCR unit population.   
These hypotheses are overwhelmingly supported by the four-month parameter 
estimates as shown in Table 14.  Figure 22 summarizes the effects of monetary 
incentives.  Figure 22 includes only Model 4 results, but the estimated relationships and 
magnitude of effects are relatively consistent across all three models.  The net effect for 
bonus_fy06plus, includes both the bonus effect combined with the effects of a lump sum 
and increased monetary amounts.  This estimate (net effect) ranges from 35.4 to 43.3 
percentage points for the four-month models.  The effect of the bonus alone is 
significantly smaller at 7.1 to 8.7 percentage points. 
Although not statistically significant, the negative relationship in Tables 15 and 
16 between a lump sum payment (positive net) for the 12- and 24-month models is 
plausible.  The incentive to receive future installment payments might outweigh the 
potential concern of paying back a bonus in the 12-month model.  Moreover, the 24-
month model is representative of prior service SMCR who have completed their three-
year participation requirements.  We might anticipate a higher percentage of these 
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Marines to depart the SMCR after having delayed a career decision until completion of 
their obligation.  However, this hypothesis is not supported by the data as the net effects 
are generally positive in nature, though not statistically significant; thus potentially 
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Figure 22.   Parameter Estimates of Monetary Incentives 
In the 24-month model, a positive lingering effect of monetary incentives, based 
on the coefficient of bonus in Model 4, could potentially signify two different 
hypotheses.  One potential conclusion is that prior service SMCR who accept monetary 
incentives are revealing a tendency to pursue a reserve career.  Thus, the monetary 
incentive becomes a proxy for and/or is positively biased by the omitted variable “career 
aspiration.”   
However, a monetary incentive might also serve to increase an SMCR member’s 
service time to a point where the net present value of future military income exceeds that 
of his civilian career opportunity costs.  This might result from several different factors.  
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For example, an individual might forego certain financially advantageous civilian career 
paths in lieu of accepting a more attractive bonus.  Three years later, these civilian 
careers opportunities may have expired or decreased in value.  Alternatively, economic 
conditions could deteriorate and reduce the estimated net present value of civilian career 
opportunities.  Changes in the service member’s military career can also occur.  For 
instance, promotion to the rank of sergeant or staff non-commissioned officer (SNCO) 
may positively affect career aspirations and decrease the net preference for civilian life.  
Another important factor to consider is the long-term effects of an initial increase 
in continuation rates, which can be easily misinterpreted in Figure 22.  At first glance, it 
would appear than a bonus has a larger impact at 24 months based on the 12-month tour 
length continuation rates than that of the bonus_fy06plus.  However, the cumulative 
effect is based on survival to the next period of observation.   
Consequently, if the initial estimated net bonus_fy06 effect is 40 percentage 
points and the net effect 12 months later is 5 percentage points over a stable baseline 
continuation rate of 50 percent, the cumulative 24-month effect is 24.5 percent of the 
original sample.  Conversely, if the original estimated bonus effect was 10 percentage 
points and increased to 20 percentage points at the 12-month estimate, then the 
cumulative 24-month effect is 17 percent (7.5 percent lower than bonus_fy06 effect).126  
Thus, using this hypothetical example, we can demonstrate that the 12- and 24-month net 
effects shown in Figure 22 can be deceiving and lead the casual observer to an erroneous 
conclusion.  We will revisit this issue later in this chapter to estimate the cost-
effectiveness of monetary incentives in terms of additional man-days and reinforce the 
principle of larger up-front effects. 
As a word of caution, complete analysis of the bonus_fy06 effect in the 12- and 
24-month models is inconclusive without additional data.127  Thus, our discussion  
 
                                                 
126 Note: (100 * 0.5 * 0.5)–(100 * .9 * .55) = 24.5 percent of the original sample. Whereas, (100 * 0.5 
* 0.5)–(100 * .6 * 0.7) = 17 percent of the original sample.  
127 As previously mentioned, the 24- and 36-month outcomes cannot be tracked with available FY08 
data. Limited observations from FY06 and FY07 reduce the probability of a statistically significant 
outcome. 
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beyond the 4-month models is hypothetical and advanced for the purpose of identifying 
future research issues.  On the other hand, the estimate of bonus using the 12-month 
models is statistically significant and conclusive based on FY02–FY05 data. 
5. Person-job Fit 
The person-job fit explanatory variables discussed above in Chapter VI can be 
divided into three main areas: (1) proficiency and conduct, (2) technical competence and 
physical ability, and (3) drill participation. 
a. Proficiency and Conduct 
Prof_svc does not appear to be a significant predictor of continuation, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis in Table 6.  However, in the 4-month models, 
there is some evidence to suggest that conduct marks positively affect continuation.  
Nonetheless, changes in service average conduct scores are unlikely to vary by more than 
0.01 points as shown in Tables 7–9.  Therefore, the magnitude of this effect at the mean, 
regardless of significance, would not be greater than 0.36 percentage points and is likely 
much lower.   
Consequently, neither proficiency, nor conduct scores are important 
predictors of continuation rates at the SMCR-level for prior service.  In part, this 
ambiguity may be the result of service policies, which attempt to maintain a relatively 
static Reserve-wide average score; thus, absolute changes in the service-wide duty 
proficiency and conduct scores are unlikely. 
Of concern is the magnitude and sign of these effects in the 24-month 
prior RC model, where a 1.0 increase in average conduct scores is estimated to be 
associated with a 63 percentage point decrease in continuation.  Conversely, a 1.0 
increase in average proficiency scores is estimated to have 90 percentage point increase 
in continuation.  Although, this large of an increase in service average scores is not 
mathematically possible, these estimates suggest error in the sample, small cells, or 
correlation with an unobserved effect. 
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b. Technical Competence and Physical Ability 
The variables Rifle_score, pft_score, bst, and wsc_advanced were 
hypothesized to be proxies for person-job fit.  As discussed above in Chapter VI, the 
hypothesized effects of rifle_score and bst were ambiguous, while pft_score and 
wsc_advanced were hypothesized to have a positive effect on continuation rates.  As 
discussed in Table 10, Models 2–4 were used to estimate these effects. 
Rifle_score is not statistically significant at the 12- and 24-month tour 
lengths.  However, the results are mixed for the 4-month length.  Specifically, there is 
evidence to indicate a small positive effect on the prior RC continuation rates, and a 
strong negative effect on prior AC continuation rates.  Both of these relationships are 
plausible given the systematic differences between the two populations.  Similarly, the 
effect of bst is not statistically significant in any of the models.  Therefore, the empirical 
evidence does not support rifle qualification scores or basic skills test (BST) as 
significant overall predictors of SMCR prior service continuation. 
Although pft is significant in only three of the nine regressions, all 
estimates are positive and range from 2.2 to 6.8 percentage points.  In particular, the 
effect is larger in the prior RC models than in the prior AC models.  Given the fewer 
number of prior RC observations, it is possible that a larger dataset might find statistical 
significance for the prior RC model.  As such, the physical fitness test score (PFT) 
appears to have some potential as a predictor of continuation, but requires additional 
research. 
Lastly, our hypothesis that an advanced water survival qualification 
certification would positively affect continuation rates is not supported by multivariate 
analysis.  In particular, limited occurrence in the prior RC population did not facilitate 
inclusion in Model 3.  For the two models, which did include this factor, the results are 
positive, but not significant at 4 and 12 months.  The estimated effects are negative and 




occurrence in the prior AC model (ranges from 42–96 observations), the estimated effects 
are inconclusive and it does not appear that advanced water survival qualifications are a 
significant predictor of continuation. 
c. Drill Participation 
Failure to attend required drill weekends is hypothesized to have a 
negative relationship with continuation rates.  For instance, unexcused absences could 
signify an incongruence of Reserve participation and personal priorities due to family, 
civilian career, or strong personal preference for leisure.  In each case, except the prior 
RC 24-month model, there is strong statistical evidence (at the .05 level or better) to 
support our hypothesis with estimates ranging from a -1.3 to a -3.8 percentage point 
difference in continuation rates.   
6. Military Experience 
Military experience variables can be categorized into prior experience, rank, 
occupational groupings, and years toward retirement.  As summarized in Table 10, we 
hypothesized that prior experience would have a strong positive effect on continuation 
along with the occupational groupings of combat_arms, aviation_community, and mfr.  
The ranks of cpl and sgt were expected to have a negative concave effect compared with 
that of the omitted variable lcpl.  Lastly, the effect of satyrs was ambiguous a priori. 
a. Prior RC Experience and Multiple Tours 
As shown in Figure 23, prior experience in the RC as an obligor is 
strongly associated with increased continuation.  Specifically, estimated effects ranged 
from 14.8 to 17.5 percentage points across the three tour lengths and were statistically 
significant at the .01 level.  Thus, there is overwhelming evidence to support our 





This same relationship is also observed between multiple tours in the 
SMCR and continuation rates.  The estimated effect ranges from 3.2 to 8.6 percentage 
points and is statistically significant in seven of the nine models.  As such, strong 
evidence also exists to indicate that multiple tours is associated with higher continuation 
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Figure 23.   Effects of Prior RC Experience and Multiple Tours on Continuation 
b. Occupational Groupings and Force-Level Units 
Tables 14–16 show that, although the estimated signs are mainly 
consistent with the hypothesized effects, none of the variables combat_arms, 
aviation_community, and mfr are reliably associated with a positive effect on 
continuation rates.  Though there is some evidence to support this hypothesis in the prior 
AC model, the results are not conclusive.  Consequently, general occupational grouping 
and force-level units are not identified as significant predictors of continuation. 
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c. Rank 
Our hypothesis that the rank of non-commissioned officer (NCO), 
particularly corporal is a decision point for SMCR unit prior service Marines is in part 
supported by the estimated parameters.  However, there is also additional evidence of 
systematic differences between prior RC and AC SMCR service members as previously 
suggested.  In the prior RC model, the estimated effects of corporal and sergeant have 
consistent, strong negative effects compared to the rank of lance corporal as shown in 
Figure 24.  The estimated effects are statistically significant at the .01 level with 
parameters ranging from -23.8 to -25.3 percentage points for corporal and -17.8 to -29.8 
percentage points for sergeant.  However, additional research into the continuation rates 
of SNCO for prior RC SMCR unit service members is necessary to validate the 
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Figure 24.   Comparison of Rank Effects on Continuation by Prior Experience and Tour 
Length 
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As shown in Figure 24, our hypothesis concerning the effect of rank is not 
supported for the prior AC SMCR unit members.  Specifically, rank is estimated to be a 
statistically significant predictor of continuation in the 4- and 12-month models.  
However, given the recent career decision to affiliate with the SMCR for prior AC, it is 
not surprising that rank is initially insignificant.  Moreover, the strong, positive effect of 
cpl and sgt in the 24-month prior AC model is most likely the result of a shrinking 
population of prior AC lance corporals (reduced from 691 to 81 during this period).  
Potentially, the remaining prior AC lance corporals have reached their terminal rank and 
thus depart the SMCR at a higher rate. 
d. Satisfactory Years Toward Retirement 
As with many of the explanatory variables discussed so far, there appears 
to be important differences between the effects of satyrs on continuation in the prior RC 
and AC models.  However, this may be due to omitted variable bias.  Specifically, 
retirement qualification is based on satisfactory years toward retirement; whereas, 
retirement pension amounts are calculated using the number of retirement qualifying 
points divided by 360, and then multiplied by 2.5 percent of the effective monthly base 
salary.   
Prior AC Marines typically have at least 1,461 points upon entry into the 
RC and even more prior to joining the SMCR.128  In contrast, prior RC Marines may 
have as few as 558 points for a 6x2 contract.129  Thus, the variable satyrs is positively 
biased by the unobserved retirement credit points, which should have a positive effect on 
continuation due to the potential of an increased retirement pension.  Specifically, the 
prior AC Model consistently estimates a 1.2 to 1.9 percentage point increase in 
continuation per additional retirement qualifying year, while the prior RC estimates are  
 
                                                 
128 As discussed in Chapter II, service members receive one point per day of active duty. 
Consequently, successful completion of a 4-year active component enlistment results in 1,461 points. 
129 Assuming 13 weeks for recruit training, five weeks for Marine Combat Training, eight weeks for 
MOS school, 14 days of annual training, and 48 drills per year, a six-year obligation would result in at least 
558 retirement points. 
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insignificant and of smaller magnitude.  As such, the effect of retirement qualifying years 
is inconclusive and future research should include a variable for the omitted cumulative 
retirement credit points.  
7. Demographics 
Explanatory control variables for demographics included gender, race, marital 
status, children and age.  For gender we hypothesized a negative continuation effect for 
females due to physiological differences, such as childbirth that might result in more 
career interruptions, as well as the traditional societal influences on career paths.  
Although we anticipated a negative effect of being married, we were unable to adequately 
form a hypothesis regarding the strength of this relationship without controlling for other 
demographic variables, such as gender, age, and number of dependents.  The remaining 
variables were ambiguous a prior. 
a. Gender: Female 
As hypothesized, the effect of being female is consistently estimated to 
have a large negative effect on continuation as shown in Figure 25.  All parameters are 
statistically significant except the 24-month prior RC model, which has consistently 
suffered from small numbers for several explanatory variables (N=27 females here, as 
shown in Appendix 26).  Additionally, the prior AC model demonstrates that the 
magnitude of this relationship is increasing over time.  As before, this trend most likely 
illustrates the difference between prior RC members who have previously served with the 
SMCR as an obligor and prior AC service members who have recently made the decision 
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Figure 25.   Comparison of Gender and Being Married by Prior Experience and Tour 
Length 
b. Marital Status: Single, Married, Divorced 
Marital status consists of the three states of single, married, and divorced 
with single represented by the omitted variable.  Estimates for being married in the 4- and 
12-month tour length models are consistently negative and statistically significant as 
shown in Figure 25 and Tables 14–16.  However, this effect in the 24-month prior AC 
model reverses signs and is not significant.  Thus, there is evidence to suggest that the 
spousal effect is greatest upon initial decision to join the SMCR, but loses value as a 
predictor as those with incongruent family lives transition away from the SMCR career 
path. 
Being divorced demonstrates the opposite trend to that of being married.  
Although not a statistically significant predictor in the 4- and 12-month models, the 
estimated magnitude and significance increase over time.  Specifically, the 24-month 
estimates range from negative 9.0 to negative 11.2 percentage points and are statistically  
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significant in three out of four models.  As such, being divorced has potential as a 
predictor of continuation for longer tour lengths; however, additional research is required 
to both understand this phenomenon and validate its potential. 
c. Number of Children 
The effect of number of children on continuation is estimated to be 
positive for prior RC and is statistically significant in the 12- and 24-month models.  The 
magnitude of this effect increases from 3.2 to 9.2 percentage points over the three tour 
lengths. In contrast, the effect of having children on the prior AC population is 
inconsistent and inconclusive.  As with being divorced, this factor may be influenced by 
the timing of life-changing events for service members.  One plausible explanation is that 
patterns for having children and/or getting divorced are more likely to occur several years 
into the tour length as opposed to during the period of initial join and/or transition to a 
non-obligor status.  As such, further research into the area of tour lengths and the effects 
of children are necessary prior to determining the usefulness of this variable to predict 
prior service SMCR unit continuation rates. 
d. Race/Ethnicity 
The variable black for the prior RC model is the only explanatory variable 
that demonstrates any potential as a significant predictor of continuation in the 
race/ethnicity category.  Although the categories of asian, nativeamerican, and 
pacificislander are inconclusive, they may also be impacted by their infrequent 
occurrence in the population as shown in Tables 7–9.   
One potential explanation for the difference in estimated effects between 
the prior RC and AC models is the equality argument posited previously in the literature 
review.  Specifically, prior AC members who have a strong preference for military 
service based on equal opportunity would have reenlisted and remained in the AC.  Thus, 
those who are released from AC have different priorities or do not perceive the service as 
the preferred option in terms of equality.  In contrast, minority prior RC service members 
might continue in the RC for the same argument as those AC members who opted to 
continue an AC career over discharge, for reasons of equal opportunity. 
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e. Age 
Although no hypothesis was given with regards to age, the prior RC model 
consistently estimates a negative effect of age (statistically significant at the .01 level).  
The overall magnitude of this relationship is substantial and ranges from -1.2 to a -2.2 
percentage points at the mean for a one-year increase in age.  This relationship is 
consistent with the empirically estimated relationship for SMCR service members in the 
literature review. 
The effect of age on the prior AC population remains ambiguous using 
Model 4.  Specifically, the magnitude is near zero and switches signs across the three tour 
lengths.  Although Models 1 and 2 estimate statistically significant negative parameters 
for age, the models likely suffer from omitted variable bias due to the systematic 
differences between the prior RC and AC populations discussed thus far in this chapter. 
8. Fiscal Year Effects 
The interpretation of fiscal year effects is problematic for a number of reasons. 
First and foremost, multiple environmental changes occur simultaneously, often across 
fiscal years.  For instance, during FY2003, stop loss was implemented in conjunction 
with Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Thereafter, public opinion towards American 
involvement in Iraq began to deteriorate. 
Moreover, fiscal year effects can differ by both tour length and prior service 
category (RC versus AC).  For instance, the 202k “Grow the Force” initiative offered 
large monetary incentives and expanded eligibility to the majority of prior service AC 
SMCR unit Marines.  Consequently, this factor would negatively impact the prior AC 4-
month, and to some extent the 12-month, models while having little effect on the 24-
month models.  As such, the 202k effect is supported by the statistically significant 
negative effects estimated in the prior AC 4-month model in contrast to the insignificant 
positive parameters estimated for the prior RC 4-month model. 
However, trying to sort out and explain the multitude of fiscal year effects is 
pointless without a desired end result or hypothesis.  In particular, it is first necessary to 
project a potential future event or environmental effect that could affect future year 
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continuation rates.  Only then is it possible to attempt to isolate this effect in historical 
data through multivariate analysis.  In this regard, the empirical results can then be 
applied to a predictive model in the form of sensitivity analysis.  
In the remaining sections of this chapter, we review potential policy applications 
of the estimated effects of activation and monetary incentives.  In addition, we 
summarize the advantages and disadvantages of each model, while determining if the 
coefficients in Models 3 and 4 are statistically different from each other.  
D. BASE CASE COMPARISON AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In a probit regression model, the marginal effects for continuous variables are 
normally computed at the mean.  However, the mean values are often unrealistic, so the 
median or other values are often used instead.  Moreover, end strength planners are often 
concerned about the net effect of two different policies or changes in the values and 
distribution of predictors due to other factors.  As an example, it would be more helpful 
for end strength planners to estimate the net effect of a 12-month activation in accordance 
with current policy than the marginal effect of increasing or decreasing cumulative 
activation by one month from the mean of 4.7 months in our data set (as shown in Table 
7). 
Using the models estimated in this chapter, we can estimate continuation rates at 
successive 12-month intervals based on a “baseline Marine” who represents Policy A, and 
a “notional Marine” who represents Policy B.  The only difference in the values of 
explanatory variables for these two individuals will represent the shift in activation 
policy.  Therefore, we can determine the difference in continuation rates at each 12-
month interval for each policy.  Using these 12-month continuation rates, we can then 
compute the successive survival rates at each 12-month interval as shown in equation 8: 
 
Survivalt+12 = Survivalt * 12-month Continuate Ratet           (8)  
 
For our analysis of activation, we will select common characteristics for prior RC 
and AC SMCR Marines as our baseline policy Base (no prior activations).  We will 
compare the baseline Marine to a notional Marine who represents the change in policy 
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Mob A who activated once in accordance to the current 12-month activation policy.  
Thus, the coding of the relevant variables is: Base: mob1 = 0, mos_mob_prior = 0; Mob 
A: mob1 = 1, mos_mob_prior = 12.  For reference purposes, a summary of the selected 
baseline and notional characteristics are shown in Table 17.  The prior RC Marine 
continuation rate effects are estimated using Model 3 at 4-, 16-, and 38-month tour 
lengths, while the prior AC Marine continuation rate effects are estimated using Model 4 
at these same tour lengths.  For simplicity, we will keep mob1 and mos_mob_prior 
constant for each tour length; however, we could also increase these values at each 12-
month interval to reflect different activation timelines.    
Our analysis of monetary incentives will be similar to that of activation, but will 
not include a prior RC SMCR baseline and notional Marine due to the issues previously 
discussed.  The first notional Marine is coded as: Bonus A: bonus = 1, bonus_fy06plus = 
0, which represents a 3-year installment bonus of up to $2500.  The second notional 
Marine is coded as: Bonus B: bonus = 1, bonus_fy06plus = 1, which represents a 3-year 
lump-sum bonus and payment (which could range from $5,000 to $15,000, as shown in 
Table 5).  Model 4 is used to estimate the effects at 4-, 16, and 38-months. 
Table 17.   Baseline and Notional Values for Policy Change Modeling 
Prior RC Prior AC Variable Base Mob A Base Mob A Bonus A Bonus B  
mob1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
mob2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
mob3 0 0 . . . . 
mos_mob_prior 0 12 0 12 0 0 
oconus_dep 0 1 0 1 0 0 
unemployment 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 
Afqt 60 60 60 60 60 60 
prof_svc 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
con_service 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
rifle_score 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 
pft_score 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Bst 45 45 45 45 45 45 
wsc_advanced . . 0 0 0 0 
unexcuse_12_mo 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Satyrs 6 6 5 5 5 5 
SMCR_break_PS_gt1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
bonus_fy06plus . . 0 0 0 1 
Bonus . . 0 0 1 1 
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Prior RC Prior AC Variable Base Mob A Base Mob A Bonus A Bonus B  
nativeamerican . . 0 0 0 0 
Asian 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Black 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 
child1_plus 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Married 0 0 0 0 0 0 
divorced 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Age 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 26.5 
Cpl 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sgt 0 0 0 0 0 0 
combat_arms 0 0 0 0 0 0 
aviation_community 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mfr 0 0 0 0 0 0 
pre_9_11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d03 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d04 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d05 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d06 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d07 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d08 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1. Activation 
By predicting the continuation rates for the base and notional Marines using 4-, 
16-, and 38-month tour lengths for Models 3 and 4, we can then use equation (8) to 
calculate the survival rates at each 12-month interval (assume 100 percent strength 
initially).130  These values are shown graphically in Figure 26. 
                                                 
130 Marginal effects were computed using the STATA/IC 10.1 statistical software package.  
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Figure 26.   Estimated Effects of a 12-month Activation Policy 
The area under each curve is the predicted cumulative manpower supply based on 
these estimates and the area between the curves is the net gain (or loss).  In order to 
convert to days, we multiply each area by 365.25 (days) and divide by 12 (months).  
Next, we subtract the area of Mob A from the Base and divide by 100 (percent) to 
approximate the net gain (+) or net loss (-).  The percent gain (or loss) is calculated by 
dividing the net difference by the Base and then multiplying by 100 (percent).  Using 
these calculations, we approximate a 30-day net loss of manpower per prior AC Marine 
and an 11.7-day loss per prior RC Marine over a 36-month period.  This represents a 7.7 
percent loss of potential prior AC manpower and 2.2 percent loss of prior RC manpower.   
Although the impact on end strength is reasonably minor and can be restored 
through an increased recruiting mission, if we conclude our analysis here, policy makers 
are likely to overlook the larger concern.  To emphasize this point, we will concentrate on 
the prior AC manpower survival prediction at the 40-month tour length.  Although, the 
net cumulative loss of manpower was estimated at 7.7 percent (Figure 26), the on-hand 
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strength declined by approximately 53 percent more than the baseline.  As such, the net 
negative effects of activation for prior AC may result in a long-term net loss of Marines 
choosing to remain in the SMCR until retirement eligibility or longer.   
While increased recruiting missions can increase end strength, the more important 
concern in this scenario is the loss of senior non-commissioned officers (NCO) who are 
the feeder population for the future senior enlisted leadership in the Reserve.  As such, a 
complete analysis of a potential policy change for activation should also include the 
effect on promotions rates and flow points.  In particular, a targeted monetary incentive 
could better address the latter concern.      
However, considerable caution is advised to modifying policy or the overall 
recruiting mission without developing a fully integrated SMCR model and applying 
sensitivity analysis to provide a range of potential effects.  For instance, the above 
estimates do not consider the consequences of activation on NPS attrition rates, NPS-to-
prior service transition rates, or SNCO prior service continuation rates.  Likewise 
potential fluctuations in other explanatory variables should be incorporated as well.  Any 
changes to behavior in these populations could either counteract or worsen the estimated 
negative effects of 12-month activation rates. 
2. Monetary Incentives 
A second potential application of the continuation model is to estimate the cost-
effectiveness of monetary incentives as shown in Figure 27.  Using 12-month 
continuation rate estimates for Bonus A and Bonus B at 4-, 16-, and 28-month tour 
lengths, survival rates are predicted using equation (8).   
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   Gain (Small Bonus)
81.5 days, $11k/ man-yr
 Lump Sum ($5k - $15k)
        77% Increase in






















4 16 28 40
Tour Length (months)
Base $2,500 (Installments)
$5k - $15k (Lump Sum)
Source:  Author
(Prior Active Component Corporal)
Estimated Effects of Monetary Incentives
 
Figure 27.   Cost Effectiveness of Monetary Incentives 
As before, the three-year net gain is calculated by subtracting Bonus A from the 
Base.  However, for comparison to other potential end-strength initiatives, one-year 
(365.25 days) is divided by the net gain (in days) and multiplied by the bonus amount to 
determine the cost per man-year.  The result ($11k) can then be used for cost-benefit 
analysis of other potential policy changes and initiatives.  Another interesting result is the 
predicted 77 percent increase in survival at the 40-month tour length (compared to the 
baseline).  Thus, this incentive could potentially nullify the 53 percent loss of manpower 
observed in the previous scenario.131    
As mentioned previously, the estimation of effects due to bonus payment methods 
and amounts, as well as validation of the 12- and 24-month bonus parameters, cannot be 
completed with the available data.  As such, an analysis of bonus amount and payment 
method is recommended for future research once DMDC data is obtained.  In addition, 
                                                 
131 53 percent * 77 percent = 0.94 percent.  
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estimation of NPS parameters is necessary to complete a comprehensive program 
evaluation and determine the most cost-effective mix of incentives currently offered in 
Table 5 (Chapter II).  The review should also include other programs, such as the Prior 
Service MOS Retraining Program (PSMRP) and an investigation of the potential 
introduction of obligor/non-obligor transition programs.  Thus, an overarching monetary 
incentive policy can be developed, which properly balances manpower requirements and 
fiscal realities. 
E. MODEL COMPARISON 
During this chapter, we analyzed the effects of activation, monetary incentives, 
and other potential predictors of 12-month continuation using four different specifications 
across three distinct tour lengths.  Although the first model was the least burdensome, it 
omitted several significant predictors of prior service SMCR continuation, such as 
unexcused absence as a person-job fit indicator, retirement qualified years, and prior 
experience indicators.  Moreover, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the 
systematic differences between prior RC and AC SMCR unit service members is biasing 
the key activation variables, unemployment effects, demographic controls, and rank. 
Thus, the first model is not preferred for predicting continuation effects. 
The second model includes most of the majority of variables missing from Model 
1.  However, it is also maybe biased due to missing interaction effects between the two 
systematically different SMCR prior service populations and the key variables.  Given 
that approximately 26 percent of the SMCR unit prior service population is composed of 
prior RC service members, these differences should not be ignored in modeling end 
strength.   
As such, it would appear that a combination of Models 3 and 4 best predict 12-
month continuation given the four different specifications presented in this thesis.  
However, empirical evidence is also necessary to support the hypothesis that the prior RC 
and AC populations are systematically different.  Using a Chow Test, we can empirically 
test for differences in the coefficients of the two models, as well as test for structural 
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changes over the three tour lengths.132  As shown in Table 18, there is overwhelming 
evidence, at the .01 level of statistical significance, that the model coefficients are 
different.  Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that there are no structural differences 
between the AC and RC prior reserve SMCR unit populations.  Likewise, we reject the 
null hypothesis that there are no structural differences between tour lengths. 
 
Table 18.   Chow Test for Structural Differences Between 4-, 12-, and 24-Month Tour 
Lengths and Prior RC and AC SMCR Unit Populations 
Chow Test χ2 Degrees of Freedom Prob > χ
2 
Models 3 & 4 140.2 36 0.0000 
4 mos 291.6 36 0.0000 
12 mos 163.6 36 0.0000 Tour Length 
24 mos 162.7 36 0.0000 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we completed an overall model assessment, systematically 
reviewed the empirical estimations for each explanatory variable, compared their effects 
to the hypothesized relationships, and assessed their potential for future use as predictors 
of SMCR prior service continuation in an end strength model.  Additionally, we have 
reviewed several policy applications for the estimated effects of activation and monetary 
incentives.  Lastly, we compared each model and determined that there was sufficient 
evidence for the use of Models 3 and 4 over Models 1 and 2.  In the next chapter, I will 
provide thesis conclusions and recommendations for future research.  
                                                 
132 Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics, 245–246, 449–450. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. REVIEW OF RESEARCH GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this thesis was to assist Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) 
in improving the SelRes end strength model used by the Reserve Affairs Personnel Plans 
and Policy (RAP) branch to develop the annual recruiting mission and retention goals.  
As discussed in Chapter II (Figure 7), the recruiting mission is segregated into non-prior 
(NPS) and prior service missions.  Although substitutions between these two separate 
missions is sometimes initiated by larger, more important Total Force objectives, 
systematic differences between these two populations due to dissimilar service 
requirements can lead to long-term manning issues.  The independent contribution of 
each recruiting mission to end strength over various tour lengths is more important than 
the absolute sum of both missions; thus, uncompensated mission swaps (as observed in 
FY2008) should not be entertained lightly. 
As discussed above in Chapter I, this thesis focused on prior service continuation 
over NPS attrition for three main reasons.  First, the proportionate share of Selected 
Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) prior service to overall SMCR strength has dropped by 
over 20 percent since 9/11.  This drop mainly occurred during a four-year period from 
FY2004–FY2007 (Figure 2).  Second, prior service Marines are a critical component of 
readiness due to their technical proficiency, leadership, and combat experience.  Lastly, 
the non-contractual nature of prior service affiliation and numerous career paths in the 
Ready Reserve make them more susceptible to changes in the military, economic, and 
political environment.  As such, they can serve as a bellwether for the Reserve 
Component (RC) as a whole.    
The continuation of lance corporals, corporals, and sergeants were modeled for 
several reasons.  First, these Marines are not overly influenced by the potential draw of a 
military pension.  Their perceived discount rate is so high as to reduce the draw of an 
already minimal reserve retirement annuity.  Second, and most important, the transition 
from lance corporal to non-commissioned officer (corporal and sergeant) is a major 
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career decision point.  Those who venture beyond this point will make-up the core of the 
Marine Corps’ future senior enlisted leadership.  Consequently, the ill health of this 
population segment can result in unanticipated consequences and manpower deficiencies 
in the SNCO ranks for 10–20 years thereafter.  
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Activation 
There were two primary research questions presented in this thesis.  The first was 
to determine the effect of activation on SMCR prior service, specifically in the grades of 
E3–E5.  This question was addressed by isolating the independent effects of activation 
frequency, cumulative length of activation, and deployment location.  Our hypothesis, 
based on the Expected Utility of Deployment Model and previous empirical evidence, 
was that a positive relationship existed between activation and continuation.  However, 
the negative marginal effects of activation duration were expected to generate a point at 
which the net effects of activation would reduce continuation rates. 
The results of multivariate analysis using a probit model to estimate 12-month 
continuation rates provided overwhelming evidence (at the .01 level of statistical 
significance) to support our hypothesis.  However, the estimated magnitude of these 
effects differed between the prior RC and Active Component (AC) SMCR populations.  
Although the effect of OCONUS deployments was ambiguous a priori, there is strong 
evidence to suggest a large negative effect. 
However, policy makers are more interested in the net effects of activation based 
on current guidelines and operational requirements.  As such, the cumulative effects of 
the current 12-month activation policy were evaluated for various tour lengths (4 to 40 
months) in the SMCR units.  The results indicate that there is a slight decrease in 
continuation for prior RC beyond 28 months of service and for prior AC Marines beyond 
16 months of service.  In addition, the model identified grade strength deficits as a 
potential concern that may need policy consideration to ensure a long-term sustainable 
Reserve. 
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One primary concern regarding the effects of activation is the potential for bias in 
the parameters.  In the literature review, Dolfini-Reed (2005) hypothesized that the 
inclusion of individuals currently on activation orders would artificially lower the loss 
rate since these individuals are unable to leave.  However, by looking at individuals six 
months after activation, Dolfini-Reed was unable to identify a baseline for comparison.  
In this thesis, we have attempted to eliminate this potential bias by looking at 12-month 
continuation rates.  However, a hybrid model, which encompasses the Dolfini-Reed post-
activation model and the tour-length specification introduced in this thesis, has the 
potential to overcome both of these limitations and is recommended for future research. 
2. Monetary Incentives 
We hypothesized a strong positive effect of monetary incentives on continuation.  
In addition, we expected an even larger effect due to the shift to lump sum payments.  In 
the 4-month model, we estimated a 7.1 to 8.3 percentage point increase in continuation 
rates due to bonuses authorized prior to FY2006.  This effect increased to between 12.7 
to 18.8 percentage points in the 12-month model.  As suggested in the literature review, 
we also estimated a 7.5 percentage point increase in the 24-month model, which suggests 
the potential for a lingering effect over time. 
Although we were unable to isolate the effects of bonus amount and the lump sum 
payment method, the 4-month model predicted a 28.2 to 35.0 percentage point effect for 
bonuses issued beginning in FY2006 for prior AC SMCR Marines.  The overall net effect 
of a bonus issued on or after FY2006 using the 4-month model was estimated to range 
from a 35.3 to 43.3 percentage point increase.  Due to unavailability of data, we were 
unable to estimate the effect of bonuses issued in FY2006–FY2008 using the 12- and 24-
month models. 
Lastly, we introduced one potential method in which to estimate the cost 
effectiveness of monetary incentives.  The analysis empirically estimated the pre-FY2006 
bonus to cost approximately $11,000 per additional man-year; however, cost-savings due 
to recruiting, accession training, and increased productivity were not included.  This 
method is recommended for incorporation of future analysis of other incentives to include 
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the Prior Service Military Occupational Specialty Retraining Program (PSMRP) and 
potential re-alignment of incentive funding and policies around cost-effectiveness and 
manpower requirements.  
C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
A tertiary objective of this thesis was to identify other predictors of continuation 
for potential inclusion in the Reserve Affairs Personnel Plans and Policies (RAP) end 
strength model.  In this regard, additional explanatory variables in the areas of state 
economic conditions, ability, person-job fit, military experience, and demographics were 
introduced and hypothetical effects evaluated.  Table 19 summarizes the finding for each 
of these areas.  Variables are categorized as “recommended” for use, further evaluation 
“potential”, or “poor” (not recommended) with empirically estimated relationships 
designated as positive (+) or negative (-). 
Table 19.   Summary Evaluation of Predictors for 12-month Continuation 
Category Recommended Potential Poor Comments 
Activation Frequency (+), length (-), OCONUS location (-)    
Monetary 






conditions Unemployment (+)   4-month model only 
Ability   AFQT Magnitude is inconsequential 










Prior AC/RC (+), multiple 






Occupation is tour 
length dependent, rank 
is experience 
dependent, use prior 
AC/RC as a model 
restriction 
Demographics Female (-), married (-), age (-) Children, black 
Other marital 
status and race Age for prior RC only 




Several variables were identified, but unavailable for analysis at this time.  These 
include educational attainment, MGIB-SR usage, additional bonus data, and retirement 
credit points.  Future research in this area should consider these potential influencers for 
inclusion into end strength modeling. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS/FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis was successful in identifying the effects of activation and monetary 
incentives within the constraints of the available data.  Two potential applications of 
these effects were introduced for incorporation into future recruiting mission analysis, 
promotion planning, and monetary incentive programs evaluation.  Ten additional 
variables were recommended for incorporation into RAP end strength modeling. 
An overarching objective of this thesis was to provide a starting point for future 
research into the area of Reserve manpower planning.  In this regard, analyses of other 
populations are necessary.  The following topics are recommended for future research. 
• Monetary incentive and PSMRP program funding allocation.  This topic 
includes analysis of incentive amount and payment methods 
• Non-prior service attrition modeling 
• Non-prior service/prior service transition modeling 
• Continuation modeling of staff non-commissioned officers (SNCO)  
• Continuation modeling of officers 
• Attrition modeling of Officer Candidate Course-Reserve graduates 
• Activation modeling using the Dolfini-Reed (2005) approach with tour 
lengths as the baseline for comparison. 
Lastly, an integrated analysis that tracks the prior service population across 
training category pay groups (TCPG) throughout their career is needed to truly 
understand the activation phenomenon.  This analysis should consider career patterns, RC 
retention, and the probability of transitioning between states given the volatile nature of 
the Ready Reserve described in Chapter II.   
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APPENDICES 
The ensuing appendices describe the data and provide the complete results of the 
multivariate analysis.  Included are the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS) 
codes used to interpret Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) data, a comprehensive 
codebook and descriptive statistics of the enlisted master file, additional descriptive 
statistics for the restricted data set, and the multivariate analysis regression results.  The 
guide below is included as a reference. The following link connects to the different 





1–25 MCTFS/TFDW Codes 
26 Codebook, Enlisted Master File 
27–31 Descriptive Statistics (E3 – E5) 
32–36  Descriptive Statistics, Prior Service RC (E3 – E5) 
37–41  Descriptive Statistics, Prior Service AC (E3 – E5) 
42–44  Regression Results, Model 1 
45–47  Regression Results, Model 2 
48–50  Regression Results, Model 3 
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